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Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews Protocol - Intervention

Pharmaceutical policies: effects of sales and dispensing policies

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Abstract

This is a protocol for a Cochrane Review (Intervention). The objectives are as follows:

To assess the effects of sales and dispensing policies on drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes and costs (expenditures).

Background

This is the protocol for a Cochrane review that will form one of a series of reviews examining the effects of pharmaceutical policies on rational drug use (Acosta 2014; Green 2010; Luiza 2015; Sturm 2007).

Description of the condition

Rational drug use could be defined as the use of those medicines that are most effective, have the least serious and fewest side effects, and cost the least (taking into consideration not only the direct costs of the drugs but also other health service costs) (Aaserud 2006). The irrational use of drugs can contribute to a reduction in access to essential medicines, defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as "those that satisfy the priority health care needs of the population" (WHO 2013). This reduction in access to essential medicines, together with the inappropriate use of medications, could result in serious morbidity and mortality, particularly in vulnerable populations. Inadequate access to therapies for childhood infections and chronic diseases, such as hypertension, diabetes, epilepsy or mental disorders, among others, could result in significant patient harm in terms of poor outcomes and adverse drug reactions (WHO 2002).

Irrational use of drugs can also lead to increased drug costs in health systems, an important contributor to total health costs. In the past decade, health systems in many countries worldwide have faced increasing expenditure on drugs. According to data provided by the WHO, pharmaceutical spending in 2006 ranged from a mean 19.7% of total health expenditure in high‐income countries to 30.4% in low‐income countries (WHO 2011; World Bank 2013). More recently the Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) reported that, in 2010, drug expenditure among their members represented between 7% and 33% of members' total spending on health care and, on average, 1.5% of members' gross domestic products (OECD 2013).

However, these growing expenditures have not denoted better access to medicine for the population as a whole. In absolute terms, high‐income countries spend much more on medicines than low‐ and middle‐income countries. The WHO reported that high‐income countries accounted for 78.5% of global pharmaceutical expenditure in 2006, with low‐ and middle‐income countries accounting for the remaining 21.5%. In terms of inhabitants, the richest 16%, distributed in 46 high‐income countries, was responsible for more than 78% of the world’s total expenditure on pharmaceuticals, leaving the poorest 71% of the people, distributed among 78 low‐ and middle‐income countries, with an 11% share of the world’s medicine expenditure. Additionally, while in high‐income countries most medicines are funded by public sources (i.e. through public health insurance or social security systems), in the poorest countries at least two‐thirds of pharmaceutical expenditure are privately financed mainly through out‐of‐pocket payments, thus contributing to the impoverishment of more vulnerable populations (WHO 2011).

As a result, there is a landscape in which there seems to be excessive spending on medicines in the most affluent health systems and limited access to them in the poorest communities. Consequently, policy makers are confronted with a situation in which they have to design and implement policies aimed at spending resources in the most rational way in order to maximise benefits and to produce better access to medicines, particularly for those in more need. The Millennium Development Goals have acknowledged this point, expressing a global commitment to ensure that access to essential affordable medicines is achieved by 2015 (MDG 8‐E) (United Nations 2012).

Description of the intervention

Policy makers have used a wide range of pharmaceutical policies to improve the rational use of drugs and access to medicines, such as policies directed at the regulation of incentives and prescribers, the licensing of new drugs or drug insurance, prices and reimbursement, among others. This review will focus on policies that intend to regulate the selling and dispensing of drugs.

We will classify these policies in four categories, according to their main goals.

1. Policies that intend to regulate who can sell drugs

This group includes regulations defining whether physicians, healthcare workers, pharmacists or others are allowed to sell or dispense drugs. For example, In some countries, such as Canada (Ontario Regulation Act 1990) and Argentina (Ley 17565 Buenos Aires), only pharmacists can sell drugs. In the UK, the 1968 Medicine Act established different categories of drugs according to their need to be sold by a pharmacist or not (UK Medicine Act 1968).

2. Policies that establish where drugs can be sold or dispensed

These are regulatory policies that establish whether drugs can be sold or dispensed in pharmacies only or at other sites. For instance, in the UK, the Medicine Act defines different categories of medicines according to whether they can be sold exclusively in pharmacies, with a professional prescription, or in any shop without a prescription (UK Medicine Act 1968).

3. Policies that regulate ownership, location and number of pharmacies or other dispensing places

Some countries have introduced tight regulations about the number of pharmacies that should be available. For instance, in Italy, Law No. 475, issued in 1968, defined that there should be one pharmacy for every 5000 inhabitants (Italia 1968). A recent law has modified this legislation, raising the number of pharmacies to 1 per 3500 residents with the aim of increasing competition in the sector (Italia 2012) .

In many low‐income countries, the pharmaceutical retail market is highly fragmented: the number of formal pharmacies is small compared to the many different types of retailers of drugs, such as dispensing doctors (DDs), medicine sellers, drug sellers and general stores that also sell a variety of drugs. This fragmentation makes difficult any regulatory enforcement further constrained by limited government capacity (Lowe 2009).

In other countries regulatory policies have established rules for pharmacy ownership ‐ private/public or the need to be a pharmacist to have a pharmacy ‐ and other regulatory policies that limit the introduction of some types of retailers such as large pharmacy chains.

4. Policies that regulate the dispensing behaviour of dispensers

This group of policies includes various mechanisms of control such as financial incentives to dispensers, specific dispensing regulations (e.g. which drugs should be dispensed), the control of marketing by retailers, regulation of generic substitution by dispensers and policies that intend to separate prescribing from dispensing roles.

Although financial incentives can be applied to all individuals related to drug use, such as prescribers, dispensers and patients, this review will consider only incentives targeting dispensers.

There is some evidence of resistance by physicians to the adoption of generic prescriptions (Tilyard 1990); hence, a number of countries have introduced regulations on dispensers to achieve this purpose. Sweden is a good example of this policy option: in 2002 the Swedish Government introduced mandatory generic substitution by dispensers (Sweden Act 2002). This policy could act as a useful mechanism to reduce drug expenses without having relevant unintended consequences (Fischer 2003).

Finally, in some Asian countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, authorities have introduced policies that intend to separate prescribing from dispensing roles. The aim of this division is to decrease the contrary incentives that arise when the individual who prescribes can generate a profit when dispensing the medication themselves, thus increasing health expenditure in their health systems without improving access to essential medicines (Kim 2004; Chou 2003).

How the intervention might work

The affordability by and availability of drugs for patients who need them are two key issues in the recent literature that concern access to medicines (ATM). Bidgeli recently mentioned that ATM at health service delivery is related, in the first place, to the irregular availability of drugs and high prices, secondly, to irrational prescription and dispensing, and finally, to the quality of medicines, including substandard and counterfeit medicines (Bigdeli 2012). The WHO has proposed a broad range of policy options to improve the affordability and availability of drugs, such as regulations on the choice of essential medicines, and the procurement and purchasing, distribution, prescribing and dispensing, generic competition and financing of drugs (WHO 2011b).

Sales and dispensing policies can affect the availability and affordability of drugs in all geographical and socioeconomic areas, although poorer and more isolated communities could be more affected than wealthier groups. Regulations on where drugs are sold or dispensed and who by can affect the direct access to medicines through effects on their prices, distribution and supply. These policies can impact the health outcomes of populations, the cost and quality of health services, and can increase inequalities in health between wealthier and poorer communities .(WHO 2011b)

In the group of policies directed at the regulation of dispensing behaviour, financial incentives to dispensers can produce different effects. On the one hand, they can increase the misuse of drugs, such as when prescribers earn money from the sale of medicines, or when the dispensing fees implemented are proportional to the costs of the medicines, encouraging sales of more expensive medicines, which can affect affordability (WHO 2002). On the other hand, financial incentives can produce benefits such as increasing the use of generics (New Hampshire). The use of incentives for private dispensers can help the expansion of services to remote and underserved areas, thus favouring ATM (WHO 1997). For example, the introduction of DDs who routinely prescribe and dispense pharmaceuticals to their patients could allow a reduction in the need for pharmacists in underserved areas. DDs could improve insufficient pharmacy coverage, increase safe drug accessibility and availability for their patients, and also could contribute to the financial support of physicians. Lim and colleagues conducted a systematic review about the effects of DDs on ATM and the drugs they prescribed. They found that “DDs prescribe more than their non‐dispensing counterparts and at greater cost to the healthcare system but there is only limited evidence that DDs prescribe less judiciously or have poorer dispensing standards” (Lim 2009).

AQUI VOY

Why it is important to do this review

Adequate policies that regulate the sale and dispensing of drugs are an important part of the options for improving ATM and may contribute to decreasing the expenditure of health systems on drugs and promote drug rational use. They are relevant also for decreasing inequalities between richer and poorer groups of populations, especially in low and middle income countries where available resources for pharmaceuticals are scarce and out‐of‐pocket payments are an important part of the funding for drugs. Furthermore, it is also in poorer communities that deleterious effects in healthcare utilisation and the health outcomes of inadequate drug policies could have more serious consequences.

We are not aware of other systematic reviews that have assessed the effects of these specific drug policies. We hope that the results of this review will provide information about specific policies, their effects in different population groups and their potential unintended consequences, helping to support policy makers in their decisions in this complex field.

Objectives

To assess the effects of sales and dispensing policies on drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes and costs (expenditures).

Methods

Criteria for considering studies for this review

Types of studies

We will include randomised controlled trials; non‐randomised controlled trials and controlled before‐and‐after (CBA) studies involving at least two intervention sites and two control sites; and interrupted time series (ITS) and repeated measures (RM) studies with a clearly defined point in time when the intervention occurred and at least three data points before and three after implementation of the intervention.

Types of participants

Healthcare consumers and providers within a large jurisdiction or healthcare system in low‐, middle‐ and high‐ income countries. Jurisdictions can be regional, national or international. We will include studies within organisations, such as health maintenance organisations, only if the organisation is multisited and serves a large population.

Types of interventions

Policies that regulate:

  1. who can sell drugs (for instance sales by physicians, pharmacists, other health workers, etc.);

  2. where drugs can be sold (for example, pharmacies, other healthcare providers, regular shops, etc.);

  3. ownership, location and number of pharmacies or other dispensing places;

  4. dispensing behaviour (such as dispensing regulations, regulations of marketing by retailers, financial incentives for pharmacies and other dispensers, generic substitution by pharmacies, separation of prescribing and dispensing functions).

We will define policies as laws, rules or financial or administrative orders made by governments, non‐government organisations or private insurers.

We will exclude interventions that regulate the pricing of drugs (Acosta 2014) or prescribers' behaviour (Sturm 2007) and those related to expanding the role of pharmacists (Evans 2011; Chisholm‐Burns 2010).

Types of outcome measures

We will include studies that report at least one of the following outcomes.

  • Drug use (prescribed, dispensed or actually used), such as the number of dispensed doses or the number of dispensed prescriptions

  • Health outcomes, such as mortality or any assessment of morbidity

  • Healthcare utilisation, such as number of emergency room visits, changes in physician office visits per year, hospitalisation rates, etc.

  • Costs (expenditures, including drug costs and prices, other healthcare costs and policy administration costs)

  • Adverse effects, such as increased inequalities (between poorer and richer groups), undesirable effects on healthcare providers, increased resource use, or decreased quality of care

Search methods for identification of studies

We will base the initial search for studies to be included in this review on the strategy proposed in a much broader review of pharmaceutical policies, which deals with the effects of a number of these policies (Aaserud 2006), but we will restrict the search to terms related to the specific topics of this review,

We will develop the search strategy without language restrictions.

Electronic searches

We will search in the following databases.

  • The Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) including the Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Group Register, from 1988 to present at: www.thecochranelibrary.com

  • MEDLINE In‐Process & Other Non‐Indexed Citations and MEDLINE Ovid 1946 to Present,

  • EMBASE Elsevier, from 1980 to present

  • CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, from 1975 to present

  • EconLit Proquest , from 1969 to present,

  • NHS EED, National Health Services Economic Evaluation Database, from 1988 to present, www.thecochranelibray.com

  • System for Information on Grey Literature in Europe (OpenGrey), from 1980 to present, at http://www.opengrey.eu/

  • International Network for Rational Use of Drugs (INRUD) from 1989 to present, at www.inrud.org

  • PAIS International (Public Affairs Information Service) ProQuest, from 1972 to present

  • Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, ProQuest, 1975 to present

  • International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP), Word Health Organization (WHO) http://www.who.int/ictrp/en/

  • ClinicalTrials.gov, US National Institutes of Health (NIH) http://clinicaltrials.gov/

Searching other resources

In addition we will search in the following websites and databases.

We present the MEDLINE search strategy in Appendix 1. We will use a modified version of the EPOC search strategy methodology filter to limit the MEDLINE strategy to randomised trials, controlled trials, time series analyses and CBA studies. We will develop the search strategies for the other databases from the MEDLINE strategy.

We will screen the reference lists of all of the relevant reports that we retrieve. We will also search the Science Citation Index for articles citing key references. We will contact the authors of relevant papers, relevant organisations and discussion lists to identify additional studies, including unpublished and ongoing studies.

Data collection and analysis

We will provide a PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta‐Analyses) flow chart showing the results of the review process (PRISMA 2009).

Selection of studies

Three of the review authors (BP ,TP and CH) will independently assess titles and abstracts identified by the search strategy and the reference lists of relevant reports in duplicate. We will retrieve the full text of any potentially relevant study and two authors (BP, TP and CH) will independently decide whether they should be included using the criteria described above. We will list those studies which, after detailed assessment, are found not to meet the inclusion criteria in a 'Characteristics of excluded studies' table. Two authors will independently extract the data from included studies. We will resolve any disagreements by discussion and, when necessary, through the arbitration of another author.

Data extraction and management

We will extract the following information from included studies using a standardised data extraction form.

  • Type of study

  • Study setting (country, classified according to World Bank income classification: low‐, middle‐ or high‐income country (World Bank 2013), key features of the healthcare system and concurrent pharmaceutical policies)

  • The sponsors of the study

  • Characteristics of the participants (organisations, regional or national level policies)

  • Characteristic of the policies

  • Main outcome measures and study duration

  • The results of the main outcome measures

Assessment of risk of bias in included studies

We will assess included studies for risk of bias using the criteria suggested by the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) group (EPOC 2015). Two authors will independently assess each study and will reach a consensus assessment.

Measures of treatment effect

For randomised, non‐randomised and CBA studies we will report adjusted relative effects. For dichotomous outcomes we will report, if possible, the relative risk adjusted for baseline differences in the outcome measure (the relative risk postintervention/the relative risk preintervention). For continuous outcomes, we will report, if possible, the relative change adjusted for baseline differences in the outcome measure (the absolute postintervention difference between groups minus the absolute preintervention difference between groups) divided by the postintervention level in the control group).

For ITS and RM studies the results will be reported, if possible, as changes along two dimensions: changes in level and changes in slope. Given that policy changes are often announced some months prior to official implementation (or take some time to be implemented), we will define a transition phase as the six months from the official announcement or formal implementation of the policy change. If the included ITS and RM studies state a different transition phase, we will use that definition. All results will exclude transition‐phase data. Change in level is the immediate effect of the policy and we will measure this as the difference between the fitted values for the first postintervention data point (e.g. after finishing the transition phase) minus the predicted outcome after the intervention based only on the preintervention slope. We will calculate the relative change in level by dividing the change in level by the predicted outcome based only on the preintervention slope and multiplying by 100%. Change in slope is the change in the trend from pre‐ to postintervention that reflects the 'long' term effect of the intervention. Since the interpretation of change in slope could be difficult, we will present the long‐term effects in a way that will be similar to the one we will use to calculate and present the relative immediate effects. We will present the effects after half a year as the difference between the fitted value for the sixth month postintervention data point (half a year after the intervention) minus the predicted outcome six months after the intervention based on the preintervention slope only, divided by the predicted outcome six months after the intervention based on the preintervention slope only and multiplied by 100%. If possible, we will measure the effects after one and two years in the same way. For drug expenditures we will calculate the savings after a half year, and after one and two years as the area between the predicted expenditure curves and the actual expenditure. If studies with an ITS design do not provide an appropriate analysis or reporting of results, but present the data points in a scannable graph or in a table, we will reanalyse the data using methods described in Ramsay 2003, as detailed in the section Dealing with missing data.

Unit of analysis issues

We expect some eligible studies to have a cluster designs (studies in which the unit of allocation is not a person, but is instead a group of people). If we include any study of this design in the review, we will determine whether the data were correctly analysed using the following criteria:

  • the analysis was conducted at the same level as the allocation (i.e. at the 'cluster' level); or

  • the usual analysis was used but the sample size was reduced to its ‘effective sample size’ or the variance was inflated by the design effect; or

  • the analysis was conducted at the level of the individual, but appropriate statistical correction for the clustering was performed (such as generalised estimating equations, mixed models or multilevel models).

If we detect unit of analysis errors we will not attempt to reanalyse the data but will report the results of the study as point estimates of the intervention effect without the presentation of any statistical analysis (P values or confidence intervals) (Higgins 2011)

Dealing with missing data

We will attempt to contact authors to obtain important missing information for studies that were published within the past 10 years. For studies published before 2003, we will use our best judgement to determine the missing information from the available publication (e.g. estimate the numbers corresponding to outcomes that are presented only in graphical form).

If studies with an ITS design do not provide an appropriate analysis or reporting of results but present the data points in a scannable graph or in a table, we will reanalyse the data using methods described in Ramsay 2003. We will use the following segmented time series regression model: Y(t) = B0 + B1*Preslope + B2*Postslope + B3*intervention + e(t), where:

  • Y(t) is the outcome in month t;

  • Pre‐slope is a continuous variable that indicates the time from the start of the study up to the last point in the preintervention phase and coded constant thereafter;

  • Post‐slope is coded 0 up to and including the first point postintervention and coded sequentially from 1 thereafter;

  • the intervention is coded 0 for preintervention time points and 1 for postintervention time points.

In this model, B1 estimates the slope of the preintervention data; B2 estimates the slope of the postintervention data; and B3 estimates the change in level of outcome as the difference between the estimated first point postintervention and the extrapolated first point postintervention if the preintervention line was continued into the postintervention phase. We will calculate the difference in slope as B2 minus B1. We will assume the error term (t) to be first order autoregressive. For controlled ITS studies, we will present the difference between the relative changes of the intervention and the control groups. We will calculate confidence intervals (95%) for all effect measures.

Assessment of heterogeneity

For studies reporting similar comparisons and outcome measures, we will assess heterogeneity visually by preparing tables, bubble plots (where the size of the bubble corresponds to the size of the population participating in each study) and box plots (displaying medians, interquartile ranges and ranges) to explore the size of the observed effects in relation to a number of explanatory factors (Subgroup analysis and investigation of heterogeneity). Additionally, we will assess the extent of the heterogeneity in results across comparable studies using forest plots, the I2 statistic and the Chi2 test.

Assessment of reporting biases

If it is possible, for studies reporting similar comparisons and outcome measures, we will use a funnel plot to visually explore the risk of publication bias, using the population of the jurisdictions included as a proxy for the precision of the estimate and the adjusted risk ratio or risk difference as the treatment effect.

Data synthesis

We will group the studies into the four categories of interventions described above (Types of interventions). We will conduct meta‐analyses only for studies that report similar comparisons (interventions, comparisons and outcome measures that are sufficiently similar that an average effect across those studies would be meaningful).

For randomised, non‐randomised and CBA studies, we will record the number of events (in the case of health outcomes) and the total numbers in each group (for risk ratios), or means and standard deviations in each group (for weighted mean differences, for instance in the case of drug utilisation). We will show all outcome effects with their associated 95% confidence intervals. Anticipating heterogeneity across studies, we will apply a random‐effects model meta‐analysis. We will perform data synthesis using Review Manager version 5.3 (Rev Man 2014)

If it is not possible to synthesize the data from included studies, we will undertake a structured synthesis following the EPOC guidance on this topic (EPOC 2013). For each category of intervention, we will describe the range of effects found in the studies and, if possible, the mechanisms through which the interventions were intended to affect specific outcomes.

We will grade our confidence in the available estimates of effects using a modification of the approach recommended by the GRADE Working Group. When grading the quality of evidence, we will initially grade ITS and RM studies as of ’moderate’ quality, and CBA studies as of ’low’ quality. This reflects our judgement that ITS and RM studies provide more compelling evidence than CBA studies in evaluating policies. We will use the GRADE quality scores high, moderate, low and very low.

Subgroup analysis and investigation of heterogeneity

Given that this review is dealing with a complex health intervention (Shepperd 2009), the following potential effect modifiers will be considered when investigating heterogeneity.

1. Differences in income of countries where the policy was implemented: We will use low‐ and lower‐middle, upper‐middle and high‐income countries, as classified by the World Bank (World Bank 2013). We will group the countries into three categories: low‐income, lower‐ and upper middle‐ and high‐income countries. We expect larger effects of the intervention with the availability of more resources because successful implementation might require information and monitoring systems that are more likely to be adequate in high‐income countries.

2. Differences in disincentives: We will assess whether each policy has no, minor or major disincentives for dispensers to adhere to the policy. We expect smaller effects with greater disincentives for dispensers given that financial disincentives or increased burdens on dispensers are likely to impair successful implementation of policies.

3. Differences in enforcement: We will assess whether the implementation of each policy was monitored and included penalties for non‐adherence, or included some other strategy for ensuring adherence. We expect larger effects with strategies for ensuring adherence given that policies that are not enforced are less likely to be successfully implemented.

We will carry out subgroup analyses only if there are sufficient numbers of studies/data within subgroups.

We will use RevMan to estimate subgroup differences (using the Chi2 test for subgroup differences).

Sensitivity analysis

We will assess the robustness of our analyses by performing sensitivity analyses for any comparison that includes studies with a high or uncertain risk of bias, by excluding those studies and recalculating the effect size.