Abstract
This article analyzes the four main criticisms against commercial manipulative advertising (here called irrational advertising): the virtue ethics criticism (“irrational advertising prevents human virtue”), the utilitarian criticism (“irrational advertising harms general happiness”), the autonomist criticism (“irrational advertising violates the audience’s autonomy”), and the Kantian criticism (“irrational advertising implies treating humanity merely as means”). After demonstrating the weaknesses of the virtue ethics criticism, the utilitarian criticism, and the autonomist criticism, I reconstruct the latter using Kant’s conception of autonomy. In doing so, I simultaneously expand the Kantian criticism: irrational advertising not only entails treating humanity merely as means, but it also threatens moral autonomy by encouraging heteronomy and sometimes even a rebellion against the moral law.
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Notes
A clarification is in order. This paper slowly unfolds towards a criticism of a type of advertising, namely irrational. The guilty party, though, are advertisers who engage in this type of advertising, not the ads themselves which, as “things,” cannot be blamed.
The utilitarian criticism may include an analysis of how it diminishes human virtue, but if so it should not be confused with the virtue ethics criticism, just as we should not equate utilitarianism and virtue ethics.
A reviewer had difficulty in designating deception as a species or component of manipulative advertising. In his or her opinion, irrational persuasion is a better correspondent, and deception is a category unto itself. To support this, the reviewer mentioned that there are consumer laws and policies against deceptive advertising, but no particular laws directed to irrational persuasion per se. I disagree. In deceiving I also manipulate others (or attempt to do so). This is further developed in “The Kantian criticism” section. Also, the fact that laws and policies tend to focus on deceptive advertising and overlook irrational persuasion may have other explanations: (a) irrational persuasion is harder to legislate; (b) legislator and the general public may be blind to the evils of irrational persuasion; and so on. That said, there are increasing examples of legislation that address irrational persuasion around the world. The case of fast food advertising addressed to children is an instance of that.
All references to Kant’s works will use Prussian Academy numbers.
What would these ads look like? That is the job of the advertiser, not of the ethicist, who merely argues for the limits of the profession.
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Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2014 Meeting of the Canadian Society for the Study of Practical Ethics. The event took place at Brock University in St. Catherines, Ontario, from May 24-26. Thanks to the co-organizers, Michel Hebert and Julie Ponesse, and to the people present for their thoughtful comments. I would also like to thank Thomas Carson, professor at Loyola University Chicago, for his helpful insights on one of the final drafts. Thanks are also due to the editor and anonymous reviewers of the Journal of Business Ethics for their time and observations. Last but not least, I owe many thanks to my wife, Laura E. Wulf, who proofread this document several times, making my raw English look good, and kept my arguments sharp (any remaining mistake, though, is all my responsibility).
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Villarán, A. Irrational Advertising and Moral Autonomy. J Bus Ethics 144, 479–490 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2813-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2813-z