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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
The focus of this study is the definitions of substance and accident as expressed and outlined in Ibn Daud's book The Exalted Faith. The original Arabic text of Ibn Daud's book, completed in 1160, is lost. However the work survives through two Hebrew translations (both date from the late 14th century). In this study I suggest a hypothetical reconstruction of the Arabic text based on a wide comparison with Ibn Daud's Muslim predecessors, such as Alfarabi, Avicenna and Alghazali, on the one hand, and the Hebrew translations on the other. By returning to Ibn Daud's direct sources, I hope to shed more light on two subjects: (1) Ibn Daud's dependance on non-Jewish sources in his attempt to establish a philosophical synthesis between Aristotelism and traditional faith; and (2) to clarify the true philosophical meaning embodied in professional terminology, such as the definitions of substance and accident.
Cette étude porte sur les définitions de la substance et de l'accident telles qu'elles apparaissent dans le livre d'lbn Daud intitule la Foi exaltee. Acheve en 1160, ce livre fut composé en arabe. Le texte original (arabe) est perdu; cependant l'ouvrage survécut grâce a deux traductions en hébreu (datant l'une et l'autre de la fin du XTVe siècle). Dans cette étude je suggère une reconstruction hypothétique du texte arabe sur la base d'une ample comparaison entre, d'une part, des prédécesseurs musulmans d'lbn Daud tels qu'Alfarabi, Avicenne et Alghazali et, d'autre part, les traductions en hébreu. En renvoyant aux sources directes d'lbn Daud, j'espère apporter plus de lumières sur deux sujets: (1) la dépendance d'lbn Daud par rapport aux sources non-juives dans sa tentative d'etablir une synthèse philosophique entre l'aristotelisme et la foi traditionnelle; et (2) l'elucidation de la véritable signification philosophique incarnée dans une terminologie technique telle qu'on la trouve dans les définitions de substance et d'accident.
1 Sefer ha-Emunah ha-Ramah, by Daud, Abraham Ibn, ed. Weil, Shimshon, Hebrew text and German translation (Frankfurt, 1852Google Scholar; repr. Jerusalem, 1967); hereafter referred to as ER; The Exalted Faith, Translated with commentary by Samuelson, Norbert M., [Hebrew] Translation edited by Weiss, Gershon (London / Toronto, 1986), hereater referred to as S.Google Scholar
2 ER, 4; S., 50, Discussion, pp. 45–6. For a profound analysis of the concept of substance according to Ibn Daud, see Arfa, M., Abraham Ibn Daud and the Beginnings of Medieval Jewish Aristotelianism, Ph.D. diss. (Columbia University, 1954), Chapters 2 and 3.Google Scholar
3 In his introduction to Alfarabi's Paraphrase of the Categories, D.M. Dunlo rightly posits that the basis for the text is the Arabic version of the Categories by Hunayn, Ishāq b. (Kitāb al-Maqūlāt),Google Scholar See Dunlop, D.M. (Edition and English translation), “Al-Rarabi's Paraphrase of the ‘Categories of Aristotle’,” Islamic Quarterly Review, 4 (1958): 168–97, and 5 (1959): 21–54.Google Scholar
4 Julius Guttmann, who describes Ibn Daud's book as an abridged version of Avicenna's theories, was not the first to point to Ibn Daud's dependence on Ibn Sīnā see Guttmann, Julius, Ha-philosofiyah shel ha-yahadut (Jerusalem, 1983), p. 135.Google Scholar For a general evaulation cf. Wolfson, H.A., Crescas' Critique of Aristotle (Cambridge Mass., 1929), p. 10.Google Scholar For a detailed description of the researches about Abraham Ibn Daud and his contribution to Jewish philosophy, see: Fontaine, TA.M., In Defence of Judaism: Abraham Ibn Daud. Sources and Structure of ha-Emunah ha-Ramah (Amsterdam, 1990), pp. 2–3, notes 7–13;Google Scholar note particularly her discussion of Ibn Daud's classification into substance and accident, and the endeavor (“a hazardous enterprise,” ibid., p. 20) to locate his direct source among Islamic philosophers (ibid., pp. 14–20).
5 A reconfirmation of my assumptions should be entailed from the following examples, taken from the definitions of other categories in Ibn Daud's book: (1) quantity, ER, p. 5:37, EN, p. 30:2–3, S. p. 51/[12b] 1–2, cf. Avicenna, al-Najāh (see below, note 26), p. 80:3; (2) Quality, ER, pp. 6:15–17, EN, p. 33: 2–5, S. p. 51:13b–9–12, cf. al-Najāh, p. 81:13; ER. p. 6:18, EN, p. 33:6, S. Ibid, line 14, p. 52:15, cf. al-Najāh, p. 81:16. Compare Fontaine, In Defence of Judaism: Abraham Ibn Daud, p. 18.
6 See Rosenthal, E.I.J., “Avicenna's influence on Jewish thought,” Avicenna: Scientist and Philosopher (London, 1952), p. 70;Google Scholar I endeavor to identify one specific source from the many writings ascribed to Avicenna which very often repeat one another, see Afnan, Sohil M., Avicenna, His life and Works (London, 1958), p. 89.Google Scholar
7 Ha-Emunah ha-Nissa'ah, survives in a unique manuscript, Mantova, Biblioteca Comunale, no. 81 (867). An annotated edition is contained in my dissertation: Eran, A., The Philosophical Sources of Abraham Ibn Daud in his Work 'Al-'Aqidah Al- Rafi'ah (The Exalted Faith), based on Motot's Translation: ha-Emunah ha-Nissa'ah, Critical Edition and Recreation of the Original Text (The Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 1990), hereafter referred to as EN.Google Scholar
8 An anonymous testimony, found in MS Montefiore 274.1, states that Ibn Labi's translation was preferred to Motot's due to its “pure language.”
9 Compare ER, p. 5: 17–19:
(S., p. 50/[10b]:19–21: For example [the term] existence which is said of substance and accident, cannot be said of them univocally, because the existence of accident is acquired through the mediation of the existence of substance. Consequently, substance is more worthy of the term existence than is accident). Cf. Avicenna, Maqūlāt, p. 60:14–16:
Cf. pp. 59:6, 75:2, 95:15. With reference to Ibn Gabirol, see Arfa, 12 ff.
10 Compare ER, Chapter 1, pp. 4:12–5:2:
(S., p. 50/[9b]– 20–23: Know that what is a substance in itself is a substance. It is not [a substance] in comparison to something else… Rather, in every place and in every respect substance is substance and accident is accident), cf. Avicenna, aqūlāt, p. 49: 13–15:
11 For the exact formulation, see texts 1.1 and 1.2.
12 Weil, book 1, chapter 1, p. 4:2; S., p. 368, [9b]:7–8.
13 Compare: S., p. 50:7–8: Substance is what exists without need of a subject.
14 EN book 1, chapter 1, in Eran, The Philosophical Sources of Abraham Ibn Daud, Appendix, V.l, p. 24:3.Google Scholar
15 Compare Dunlop's translation to the same wording used by Alfarabi, Paraphrase, p. 185:11, and see the following discussion concerning Alfarabi's definition of substance, text 3.3.
16 I wish to thank Gad Freudenthal for drawing my attention to this possible interpretation. Compare ER, Weil, p. 4:7; EN, p. 25:7:
17 See my concluding remarks.
18 Aristotelis Categoriae, Cum Versione Arabica Issei Honeini, ed. Zenker, Julius T. (Lipsiae, 1846), pp. 6–10.Google Scholar
19 Ibid., p. 6: 2 (fi al-jawhar).
20 Compare ibid., p. 9:5.
21 Dunlop, “Al-Farabi's Paraphrase of the ‘Categories’,” p. 169: 21 (2).
22 Ibid., p. 169: 8–9(1).
23 Ibid., p. 170: 16–17.
24 Sīnā, Ibn, al-Shifa', Maqūlāt, ed. Alkhodieri, M./Anawati, G. (Cairo, 1959), p. 46:8.Google Scholar
25 Ibid., p. 51:4.
26 Sīnā, Ibn, Kitāb al-Najāh (Cairo, 1957), p. 80:1 (of the new chapter).Google Scholar
27 Alghazali, , Maqāsīd al-Falāsifa, ed. Dunya, S., 2nd edn (Cairo, n.d.), p. 141:18.Google Scholar
28 Norbert Samuelson suggests that “subject” and “thing” should be regarded as “interchangeable terms”: “to ‘need a subject’ means to [exist in something’,” (Note S., the introduction to Chapter One, p. 45).
29 Translated by Dunlop, “Al-Farabi's Paraphrase of the ‘Categories’,” p. 184:17.
30 Ibid., p. 183:10.
31 The resemblance between the Hebrew term for substance
and the Hebrew term for essence:
, might lead to the omission of the latter, in the course of rendering Arabic text into Hebrew. The fact that neither of the Hebrew translations reflects in any way the existence of this term in the original Arabic makes this possibility very weak. According to Avicenna, “Nothing gives meaning to a particular, rather its meaning is derived from its essence.” Yet, “the existence of Essential Universal is prerequisite for the existence of its Particular.” Thus, essential qualities are those which stand in a clear cut contrast to accidental qualities, because the accidental qualities “can never arise from the essence of a thing,” Zabeeh, F., Avicenna's Treatise on Logic (The Hague, 1971), pp. 16–17. The distinction between essential and accidental is of secondary importance for Ibn Daud.Google Scholar
32 See above, note 21.
33 For Avicenna's definition of substance, see: Morewedge, P., The Metaphysica of Avicenna (London, 1973), pp. 15–16 [3], pp. 56–7, and definition of accident, pp. 26–7.Google Scholar
34 For the meaning of the term “mahall” (“abode”) with regard to substance and accident, see Wolfson, Crescas, p. 577, note 15. Frank, R.M., Beings and Their Attributes (Albany, 1978), renders “mahall” as “substrate,” see for instance, pp. 94, 105.Google Scholar
35 See my remark when discussing the rendition of the two Hebrew versions, 1.
36 See my remark, conclusions (2).
37 S., p. 38:18.
38 Weil, p. 4:3: S., p. 368 [9b]: 9–10.
39 Compare, S., p. 50, [9b]: 10: It does not have a duration without it.
40 Eran, , The Philosophical Sources of Abraham Ibn Daud, Appendix, V. 1, p. 24:6.Google Scholar
41 For this possible omission in the rendition of the original Arabic into Hebrew, see section III/B (3).
42 Aristotelis Categoriae, p. 10:1.
43 Dunlop, “Al-Farabi's Paraphrase of the ‘Categories’,” p. 169: 20–21 (2), trans., p. 184:16.
44 Ibid., p. 169:6 (1), trans., p. 183:6.
45 Maqūlāt, ed. Alkhodieri / Anawati, p. 46:10.
46 Ibid., p. 28:1.
47 Maqāsīd, ed. Dunya, S., p. 142:17.Google Scholar
48 Aristotelis Categoriae, p. 9–14 (fi al-jawhar).
49 R. Frank sees “ma‘na’” as the “determinant accident”, which by its existence and inherence in a substrate, makes it possible to define particular position as essential; Beings and Their Attributes, p. 98. Entity, he explains, may have some distinguishing qualification or attribute by virtue of the presence of the determinant accident, viz. the “ma‘na’”; ibid., pp. 94–5.
50 See for example, Fontaine, In Defence of Judaism: Abraham Ibn Daud, p. 5:24.
51 Wolfson, Crescas, p. 22. Literary dependence of Crescas on Ibn Daud has been proven in a most definitive way by Harvey, Z.W., in: “Crescas and Bernat Metge on the soul” (Hebrew), Mehqarey yerushalayim be-mahshevet yisrael, V. 5 (1986): 141–54.Google Scholar
52 Wolfson, Crescas, pp. 574–5, note 9.
53 Ibid., pp. 587–8, note 18.
54 Ibid., p. 579, note 16.
55 Ibid., pp. 418, 420 note 34, 35
56 Ibid., p. 419, note 35.
57 Ibid., p. 6.
