Redesigning conditionality

doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(97)00053-3

World Development

Volume 25, Issue 9, September 1997, Pages 1399-1407

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Abstract

Conditionality has been used to induce reform. The rather disappointing results of this approach have led to a gradual redesign of the aid contract, toward a shorter period and more detailed conditions. The logical conclusion of this approach is for reforms to be priced piecemeal. Such an approach is fundamentally incompatible with government ownership of policy and hence reduces the credibility of reforms. Further, this attempt to induce reform has crowded out other uses of conditionality. We propose an alternative basis for aid allocation in terms of a retrospective assessment of a few major outcomes such as growth. We show how outcome measures can control for influences on growth over which the government has no control.

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^∗: We have benefited from discussions with Elliot Berg, Richard Blackhurst, Chris Elbers, Ravi Kanbur, Michiel Keyzer, Bernard Petit, Wouter Tims and Howard White and from the comments of two anonymous referees. We would like to thank Anke Hoeffler for research assistance.

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Redesigning conditionality

Abstract

World Development

Journal of Development Economics

Primary education as an input into post-primary education

Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics

Rates of return to education: Does the conventional pattern prevail in sub-Saharan Africa?

Trade Shocks in Developing Countries

The economic recovery from Civil War

Adjustment with a Human Face. Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth

International commodity prices, macroeconomic performance and policies in sub-Saharan Africa

Journal of African Economies

Africa's growth tragedy: A retrospective, 1960–1989