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This paper analyzes devaluations in a fixed exchange rate system by endogenizing both the speculation and devaluation decisions. It is shown that deterministic devaluation rules are generally sub-optimal for the central bank. In order to deter speculation the central bank introduces uncertainty into the timing of devaluation. The nature this mixed strategy is derived, as is the optimal strategy for speculators. The analysis allows an explanation of successful devaluations that are not precipitated by a speculative attacks, even under perfect capital mobility.
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Received: May 17, 1999; revised version: June 2, 1999
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Pastine, I. Devaluation of fixed exchange rates: optimal strategy in the presence of speculation. Econ Theory 15, 631–661 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050315
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050315