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Inward-Looking Policies, Institutions, Autocrats, and Economic Growth in Latin America: An Empirical Exploration

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An Erratum to this article was published on 01 April 2011

Abstract

This paper explores the institutionaldeterminants of economic growth in LatinAmerica by taking advantage of recentempirical research that employs subjectiveand objective measures to test for apossible “Northian” explanation that linksinstitutional quality and economic growth.We explore a simple framework that may helpbetter understand the policymakers’ choicesand persistence regarding inward-lookingpolicies that were pursued between the1930s and the 1980s by arguing that in theLatin American case Olson’s (1982) idea ofencompassing interest should be expanded tocover not only the economic stakes of powerholders, but in particular, their psychicincome which includes their politicalstakes, along the lines of recent work byRobinson (1997), Coyne (2002), andothers.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC, 20577, U.S.A.

    Alberto Chong

  2. International Capital Markets Division, International Monetary Fund, 700 19th SC, NW Washington, DC, 20431, U.S.A.

    Luisa Zanforlin

Authors
  1. Alberto Chong
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  2. Luisa Zanforlin
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An erratum to this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9787-x

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Chong, A., Zanforlin, L. Inward-Looking Policies, Institutions, Autocrats, and Economic Growth in Latin America: An Empirical Exploration. Public Choice 121, 335–361 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-004-1683-1

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