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International travel‐related control measures to contain the COVID‐19 pandemic: a rapid review

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Background

In late 2019, the first cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) were reported in Wuhan, China, followed by a worldwide spread. Numerous countries have implemented control measures related to international travel, including border closures, travel restrictions, screening at borders, and quarantine of travellers.

Objectives

To assess the effectiveness of international travel‐related control measures during the COVID‐19 pandemic on infectious disease transmission and screening‐related outcomes.

Search methods

We searched MEDLINE, Embase and COVID‐19‐specific databases, including the Cochrane COVID‐19 Study Register and the WHO Global Database on COVID‐19 Research to 13 November 2020.

Selection criteria

We considered experimental, quasi‐experimental, observational and modelling studies assessing the effects of travel‐related control measures affecting human travel across international borders during the COVID‐19 pandemic. In the original review, we also considered evidence on severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). In this version we decided to focus on COVID‐19 evidence only. Primary outcome categories were (i) cases avoided, (ii) cases detected, and (iii) a shift in epidemic development. Secondary outcomes were other infectious disease transmission outcomes, healthcare utilisation, resource requirements and adverse effects if identified in studies assessing at least one primary outcome.

Data collection and analysis

Two review authors independently screened titles and abstracts and subsequently full texts. For studies included in the analysis, one review author extracted data and appraised the study. At least one additional review author checked for correctness of data. To assess the risk of bias and quality of included studies, we used the Quality Assessment of Diagnostic Accuracy Studies (QUADAS‐2) tool for observational studies concerned with screening, and a bespoke tool for modelling studies. We synthesised findings narratively. One review author assessed the certainty of evidence with GRADE, and several review authors discussed these GRADE judgements.

Main results

Overall, we included 62 unique studies in the analysis; 49 were modelling studies and 13 were observational studies. Studies covered a variety of settings and levels of community transmission.

Most studies compared travel‐related control measures against a counterfactual scenario in which the measure was not implemented. However, some modelling studies described additional comparator scenarios, such as different levels of stringency of the measures (including relaxation of restrictions), or a combination of measures.

Concerns with the quality of modelling studies related to potentially inappropriate assumptions about the structure and input parameters, and an inadequate assessment of model uncertainty. Concerns with risk of bias in observational studies related to the selection of travellers and the reference test, and unclear reporting of certain methodological aspects.

Below we outline the results for each intervention category by illustrating the findings from selected outcomes.

Travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel (31 modelling studies)

The studies assessed cases avoided and shift in epidemic development. We found very low‐certainty evidence for a reduction in COVID‐19 cases in the community (13 studies) and cases exported or imported (9 studies). Most studies reported positive effects, with effect sizes varying widely; only a few studies showed no effect.

There was very low‐certainty evidence that cross‐border travel controls can slow the spread of COVID‐19. Most studies predicted positive effects, however, results from individual studies varied from a delay of less than one day to a delay of 85 days; very few studies predicted no effect of the measure.

Screening at borders (13 modelling studies; 13 observational studies)

Screening measures covered symptom/exposure‐based screening or test‐based screening (commonly specifying polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing), or both, before departure or upon or within a few days of arrival. Studies assessed cases avoided, shift in epidemic development and cases detected. Studies generally predicted or observed some benefit from screening at borders, however these varied widely.

For symptom/exposure‐based screening, one modelling study reported that global implementation of screening measures would reduce the number of cases exported per day from another country by 82% (95% confidence interval (CI) 72% to 95%) (moderate‐certainty evidence). Four modelling studies predicted delays in epidemic development, although there was wide variation in the results between the studies (very low‐certainty evidence). Four modelling studies predicted that the proportion of cases detected would range from 1% to 53% (very low‐certainty evidence). Nine observational studies observed the detected proportion to range from 0% to 100% (very low‐certainty evidence), although all but one study observed this proportion to be less than 54%.

For test‐based screening, one modelling study provided very low‐certainty evidence for the number of cases avoided. It reported that testing travellers reduced imported or exported cases as well as secondary cases. Five observational studies observed that the proportion of cases detected varied from 58% to 90% (very low‐certainty evidence).

Quarantine (12 modelling studies)

The studies assessed cases avoided, shift in epidemic development and cases detected. All studies suggested some benefit of quarantine, however the magnitude of the effect ranged from small to large across the different outcomes (very low‐ to low‐certainty evidence). Three modelling studies predicted that the reduction in the number of cases in the community ranged from 450 to over 64,000 fewer cases (very low‐certainty evidence). The variation in effect was possibly related to the duration of quarantine and compliance.

Quarantine and screening at borders (7 modelling studies; 4 observational studies)

The studies assessed shift in epidemic development and cases detected. Most studies predicted positive effects for the combined measures with varying magnitudes (very low‐ to low‐certainty evidence). Four observational studies observed that the proportion of cases detected for quarantine and screening at borders ranged from 68% to 92% (low‐certainty evidence). The variation may depend on how the measures were combined, including the length of the quarantine period and days when the test was conducted in quarantine.

Authors' conclusions

With much of the evidence derived from modelling studies, notably for travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel and quarantine of travellers, there is a lack of 'real‐world' evidence. The certainty of the evidence for most travel‐related control measures and outcomes is very low and the true effects are likely to be substantially different from those reported here. Broadly, travel restrictions may limit the spread of disease across national borders. Symptom/exposure‐based screening measures at borders on their own are likely not effective; PCR testing at borders as a screening measure likely detects more cases than symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders, although if performed only upon arrival this will likely also miss a meaningful proportion of cases. Quarantine, based on a sufficiently long quarantine period and high compliance is likely to largely avoid further transmission from travellers. Combining quarantine with PCR testing at borders will likely improve effectiveness. Many studies suggest that effects depend on factors, such as levels of community transmission, travel volumes and duration, other public health measures in place, and the exact specification and timing of the measure. Future research should be better reported, employ a range of designs beyond modelling and assess potential benefits and harms of the travel‐related control measures from a societal perspective.

PICOs

Population
Intervention
Comparison
Outcome

The PICO model is widely used and taught in evidence-based health care as a strategy for formulating questions and search strategies and for characterizing clinical studies or meta-analyses. PICO stands for four different potential components of a clinical question: Patient, Population or Problem; Intervention; Comparison; Outcome.

See more on using PICO in the Cochrane Handbook.

Can international travel‐related control measures contain the spread of the COVID‐19 pandemic?

What are international travel‐related control measures?

International travel control measures are methods to manage international travel to contain the spread of COVID‐19. Measures include:

‐ closing international borders to stop travellers crossing from one country to another;

‐ restricting travel to and from certain countries, particularly those with high infection levels;

‐ screening or testing travellers entering or leaving a country if they have symptoms or have been in contact with an infected person;

‐ quarantining newly‐arrived travellers from another country, that is, requiring travellers to stay at home or in a specific place for a certain time.

What did we want to find out?

We wanted to find out how effective international travel‐related control measures are in containing the COVID‐19 pandemic.

What we did

We searched for studies on the effects of these measures on the spread of COVID‐19. Studies had to report how many cases these measures prevented or detected, or whether they changed the course of the pandemic. The studies could include people of any age, anywhere. They could be of any design including those that used ‘real‐life’ data (observational studies) or hypothetical data from computer‐generated simulations (modelling studies).

This is the first update of our review. This update includes only studies on COVID‐19, published up to 13 November 2020.

What we found

We found 62 studies. Most (49 studies) were modelling studies; only 13 used real‐life data (observational studies). Studies took place across the world and at different times during the pandemic. Levels of COVID‐19 within countries varied.

Most studies compared current travel‐related control measures with no travel‐related controls. However, some modelling studies also compared current measures against possible measures, for example, to see what might happen if controls were more or less relaxed or were combined with other measures.

Main results

Below we summarise the findings of some outcomes.

Travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel (31 modelling studies)

Most studies showed that travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel were beneficial, but this beneficial effect ranged from small to large. Additionally, some studies found no effect. Studies also predicted that these restrictions would delay the outbreak, but the delay ranged from one day to 85 days in different studies.

Screening at borders (13 modelling studies and 13 observational studies)

These studies assessed screening at borders, including screening people with symptoms or who had potentially been exposed to COVID‐19, or testing people, before or after they travelled.

For screening based on symptoms or potential exposure to COVID‐19, modelling studies found that screening reduced imported or exported cases and delayed outbreaks. Modelling studies predicted that 1% to 53% of cases would be detected. Observational studies reported a wide range of cases detected, from 0% to 100%, with the majority of studies reporting less than 54% of cases detected.

For screening based on testing, studies reported that testing travellers reduced imported or exported cases, and cases detected. Observational studies reported that the proportion of cases detected varied from 58% to 90%. This variation might be due to the timing of testing.

Quarantine (12 modelling studies)

All studies suggested that quarantine may be beneficial, but the size of this effect ranged from small to large in the different studies. Modelling studies, for example, predicted that quarantine could lead to between 450 and over 64,000 fewer cases in the community. Differences in effects may depend on how long people were quarantined for and how well they followed the rules.

Quarantine and screening at borders (7 modelling studies and 4 observational studies)

For quarantine and screening at borders, most studies suggested some benefit, however the size of this effect differed between studies. For example, observational studies reported that between 68% and 92% of cases would be detected. Differences in effects may depend on how long people were quarantined for and how often they were tested while in quarantine.

How reliable are these results?

Our confidence in these results is limited. Most studies were based on mathematical predictions (modelling), so we lack real‐life evidence. Further, we were not confident that models used correct assumptions, so our confidence in the evidence on travel restrictions and quarantine, in particular, is very low. Some studies were published quickly online as ‘preprints’. Preprints do not undergo the normal rigorous checks of published studies, so we are not certain how reliable they are. Also, the studies were very different from each other and their results varied according to the specification of each travel measure (e.g. the type of screening approach), how it was put into practice and enforced, the amount of cross‐border travel, levels of community transmission and other types of national measures to control the pandemic.

What this means

Overall, international travel‐related control measures may help to limit the spread of COVID‐19 across national borders. Restricting cross‐border travel can be a helpful measure. Screening travellers only for symptoms at borders is likely to miss many cases; testing may be more effective but may also miss cases if only performed upon arrival. Quarantine that lasts at least 10 days can prevent travellers spreading COVID‐19 and may be more effective if combined with another measure such as testing, especially if people follow the rules.

Future research needs to be better reported. More studies should focus on real‐life evidence, and should assess potential benefits and risks of travel‐related control measures to individuals and society as a whole.

Authors' conclusions

Implications for practice

This review suggests that travel‐related control measures during the COVID‐19 pandemic may have a positive impact on infectious disease transmission and screening‐related outcomes. However, the certainty of evidence included in this rapid review is moderate to very low, due to the nature as well as quality and heterogeneity of available studies. Therefore, true effects may be substantially different from those reported here. Broadly, travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel may limit the spread of disease across national borders. Regarding screening at borders, symptom/exposure screening on its own will detect some COVID‐19 cases. However, it would likely not detect a large enough proportion of cases to prevent seeding new cases within the region protected by the measure. In comparison, PCR testing as a screening measure detects more cases than symptom/exposure screening, although if performed only upon arrival will likely also miss a significant proportion of cases. The effectiveness of quarantine is dependent on high compliance and the length of quarantine, with longer periods such as 10 or 14 days preventing most cases from being released into the community. Combining quarantine with screening at borders is likely to meaningfully improve the effectiveness.

Travel‐related control measures target one specific source of SARS‐CoV‐2 transmission, that is, human travel. The importance of this source of transmission in influencing overall epidemic development depends on a variety of factors, including the degree of interconnectedness between countries (in terms of the number and nature of borders as well as travel volumes) and the levels of community transmission in the region restricted and the region protected by the measure (i.e. high versus low levels of community transmission). Similarly, the contribution of travel‐related control measures to controlling the COVID‐19 pandemic will depend on the specification of these measures regarding their design and stringency (e.g. single polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing versus repeated PCR testing; 7‐day quarantine versus 14‐day quarantine), the target group (e.g. all travellers versus specific groups), which borders or means of transport are affected (e.g. travel by air, land or sea), timing of implementation (measure implemented at an early versus late stage of the epidemic), and combinations with measures during travel (e.g. wearing of masks, hygiene, physical distancing). Importantly, the degree of adherence and, where applied, enforcement of the measure (e.g. recommendation to quarantine, various forms of control, fine and magnitude of fine) are also likely to play an important role. Finally, the contribution of travel‐related control measures to controlling the COVID‐19 pandemic will also depend on a range of other measures implemented to control community transmission (e.g. testing, contact tracing, social distancing measures, wearing face masks) in the region restricted and the region protected by the measure.

As the pandemic progresses, decision‐makers can implement/increase or de‐implement/loosen a range of potentially appropriate measures, and, in doing so, consider the above described factors. Importantly, travel‐related control measures affect health and society in much broader ways, and decisions will need to balance all benefits and potential harms associated with a specific measure (not assessed in this review).

Implications for research

Decision‐makers need high‐quality research that helps to inform the decisions they continually have to make to chart the course through the COVID‐19 pandemic. Research should be responsive to the questions most urgently raised by decision‐makers, such as how can travel restrictions help delay a next wave of infections, how do screening at borders and quarantine need to be specified and enforced to optimise benefit‐harm balance, and at what point is it safe to relax travel‐related control measures. It would also be important that studies continue to refine the assessment of factors that influence the effectiveness of travel‐related control measures, such as the stage of the pandemic and steps taken to increase or enforce implementation and adherence. Some of these questions may be answered quickly by refining existing models. Although measures such as border closures are, by nature, challenging if at all possible to evaluate using internally valid experimental or quasi‐experimental approaches, the pandemic presents an opportunity to explore how critical questions can be answered through rigorous data collection and analysis.

In observational studies assessing the effectiveness of border screening measures and quarantine of travellers, it would be helpful to go beyond evaluating single measures. If, for example, all arriving travellers are quarantined for 14 days, it provides a cohort and an opportunity to assess not only the benefit of this quarantine, but also of a range of other single and combined measures, such as 3‐day, 5‐day and 8‐day quarantine or PCR testing upon arrival, at day 3, day 5 or day 8. Additionally, related to outcomes it would be critical to look beyond the number of cases detected and to consider the number of cases missed, as well as the impact of these measures on the spread and development of the epidemic in the community. As many governments currently employ travel‐related control measures, as well as a range of other public health measures to contain the pandemic, moving forward, it would be important to assess various combinations of these measures to identify those that are most effective. This concerns both primary research and future systematic reviews.

With the evidence base on COVID‐19 and the impact of travel‐related control measures growing quickly, it is important that future modelling studies improve reporting and technical documentation to allow for adequate assessment of their quality. Specific aspects considered in assessing the modelling studies in this review can help inform the development of high quality models. Finally, to ensure that the best available evidence informs complex and evolving decisions, future research should employ a range of epidemiological designs and assessment tools to assess the broad impacts of travel‐related control measures, including all potential benefits and harms from a societal perspective. In order to integrate the rapidly growing evidence base on the topic, as well as new studies that may use more rigorous methods and approaches, we plan to update this review again later in 2021.

Summary of findings

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Summary of findings 1. Travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel

Disease: COVID‐19

Interventions: implementing travel restrictions reducing/stopping cross‐border travel; maintaining the measure; early implementation of the measure; implementing a highly stringent measure

Comparators: no measure; relaxation of the measure; late implementation of the measure; implementing a less stringent measure

Outcome

Number of studies

Summary of findings

Certainty of evidence

Outcome category: cases avoided due to measure

Number or proportion of cases in the community

13 modelling studies

Ten out of 13 studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases resulting from various travel restrictions. These positive effects ranged from a 1.8% (95% CI ‐21.9% to 17.5%) reduction to a 97.8% reduction. The remaining three studies reported mixed effects, including a positive effect,no effect or even a negative effect. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by the level of community transmission, implementation of community‐based interventions, and the countries restricted by the measure.

Very low a,b,c

⨁◯◯◯

Number or proportion of imported or exported cases

9 modelling studies
 

Eight out of nine studies reported reductions in importations or exportations. These positive effects ranged from a 18% reduction to a 99% reduction. One study reported mixed effects, observing both positive effects and no effect. The variation in the magnitude and direction of effect might be explained by differences in travel volumes, the timing of implementation, the comprehensiveness and severity of the measure implemented.

Very lowb,c,d

⨁◯◯◯

Number or proportion of deaths

3 modelling studies
 

All studies showed reductions in deaths. These positive effects ranged from a 4.3% (95% CI ‐39.1% to 39.1%) reduction to a 98% reduction in deaths. The variation in the magnitude of effect across studies might be explained by differences in the implementation of community‐based interventions.

Very lowb,c,e

⨁◯◯◯

Risk of importation or exportation

3 modelling studies
 

Two studies reported reductions in the risk of importing and/or exporting cases as a result of travel restrictions; however, no effect estimates were available. The other study reported mixed effects, including an increased risk of importation at some airports, but decreased risk at other airports as a result of lessening travel restrictions. One study suggested that connectedness to the international travel network and the level of community transmission might explain that variation in the effect direction.

Very lowc,f,g

⨁◯◯◯

Outcome category: shift in epidemic development

Probability of eliminating the epidemic

1 modelling study

The study reported mixed effects: the probability would be higher (66% probability) for border restrictions followed by strict community measures than for a delayed border closure (55% probability), and the same as early implementation of border restrictions (66% probability).

Very low h,i,j

⨁◯◯◯

Effective reproduction number

2 modelling studies

One study reported a beneficial change (i.e. break point) in Rt after the implementation of travel restrictions in European Union countries (mean duration 12.6 days). The other study reported mixed effects, suggesting that complete border closures would lead to a 0.045 reduction in Rt, partial relaxation through the opening of land borders would lead to a 0.177 increase in Rt, while further relaxation allowing for international travel followed by quarantine upon arrival would not lead to a change in Rt.

Very low c,e,i

⨁◯◯◯

Time to outbreak

6 modelling studies
 

Four out of six studies reported reductions in the time to outbreak. These positive effects ranged from a delay of less than one day to 85 days. Two studies reported mixed effects, suggesting both positive effects and no effect. The variation in the direction and magnitude of effect across studies might be explained by differences in the levels of community transmission, the timing of implementation, and the countries restricted by the measure.

Very lowb,c,d

⨁◯◯◯

Risk of outbreak

2 modelling studies
 

One study reported reductions in the risk of an outbreak resulting from travel restrictions with effects ranging from a 1% to a 37% reduction. The other study reported mixed effects, including both a positive effect and no effect. The variation in the magnitude and direction of effect might be explained by differences in the levels of community transmission, the number of cases in the country of departure, the severity of the travel restriction, co‐interventions, and the percentage of contacts being traced.

Very low c,i,j

⨁◯◯◯

Number or proportion of cases at peak

2 modelling studies

Both studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases at peak. These positive effects ranged from a 0.3% reduction to a 8% reduction. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by differences in the implementation of community‐based interventions.

Lowk,l

⨁⨁◯◯

Epidemic growth acceleration

1 modelling study

The study reported that international travel controls would lead to a decrease in the growth acceleration of the epidemic progression across 62 countries (−6.05% change, P < 0.0001).

Low h,m

⨁⨁◯◯

Exportation growth rate

1 modelling study

The study reported that both the lockdown of Hubei, resulting in a ban of all travel, as well as travel restrictions imposed on China led to a decrease in the growth rate of cases exported from Hubei and the rest of China, to the rest of the world.

Low h,m

⨁⨁◯◯

Outcome category: cases detected due to the measure

No contributing study

aDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural elements, the input parameters, and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.
bDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to a wide range of plausible effects.
cDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in some studies and/or concerns with reporting of external validation in others.
dDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural elements, the input parameters, the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty, and incomplete technical documentation.
eDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural elements and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.
fDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural elements, the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty and the lack of technical documentation.
gDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to effect estimates being unavailable.
hDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to only one contributing study.
iDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to insufficient data reported to enable assessment of precision.
jDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model's structural elements and input parameters.
kDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the models's structural elements.
lDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in all included studies.
mDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

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Summary of findings 2. Screening at borders

Disease: COVID‐19

Interventions: implementing entry and/or exit symptom/exposure‐based screening; implementing entry and/or exit test‐based screening; implementing a highly stringent screening measure

Comparators: no measure; implementing an alternative measure; implementing a less stringent screening measure

Outcome

Number of studies

Summary of findings

Certainty of evidence

Symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders

Outcome category: cases avoided due to the measure

Number or proportion of cases exported

1 modelling study

The study reported that putting screening measures in place across the world would reduce the number of cases exported per day from China would be reduced by 82% (95% CI 72% to 95%),  under the assumption of only 35.7% of symptomatic individuals being detected.

Moderatea

⨁⨁⨁◯

Outcome category: shift in epidemic development

Time to outbreak

4 modelling studies

All studies reported that entry and/or exit screening alone would delay an outbreak. These positive effects ranged from 2.7‐day delay (from 45 days to 47.7 days in reaching 1000 cases) to 0.5‐year delay (from 1.7 years (95% CI 0.04 to 6.09) to 2.2 years (95% CI 0.6 to 8.11)). The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by differences in the timing of implementation, the number of arriving travellers, the percentage of asymptomatic cases screened, and the sensitivity of screening.

Very lowb,c,d

⨁◯◯◯

Risk of outbreak

1 modelling study

The study reported that under the assumption of one infected person entering Mauritius per 100 days, entry screening with 100% sensitivity would reduce the probability of an outbreak within 3 months to 10% and screening with 50% sensitivity would reduce the probability to 48%.

Lowa,b

⨁⨁◯◯

Outcome category: cases detected due to the measure

Number or proportion of cases detected

4 modelling studies

All studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases detected. These positive effects ranged from detecting 0.8% (95% CI 0.2% to 1.6%) of cases to detecting 53% (95% CI 35% to 72%) of cases. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by the time window in which the exposure may have occurred, flight duration, the percentage of asymptomatic cases in the population, the combination of entry and exit screening measures, and the sensitivity of screening.

Very lowb,c,e

⨁◯◯◯

Proportion of cases detected

9 observationalstudies

Across studies, the proportion of cases detected by entry and/or exit screening measures ranged from 0 to 100%. For symptom and temperature screening, one study reported that the measure detected 100% of cases; however, all other studies reported substantially lower proportions of cases detected, ranging from 0% to 53%. Across studies, the variation in effects could be due to the specific measure; for example, some symptom/exposure screening procedures may have been more thorough than others.

Very lowc,f,g

⨁◯◯◯

Positive predictive value (PPV)

6 observationalstudies

The PPV ranged from 0 to 100% in studies assessing symptom/exposure screening. This is likely highly dependent on how exactly symptoms are defined in studies, however this is poorly described in most included studies.

Very lowc,f,g

⨁◯◯◯

Test‐based screening at borders

Outcome category: cases avoided due to the measure

Proportion of secondary cases

1 modelling study

The study reported that PCR testing all incoming travellers upon arrival, followed by isolation of test‐positives and requiring a negative test at the end of the isolation would lead to a reduction in secondary cases of 88% (95% CI 87% to 89%) for a 7‐day isolation period and 92% (95% CI 92% to 93%) for a 14‐day isolation period.

Very lowa,e,h

⨁◯◯◯

Proportion of imported cases

1 modelling study

The study reported that PCR testing all incoming travellers upon arrival, followed by isolation of test‐positives and requiring a negative test at the end of the isolation would lead to a reduction of 90% of imported cases for a 7‐day isolation period and 92% for a 14‐day isolation period. Testing all incoming travellers and refusing entry to test‐positives would lead to a reduction of 77%.

Very low a,e,h

⨁◯◯◯

Outcome category: shift in epidemic development

No contributing study.

Outcome category: cases detected due to the measure

Days at risk of transmitting the infection into the community

2 modelling studies

Both studies showed that a single PCR test upon arrival would reduce the days that travellers, upon release, remain at risk of transmitting the infection into the community. These positive effects ranged from 0.1 fewer days to 0.3 fewer days at risk of transmission.

Low e,i

⨁⨁◯◯

Proportion of cases detected

5 observationalstudies

The proportion of cases detected ranged from 58% to 90%. The timing of certain procedures could play a role in the variation of effect, with PCR tests conducted two days after arrival potentially being more effective in detecting cases than those conducted immediately upon arrival.

Lowc,g

⨁◯◯◯

Probability of releasing an infected individual into the community

2 modelling studies

Both studies showed reductions in the probability of releasing an infected individual into the community as a result of PCR testing. These positive effects included a risk ratio of 0.55 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.83) and probabilities of releasing an infected individual ranging from 48% to 53% for scenarios with different risks of transmission while travelling.

Lowc,e

⨁⨁◯◯

aDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to only one contributing study.

bDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural elements, the input parameters, and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

cDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to a wide range of plausible effects

dDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in some studies and concerns with reporting of external validation in others.

eDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in all included studies.

fDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to concerns with traveller selection, the reference test, and the flow and timing of procedures.

gDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, as travellers on evacuation flights and cruise ships comprised most of the studies; these are likely not representative of usual travels.

hDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural elements and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

iDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

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Summary of findings 3. Quarantine

Disease: COVID‐19

Interventions: implementing quarantine; implementing a highly stringent quarantine

Comparators: no measure; implementing an alternative measure (e.g. screening); implementing a less stringent quarantine

Outcome

Number of studies

Summary of findings

Certainty of evidence

Outcome category: cases avoided due to the measure

Number or proportion of cases in the community

3 modelling studies

All studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases. These positive effects ranged from 450 fewer cases to 64028 fewer cases during the first wave of the pandemic. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by differences in the population group targeted by the measure.

Very lowa,b,c

⨁◯◯◯

Proportion of imported cases

1 modelling study

The study reported that quarantining all incoming travellers would reduce the proportion of imported cases by 55% for a 7‐day quarantine period and by 91% for a 14‐day quarantine period.

Very lowb,d,e,f

⨁◯◯◯

Number or proportion of cases seeded by imported cases

3 modelling studies

All studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases seeded by imported cases as a result of quarantine of travellers. These positive effects ranged from a 26% (95% CI 19% to 37%) reduction to a 100% reduction. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by enforcement of the quarantine, age, and the length of the quarantine period.

 Very low c,g,h

⨁◯◯◯

Probability of an imported case not infecting anyone

1 modelling study

The study reported that a 14‐day quarantine of all international arrivals in New Zealand would lead to a 4% increase in probability in adults and a 14% in the elderly that an imported case would not infect anyone among adults and the elderly. The increase in the probably would be larger when a 14‐day government‐mandated quarantine is required (31% and 36% among adults and the elderly, respectively).

Very low e,f,i

⨁◯◯◯

Outcome category: shift in epidemic development

Time to outbreak

1 modelling study

The study reported that increasing the effectiveness of quarantine to 80% and 90% from the base case of 75% effectiveness would delay the peak in active cases and deaths by 3.5 and 5.5 days, respectively.

Lowe,b

⨁⨁◯◯

Outcome category: cases detected due to the measure

Days at risk of transmitting the infection into the community

2 modelling studies

Both studies reported reductions in the numbers of days that travellers, upon release, remain at risk of transmitting the infection into the community. These positive effects ranged from 0.1 fewer days to 2.1 fewer days at risk of transmission. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by the length of quarantine.

Lowf,h

⨁⨁◯◯

Proportion of cases detected

1 modelling study

The study reported that requiring travellers to quarantine upon arrival in the UK would lead to detecting different proportions of cases, with the magnitude increasing with the number of days in quarantine (7‐day quarantine: 51% (95% CI 47% to 56%); 14‐day quarantine: 78% (95% CI 74% to 82%)). These proportions are higher than those for screening alone (with either thermal imaging scanners or health checks detecting 0.78% and 1.13% of cases, respectively).

Very low a,e,f

⨁◯◯◯

Probability of releasing an infected individual into the community

3 modelling studies

All studies reported reductions in the risk or probability of releasing an infected individual into the community. These positive effects included a risk ratio ranging from 0.00 (95% CI 0.00 to 0.01) to 0.59 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.85) and probabilities of releasing an infected individual ranging from 0% to 85%. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by the length of the quarantine period and the risk of transmission within quarantine settings.

Very lowf,h,i

⨁◯◯◯

aDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty and incomplete technical documentation.

bDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to insufficient data reported to enable assessment of precision.

cDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in some studies and concerns with reporting of external validation in others.

dDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the models’ structural assumptions and adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

eDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to only one contributing study.

fDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in included studies.

gDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the models’ structural assumptions, the input parameters and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

hDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to a wide range of plausible effects.

IDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

Open in table viewer
Summary of findings 4. Quarantine and screening at borders

Disease: COVID‐19

Interventions: implementing quarantine and screening measures combined

Comparators: implementing a single measure of quarantine or screening

Outcome

Number of studies

Summary of findings

Certainty of evidence

Outcome category: cases avoided due to the measure

No contributing study.

Outcome category: shift in epidemic development

Time to outbreak

1 modelling study

The study reported delays in outbreak resulting from combination of screening and quarantine compared with a single measure. Under the assumption of one flight per day (7.1% of normal travel volume) and 50% sensitivity of screening, the time to outbreak would vary greatly for different combinations of measures ranging from 3.5 years (95% CI 0.09 to 12.9) to 34.1 years (95% CI 0.86 to 126) to outbreak.

Very low a,b,c

⨁◯◯◯

Outcome category: cases detected due to measure

Days at risk of transmitting the infection into the community

2 modelling studies

Both studies reported that the combination of quarantine and testing would reduce days that travellers, upon release, remain at risk of transmitting the infection into the community compared with a single measure. These positive effects ranged from 0.01 fewer days to 2.0 fewer days at risk of transmission.

Low b,c

⨁⨁◯◯

Probability of releasing an infected individual into community

3 modelling studies

All studies reported positive effects resulting from a combination of screening and quarantine. These positive effects included a reduction in the probability of releasing an infected individual ranging from 2% to 48%. The variation in the magnitude of effect could be explained by the length of the quarantine period, day(s) on which the test is conducted in quarantine or the risk of transmission within quarantine.

Very lowb,c,d

⨁◯◯◯

Proportion of cases detected

2 modelling studies

Both studies reported that the combination of quarantine and testing would further increase case detection compared with single measures. These positive effects ranged from 41% to 99% of cases detected. The variation in the magnitude of effect may be explained by the length of the quarantine period with longer quarantine and the duration of travel and stay in the country of departure.

Very low b,c,e

⨁◯◯◯

Proportion of cases detected

4 observational studies

All studies reported that the combination of quarantine and testing would further increase case detection compared with single measures. The proportion of cases detected ranged from 68.8% to 90.2%. The type of initial exit and/or entry screening could play a role; while most employed a PCR test upon arrival, one study employed symptom screening. Whether travellers in quarantine were monitored for the development of symptoms, and the intensity of this monitoring may also have been important.

Lowb,f

⨁⨁◯◯

aDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural assumptions, the input parameters, and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

bDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to a wide range of plausible effects.

cDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in included studies.

dDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

eDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural assumptions and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

fDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, as travellers on evacuation flights comprised most of the studies; these are likely not representative of usual travels.

Background

Description of the condition

The first case of the novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) was reported in Wuhan, Hubei, China in late 2019. Over the following weeks, the disease spread further in China and several other Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, and Thailand (WHO 2020a). By mid‐March 2020, COVID‐19 cases had been reported in over 100 countries across the globe. On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak to be a global pandemic (WHO 2020b).

COVID‐19 is caused by SARS‐CoV‐2, a virus closely related to those of the coronaviruses which cause severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS‐CoV‐1/SARS) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS‐CoV/MERS). However, in comparison with these viruses, SARS‐CoV‐2 has higher transmissibility and lower pathogenicity (Fani 2020). Most people infected with SARS‐CoV‐2 have mild disease with non‐specific symptoms (Wu 2020). The proportion of cases becoming critically ill, with respiratory failure, septic shock, multiple organ failure, or a combination of two or all of these, has been reported as 5% in China (Wu 2020). The length of stay in hospital varies from less than one week to nearly two months; the length of stay in intensive care ranges from one to three weeks (Rees 2020). Among hospitalised patients, mortality from COVID‐19 is reported to be 20% (95% confidence interval (CI) 18% to 23%), 23% (95% CI 19% to 27%) and 11% (95% CI 7% to 16%) in the USA, Europe and China, respectively (Dorjee 2020). Although long‐term research is still lacking, there is also growing concern over 'long COVID', defined as “signs and symptoms that develop during or following an infection consistent with COVID‐19 and which continue for more than four weeks and are not explained by an alternative diagnosis” (NICE 2020). Long COVID is likely to affect 10% or more of those who have tested positive for SARS‐CoV‐2 (Carfi 2020; Greenhalgh 2020). Even a mild course of COVID‐19 may be associated with long‐term symptoms, most commonly cough, fever and fatigue, but also shortness of breath and chest pain, headaches and neurocognitive difficulties, and various mental health conditions (Greenhalgh 2020). It is estimated that between 4% and 41% of infected individuals never develop symptoms (Byambasuren 2020). Both presymptomatic and asymptomatic transmission have been described and are likely to play an important role in the dynamics of the pandemic (Furukawa 2020).

A range of non‐pharmacological interventions (NPIs) have been put into place by governments to contain and mitigate the spread of COVID‐19. Given the lack of a drug to prevent SARS‐CoV‐2 infection, the current stage of vaccine distribution and provision, and the limited pharmacological interventions to treat COVID‐19, NPIs will continue to play a critical role in containing the SARS‐CoV‐2 pandemic for a significant period of time to come. Travel‐related control measures, one important type of NPI, range from the screening of travellers entering or leaving a country to the complete closure of national borders. Starting from February 2020, many countries and regions in the world implemented some type of travel‐related control measure, and these continue to be implemented across many countries. As the pandemic continues across the globe, with many countries having experienced a second wave of infection, and others having moved beyond this second wave, it is crucial to understand the effectiveness of these measures, including at what point in an outbreak they should be implemented and when they can be relaxed. Such knowledge will help to inform decisions on implementation or re‐implementation, relaxation or suspension of these measures, as well as potential modifications to them, and will help to guide public health resource allocation. This is in line with the WHO's International Health Regulations 2005, which call to ground public health decision‐making in scientific evidence (WHO 2005).

Description of the intervention

Travel‐related control measures comprise different interventions, including the complete closure of national borders to entry or exit, or both; travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel (e.g. denial of entry or exit on the basis of nationality, travel history, health status or other characteristics, suspension of travel via air, land, and sea); symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders; test‐based screening at borders; and quarantine of travellers. These measures can be implemented for all modes of travel, including air, land, and sea.

Travel‐related public health measures have a long tradition as a means of preventing the spread of epidemic diseases. Historic examples include the prevention of the spread of bubonic plague through widespread travel‐related quarantine in medieval port towns and other locations (Tognotti 2013). More recently, entry screening at national borders was implemented during the SARS epidemic in 2003, and airport exit screening measures were used in efforts to contain the Ebola epidemic in West Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo between 2014 and 2016 (Mouchtouri 2019).

In 2019, the WHO developed guidelines on non‐pharmacological public health measures for mitigating the risk and impact of epidemic and pandemic influenza. Based on a systematic review of the evidence, internal (i.e. subnational) travel restrictions were among the measures recommended during early stages of extraordinary, localised influenza epidemics. In contrast, entry and exit screening were not recommended due to overall ineffectiveness of the measure, and border closures were not recommended, unless required by national law or in extraordinary circumstances (WHO 2019). However, the transmission characteristics of influenza are different from those of SARS‐CoV‐2 and these insights are therefore not directly applicable to SARS‐CoV‐2. More directly relevant, two reviews assessed the effectiveness of travel‐related control measures in the context of the SARS‐CoV‐1, MERS‐CoV and other infectious disease epidemics (Errett 2020; Mouchtouri 2019). One review reports that effectiveness was limited, as few infected travellers were identified; however, the review finds secondary potential benefits, such as raising awareness and discouraging sick individuals from travelling (Mouchtouri 2019). The second review examined the impact of travel reductions on the spread of infectious diseases other than influenza, and concluded that these had some success in reducing disease spread across countries, but did not halt transmission. It also emphasised the potentially high social, economic, and political costs of travel bans (Errett 2020). Undertaken in the context of the ongoing SARS‐CoV‐2 pandemic, a Cochrane Rapid Review examined, among other quarantine measures, the effectiveness of quarantining individuals travelling from countries with a declared outbreak (Nussbaumer‐Streit 2020). This review found very low‐certainty evidence for a small effect for SARS and a potentially larger effect for COVID‐19 (Nussbaumer‐Streit 2020). Thus, the evidence regarding the effectiveness of travel‐related control measures to prevent infectious disease spread is mixed and incomplete. Importantly, given the different transmission characteristics of influenza and the likely high rate of asymptomatic transmission for SARS‐CoV‐2 as compared to SARS‐CoV‐1 or MERS‐CoV, many of the insights gained from these other pathogens are not directly transferable. Consequently, a systematic review of the effectiveness of travel‐related control measures drawing on the growing evidence base from the COVID‐19 pandemic is warranted.

How the intervention might work

Travel‐related control measures limit the mobility of potential human carriers of infection when crossing national (and in principle, subnational) borders. These restrictions can be imposed on travellers arriving or leaving via land, air, or sea and are usually implemented by government agencies. The main idea behind all of these measures is to prevent the introduction of an infectious agent (in the present context, SARS‐CoV‐2) into a country, to reduce or delay the spread of an infectious disease within a country, or both. The intervention thus seeks to achieve a shift in epidemic development, whether by avoiding the epidemic entirely (i.e. cases do not occur at all), by reducing the peak of the epidemic (i.e. fewer cases occur, or are spread over a longer time period) or by delaying the arrival or peak of the epidemic (i.e. cases occur later).

All travel‐related control measures are based on the notion that travellers (all travellers or those from specific regions or with specific characteristics) represent a population at risk of being infected and of spreading the infection. For SARS‐CoV‐2, the risk of an infected person travelling and being unaware of being infected is compounded by the fact that presymptomatic and asymptomatic transmission are likely to play an important role. The intervention works by:

  • stopping travel (i.e. complete border closure);

  • limiting the number of at‐risk individuals entering or exiting a country (i.e. travel restrictions);

  • detecting infected individuals based on symptoms or testing for the virus (i.e. symptom/exposure‐based screening; test‐based screening); and

  • preventing disease transmission until a person has been clearly identified as non‐infectious (i.e. quarantine).

In light of the high rates of pre‐ and asymptomatic transmission, certain travel‐related control measures may be more appropriate in the SARS‐CoV‐2 pandemic than others. For example, quarantine of travellers may prove more effective than entry and exit screening.

In addition to their intended positive impact on infectious disease dynamics, travel‐related control measures may also have negative health impacts, notably the well‐known side effects of quarantine and isolation on mental health. Moreover, they have far‐reaching economic, social, legal, ethical, and political implications (Folayan 2015; Nuttal 2014; Nuzzo 2014).

Objectives

To assess the effectiveness of international travel‐related control measures during the COVID‐19 pandemic on infectious disease transmission and screening‐related outcomes.

Methods

In May 2020, the WHO asked the review authors to develop an evidence map that would chart the evidence of various travel‐related control measures relevant to containing the COVID‐19 pandemic (Movsisyan 2021). This map informed the scope and methodological considerations of a subsequent rapid review requested by the WHO. We first published this rapid review in September 2020 (Burns 2020). Because the body of evidence on COVID‐19 is growing very quickly, the WHO requested the present (first) update of that review. The methods for the original rapid review were prespecified in a protocol that was submitted to and reviewed by Cochrane (see Appendix 1). The eligibility criteria were reviewed and agreed upon with WHO. The methods used in this update were largely identical to those employed in the original review; we transparently report below any instances where we have adapted the methods.

To conduct this rapid review, we employed abridged procedures of systematic reviewing at certain stages, according to the Cochrane guidance for rapid reviews (Garritty 2020). Specifically, only one review author conducted data extraction, assessed the risk of bias in epidemiological studies and assessed the quality of modelling studies. One review author checked risk of bias and quality ratings of all studies for consistency and plausibility. At least one additional review author checked for the correctness of all data reported in the data synthesis. Two or more review authors discussed any uncertainties during these stages. To ensure that the abridged procedures did not compromise the methodological rigour of the review, but also to ensure that all stages of the review were conducted consistently and correctly, we assigned these data extraction, risk of bias and quality assessment tasks to experienced Cochrane review authors, and involved researchers with modelling expertise to assist with the data extraction and quality assessment of modelling studies. Furthermore, we piloted the procedures for each stage, conducted regular team meetings, and kept a list of rolling questions that were updated continuously.

Criteria for considering studies for this review

Study designs

In the context of a global pandemic, evidence to inform decisions must be generated rapidly, meaning that methods traditionally used to evaluate the impact of interventions, such as randomised controlled trials (RCTs) or quasi‐experimental studies, while possible, may not be considered feasible, appropriate, timely or ethical. Indeed, in this specific context, simulation models developed to make predictions about the (highly uncertain) future often represent the only available evidence to guide decision‐making. To ensure that we captured all relevant study types, we considered a broad range of empirical studies of any size that provided a quantitative measure of impact, including experimental and quasi‐experimental studies, observational studies, and mathematical modelling studies. Thus, we included the following types of studies:

  • Experimental and quasi‐experimental studies, such as

    • RCTs

    • Interrupted time series (ITS) studies

    • Controlled before‐after (CBA) studies and difference‐in‐differences (DiD) studies

    • Instrumental variable (IV) studies

    • Regression discontinuity (RD) studies

  • Observational studies, such as

    • Cohort studies

    • Case‐control studies

  • Modelling studies, such as

    • Compartmental models (e.g. SEIR‐type models comprising multiple compartments, such as S: susceptible, E: exposed, I: infectious, R: recovered)

    • Bayesian hierarchical models (i.e. models comprising several submodels to integrate observed data as well as uncertainty)

    • Spatial models (i.e. modelling disease transmission spatially)

    • Time‐series models (i.e. models that model the temporal nature of disease transmission using time‐series techniques)

To avoid the inappropriate exclusion of studies, we considered all studies providing a quantitative measure of impact, regardless of whether they were indicated by any of these labels. We considered studies published in peer‐reviewed journals as well as those published on preprint servers. Our rationale for including preprint articles was that in the context of a global pandemic, there may be a scientific as well as moral case for publishing studies at the earliest opportunity to inform the emergency response. We included any studies that had been registered but not yet published (in a peer‐reviewed journal or on a preprint server) as 'ongoing' studies.

We excluded the following types of studies and publications:

  • Case reports

  • Studies that did not provide a quantitative measure of impact (e.g. studies providing a graphical summary of the number of cases over time in relation to the introduction of control measures, qualitative studies)

  • Diagnostic studies (e.g. assessing the sensitivity and specificity of different screening tests in general; we did, however, include studies on the use of screening tests at national borders as a travel‐related control measure)

  • Non‐empirical studies (e.g. commentaries, editorials, non‐systematic literature reviews not reporting primary empirical data)

  • Systematic reviews (although relevant reviews were used for backward citation searches)

  • Conference abstracts

Population

We included studies on human populations (without any age restriction) susceptible to SARS‐CoV‐2/COVID‐19. To be eligible, modelling studies had to use modelling parameters for disease transmission specified to reflect SARS‐CoV‐2/COVID‐19. In the original review, we also included studies on SARS‐CoV‐1/SARS and MERS‐CoV/MERS (Burns 2020).

For this update, we excluded studies:

  • not targeting human transmission;

  • concerned with humans at risk of developing other infectious diseases, characterised by different transmission properties (e.g.  SARS‐CoV‐1/SARS and MERS‐CoV/MERS, Ebola and viral meningitis, the transmission modes of which are primarily person‐to‐person, rather than airborne); and

  • addressing humans at risk of developing other infectious diseases, for which travel‐related control measures do not play a significant role in containing outbreaks (e.g. influenza).

Interventions

We considered travel‐related control measures affecting human travel across national borders. We considered both introduction and implementation, as well as relaxation and de‐implementation of the following measures.

  • Closure of national borders to entry or exit, or both, which stop cross‐border travel 

  • International travel restrictions or bans, or both, which reduce cross‐border travel. These may include the following specific measures.

    • Denial of entry or exit, or both, on the basis of nationality, travel history, health status or other characteristics

    • Full or partial suspension of cross‐border travel via any or all of land, air and sea

    • Visa requirement or refusal on the basis of nationality, travel history, health status or other characteristics

  • Screening at national borders, involving any of the measures listed below, as well as a follow‐up measure, such as testing, self‐isolation or refusal of entry, only for those who screen positive

    • Temperature measurement (e.g. thermography)

    • Health questionnaire (e.g. symptoms, travel history, contact history)

    • Physical examination

    • Testing for current or past infection

  • Quarantine or isolation of travellers crossing national borders, including voluntary or government‐mandated quarantine of travellers for different durations and without any follow‐up measures, such as testing at certain days of the quarantine

  • Any combination of the above measures

We excluded the following types of interventions.

  • Combinations of the above‐mentioned travel‐related control measures with other measures where studies do not provide effect estimates for the travel‐related control measures (e.g. studies providing a combined effect estimate for suspension of cross‐border travel and use of mandatory face masks in the general population) Studies in which the effect of travel‐related control measures cannot be disentangled from the effect of a broader suite of public health measures cannot usefully inform WHO recommendations on whether countries should or should not consider travel‐related control measures to contain the COVID‐19 pandemic.

  • All interventions not directly related to travel, including a range of containment and mitigation measures (e.g. community‐based quarantine, personal protective measures, hygiene measures, bans on mass gatherings and other social‐distancing measures).

  • All interventions related to movement of animals or goods.

  • All interventions concerned with human travel across subnational borders. While subnational measures can potentially inform national travel‐related control measures, these measures are not prioritised by the WHO. As shown in the previous evidence map (Movsisyan 2021), they are also often impossible to disentangle from other subnational measures, such as lockdowns, community quarantine or social distancing recommendations.

  • Travel warnings or travel advice issued by the WHO or national governments.

  • Studies of interventions solely concerned with the accuracy of tests rather than their implementation as part of an entry and/or exit border control measure.

  • Studies of interventions related to international travel but not concerned with cross‐border impacts, i.e. interventions to contain transmission within closed populations that only assessed their effect on these closed populations (e.g. on cruise ships, within detention centres). This exclusion criterion was added post hoc.

  • Usual practice (e.g. seasonal changes to travel) or events (e.g. school holidays) affecting travel but not representing travel‐related control measures.

  • Cancellation of events affecting international travel but undertaken as a means to prevent mass gatherings (e.g. Hajj, international sporting events, international trade fairs).

We included studies that assessed travel‐related control measures as specified above, targeting populations within one country (e.g. the lockdown of Wuhan, China) if their impact was assessed on the population of other countries (e.g. Australia).  We additionally considered relevant restrictions between mainland China and Hong Kong and Taiwan, given the existence of a hard border and the implementation of travel‐related control measures analogous to those implemented internationally.  

Other considerations

There are two Cochrane Rapid Reviews with overlapping studies. One published review focuses on quarantine measures, including quarantining travellers crossing national borders (Nussbaumer‐Streit 2020). The other review is concerned with screening measures, including entry and exit screening at national borders (Viswanathan 2020). In discussions with Cochrane and the WHO, we decided that it would be important for decision‐makers to be able to access the evidence on all travel‐related control measures in a single review. To address the overlap between the present review and the two separately conducted reviews, we checked our review findings with the findings from those reviews. While we identified a few overlapping studies, these are presented and discussed as part of different bodies of evidence and in relation to different scopes. We did not identify any discrepancies in reporting and interpretation. Along with our previous evidence map on travel‐related control measures (Burns 2020), we considered these reviews for backward citation searches.

Comparator(s)

We included a range of possible comparators, such as a counterfactual scenario in which the intervention was not implemented, a complete relaxation of the measure, or a partial relaxation of the measure. Likewise, a scenario of no intervention could have been compared against a counterfactual scenario in which an intervention was implemented or relaxed. A relevant study therefore may compare an observed intervention with a simulated scenario of no intervention, while another study may compare simulated stringent interventions with simulated lax interventions, while yet another study may compare an observed intervention with a simulated intervention implemented at an earlier time.

Outcome(s)

Primary outcomes

We considered studies assessing any of the following infectious disease transmission and screening‐related outcomes.

  • Cases avoided due to the measure (e.g. number, proportion, rate of cases observed or predicted in the community with and without the intervention).

  • Shift in epidemic development due to the intervention (e.g. probability of epidemic, time to/delay in epidemic arrival or peak, size of epidemic peak, change in the effective reproduction number).

  • Cases detected due to the measure: we focused on outcomes we felt are most relevant for decision‐makers in the current pandemic: the proportion of cases detected among the total number of cases (i.e. sensitivity, case detection rate) and the proportion of cases among those screening positive (i.e. the positive predictive value).

Secondary outcomes

We considered the following secondary outcomes if identified in studies that assessed at least one of the primary outcomes.

  • Any other infectious disease transmission outcome (e.g. number of severe cases in the community)

  • Healthcare utilisation (e.g. number of cases requiring treatment in the intensive care unit (ICU), time until ICU capacity is reached)

  • Resource requirements for implementing the intervention (e.g. costs associated with intervention, additional personnel, number of tests required)

  • Any adverse effects (e.g. health, economic and social outcomes)

  • User acceptability (e.g. passenger confidence)

We did not assess user acceptability in the original review; following exchanges with the WHO, we added this secondary outcome to the update.

Search methods for identification of studies

The search strategy was structured around two blocks focusing firstly on COVID‐19, SARS and MERS, and secondly on travel‐related control measures. For the first block, we added search terms related to ‘test’ to make the strategy more sensitive to capturing studies on testing in this update. We conducted the searches in English but aimed to include studies published in any language. The search strategy was informed by the search strategy used in the evidence map for travel‐related control measures (Movsisyan 2021). An experienced information specialist adapted and ran the searches, which were verified by a content expert and reviewed by Cochrane.

Electronic databases

For this update, we ran searches in the following electronic databases.

  • Ovid MEDLINE and Epub Ahead of Print, In‐Process & Other Non‐Indexed Citations, Daily and Versions (1946 to 13 November 2020)

  • Ovid Embase (1996 to 13 November 2020)

Other searches

We additionally searched the following COVID‐19‐specific databases.

  • Cochrane COVID‐19 Study Register (covid-19.cochrane.org), which contains study references from ClinicalTrials.gov, WHO International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP), PubMed, medRxiv and other handsearched articles from publishers’ websites.

  • WHO 'Global literature on coronavirus disease' database (search.bvsalud.org/global-literature-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov), which primarily contains research (published and/or prepublication) articles indexed in PubMed, Web of Science, Global Index Medicus and Embase. In addition, Lanzhou University (Lanzhou, China) submits citations on a daily basis from the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) as well as a number of Chinese journal publishers. Due to high overlap across our sources, we added a filter here to exclude records from MEDLINE and Embase.

In the original review, we also searched the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) COVID‐19 Research Articles Downloadable Database, but this resource is no longer available. Instead, the contents of this database are now contained in both the Cochrane COVID‐19 Study Register and the WHO 'Global literature on coronavirus disease' database.

Finally, we conducted backward citation searches of systematic reviews on travel‐related control measures known to us or identified through our searches (see Appendix 2) to identify additional eligible studies. The full search strategy is presented in Appendix 3.

Data collection and analysis

Selection of studies

To harmonise the screening process, we asked all review authors involved with the title and abstract screening to screen an initial set of the same 50 studies, after which we organised a group call to discuss any issues. In the original review, one review author screened all titles and abstracts, while a second review author screened only those excluded by the first review author. For this update, we screened all titles and abstracts in duplicate. The team conducted title and abstract screening using the Rayyan online systematic review software (Ouzzani 2016).

As with the title and abstract screening process, we harmonised the full‐text screening process by asking all review authors involved with full‐text screening to screen an initial same set of 10 studies (Garritty 2020). The team then discussed any open questions or issues in a group call. Subsequently, two review authors working independently each screened the remaining full‐text records in duplicate. The two review authors discussed any discrepancies, and consulted a third review author or the entire author team where necessary until they reached consensus. We recorded reasons for exclusion for all studies excluded at the full‐text screening stage.

Inclusion of non‐English language studies

We considered studies published in all languages. Within the review team, we were able to consider studies in Armenian, English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, and sought help with translation for any other languages, where needed. We screened a small number of studies in other languages at the title and abstract screening stage, including some with an English abstract and some written in German and Spanish, however, we did not identify any relevant studies in any languages other than English.

Excluding eligible studies from the analysis

For this update, we made the post hoc decision to exclude from the analysis several studies meeting the review eligibility criteria. During data extraction and synthesis, we found these studies to be less informative or potentially misleading for decision‐making. These studies included: (1) observational screening studies with limited data; (2) observational ecological studies; and (3) modelling studies using overly simplistic or theoretical assumptions and presenting abstract findings.

  1. Some observational studies evaluating entry and/or exit screening measures reported only limited data regarding the effectiveness of the measure. These studies report, for example, how many individuals have been screened, how many were screened positively, and how many were COVID‐19 cases. However, due to the lack of a reference test, the true number of cases is unknown. As a result, these studies provide information on how many cases were detected, but not on how many cases were missed; thus we feel that these studies are not sufficiently informative for decision‐makers. We also excluded such studies from the analysis in the original review.

  2. Observational ecological studies examine the aggregated impact of various travel‐related control measures across countries, and, in principle, such studies could be of interest to decision‐makers. However, the aggregated nature of the data places these ecological studies at even higher risk of bias than other observational studies, making them even less able to deliver causal insights. Moreover, interventions and outcomes, and the associated results, tend to be operationalised in a simplified manner across countries. Consequently, we felt that these studies were at high risk of delivering over‐simplified and biased results.

  3. All modelling studies providing an assessment of the impact of travel‐related control measures make some assumptions to simulate the real‐world; these assumptions relate to aspects such as the intervention itself, the travel scenario and/or the regions implementing and being restricted by the intervention. Studies in which most of these aspects use simplistic or conceptual assumptions, however, tend to provide abstract findings that cannot readily be interpreted or applied. We feel that mainly theoretical studies are not sufficiently informative for decision‐makers.

Data extraction and management

One review author extracted study characteristics and data from all included main studies using a data extraction form in Microsoft Excel. All extracted data were checked by a second review author. We piloted the data extraction form, using three studies that represented different intervention types and that met the inclusion criteria. Appendix 4 provides the details on the data extraction categories. For studies excluded from the analysis, we extracted descriptive characteristics relating to the PICO elements, as well as a short narrative description of the results. To do so, we used a simplified version of the data extraction form used for the main studies.

In the review protocol (see Appendix 1), we specified that we would consider searching for data from external sources to enhance our understanding of the design features of the travel‐related control measures and the stage of the pandemic at the time these were implemented. However, given the lack of comprehensive reporting and the inconsistency of the information provided across these sources (e.g. discrepancies in how WHO reports described the stage of the pandemic in earlier months), and given that this information was largely not applicable to modelling studies, we decided against using these sources.

Assessment of risk of bias in included studies

One review author rated the risk of bias or the quality of each included study, depending on the type of study, and a second review author checked the judgements. The studies excluded from the review analysis were not further assessed at this stage. The team of review authors involved with assessing risk of bias and quality was largely the same for this update as for the original review. Given that one new review author was involved with this step, at the outset we discussed how to correctly and consistently apply each of the tools to one screening study and two modelling studies before beginning the assessment. These review authors discussed any questions or uncertainties that arose during the process.

Given the broad range of study designs, we applied multiple tools in assessing the risk of bias or quality of included studies, with the same tools applied in the original review and the present update. We had planned to use version 2 of the Cochrane 'Risk of bias' tool for experimental studies (Higgins 2019), and ROBINS‐I for quasi‐experimental and observational intervention studies (Sterne 2016). However, we did not identify any experimental studies. We identified two synthetic control studies, which are generally considered a type of quasi‐experimental study. However, given that ROBINS‐I was not developed for this type of quasi‐experimental study with more sophisticated statistical methods, we assessed these studies with the quality appraisal tool developed for modelling studies, as described below.

To appropriately assess the risk of bias of observational studies evaluating screening at borders, which are more closely related to diagnostic studies than intervention evaluations, we decided post‐protocol to apply the Quality Assessment of Diagnostic Accuracy Studies (QUADAS‐2) tool (Whiting 2011), as also employed in the Cochrane review on screening measures to control COVID‐19 (Viswanathan 2020). This tool comprises four domains: participant selection (i.e. passenger/traveller selection, for our purposes), the index test, the reference standard, and the flow and timing. For each of these domains, using a series of signalling questions, we provided a judgment of ‘low’, ‘unclear’ or ‘high’ risk of bias for each study. Additionally, the tool facilitates a concrete assessment of generalisability through considering how the population, index test and reference standard compares with the aspects of interest in this review. In line with QUADAS‐2 guidance, we considered how best to apply the tool to our specific review question. The tool, including the specifications we applied in making judgements, is outlined in Appendix 5.

As described in the original review (Burns 2020), no validated tool is available for assessing the risk of bias of modelling studies. Following the suggestions by (Egger 2017), we developed a bespoke tool for the assessment of modelling studies and selected criteria from a rapid review of the methodological literature (Philips 2006) and two methodological studies (Caro 2014; Egger 2017). The tool comprises the following domains: (i) model structure, (ii) input data, (iii) validation, (iv) uncertainty and (v) transparency. The individual criteria we applied, in the form of signalling questions, are outlined in Appendix 6. We reported each of the criteria separately, that is, we did not combine multiple criteria into a summary score. This also allows for a distinction between ‘fatal flaw indicators’, notably inappropriate structural assumptions and input parameters, and other aspects of model quality and credibility, such as internal and external model validation (Caro 2014).

Contacting study authors

We contacted study authors to request additional information where unclear or non‐reported aspects precluded the assessment of eligibility or inclusion in the data synthesis.

Data synthesis

Given that observational studies provide a measured estimate of effect whereas modelling studies predict such an effect, we treated these as two separate bodies of evidence in the synthesis (see also 'Assessment of certainty of evidence').

Due to substantial heterogeneity across included studies with regard to the setting, population, intervention and other contextual factors, as well as study methods, and as specified in the protocol (Appendix 1), we decided that data were not sufficiently similar to conduct meta‐analyses. We therefore synthesised the findings narratively and in tabular form, stratified by intervention type and outcome. We adhered to the 'Synthesis without meta‐analysis' (SWiM) in systematic reviews reporting guideline (Campbell 2020).

Part one of the narrative synthesis comprised four steps in moving from the effects reported at the individual study‐level to a summary across studies: (i) we created a study‐by‐study table describing the effects of interventions, as well as potential effect moderators, as estimated in each included study; (ii) we classified the effect direction for each reported intervention effect, following recent guidance (Hilton Boon 2020); (iii) for each intervention category and primary outcome, we subsequently looked across contributing studies to develop the summary of findings, including a description of the proportion of studies predicting a positive, negative or no effect for the intervention; (iv) we abstracted this summary of findings for each intervention category and primary outcome into a concise narrative summary to present, along with the certainty of the evidence, in the 'Summary of findings' table and the 'Results' section of the review, paying particular attention to sources of heterogeneity (see below).

Part two involved determining the direction of effect for each intervention‐outcome pair, which could be a positive effect, no effect, mixed effect, or negative effect. For systematic reviews of public health interventions, a beneficial effect of any size beyond the null is often considered to be potentially relevant. Additionally, for travel‐related control measures, this minimal important difference is highly context‐dependent. For example, the role of international travel in importing cases, and the associated role of travel‐related control measures in containing the pandemic, will be different in countries where community transmission is not occurring compared to countries where community transmission is widespread. Consistent with this perspective, we did not consider the size of the effect in determining effect direction.  

Specifically, we first specified the comparators used in each study (e.g. measure versus no measure or combined measure versus single measure). In determining effect direction, we classified an effect for which a better outcome was observed for the intervention condition than the comparator condition as ‘positive’, and an effect for which a worse outcome was observed for the intervention condition as ‘negative’.  Only studies in which the two conditions reported identical effect estimates were classified as ‘no effect’. Many studies assessed an intervention in multiple countries or examined a range of scenarios related to a specific intervention (e.g. in the context of high‐, moderate‐ and low‐community transmission). Where studies observed consistent effect directions across these conditions, we classified the effect direction as such; where inconsistent effect directions were observed, we classified the effect direction as ‘mixed’.

Assessment of heterogeneity and subgroup analyses

In the absence of meta‐analyses, and given the substantial heterogeneity of included studies, we did not conduct analyses of subgroups. As part of our narrative synthesis, however, we aimed to identify potential sources of heterogeneity that may have influenced intervention effectiveness. Given methodological differences, as well as differences in interventions, contexts and outcomes, for modelling studies we focused on potential moderating factors (e.g. level of community transmission, stringency of intervention, level of travel after relaxation of intervention) that were assessed within a given study. The methods used to assess these potential moderators differed widely across individual studies, however we only considered data that were assessed and clearly reported as part of a formal analysis. Given that observational studies of entry and exit screening measures were relatively homogeneous, for these studies we examined potential moderators across studies (e.g. type of screening, timing of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing).

Assessment of certainty of evidence

We used the GRADE approach to assess the certainty of the primary outcomes. One review author collated the evidence for each primary outcome and suggested initial certainty of evidence ratings. These were then further deliberated in a team of review authors and a joint decision for certainty of evidence ratings was made for each primary outcome.

The certainty of evidence is defined in GRADE as the extent to which one can be confident that the true effect of an intervention lies on one side of a specified threshold, or within a chosen range (Hultcrantz 2017). In the original review, as well as in this update, we considered 'difference from the null' as an important threshold, assuming that even small effect sizes may be relevant for population‐level travel‐related control measures, as noted above.

The certainty of evidence rating in GRADE yields four possible levels of evidence: high certainty (i.e. the estimated effect lies close to the true effect), moderate certainty (i.e. the estimated effect is probably close to the true effect), low certainty (i.e. the estimated effect might substantially differ from the true effect), and very low certainty (i.e. the estimated effect is probably substantially different from the true effect).

In accordance with our approach to data synthesis, we rated bodies of evidence from observational and modelling studies separately. In GRADE, evidence from RCTs enters the rating as high certainty, as does evidence from observational studies whose risk of bias has been assessed using ROBINS‐I (Schünemann 2019). Subsequently, five domains are used to downgrade evidence, including study limitations, inconsistency, indirectness, imprecision and publication bias, and three domains are used to upgrade evidence, including plausible confounding, large estimates of effect, and dose‐response relationship. The upgrading applies only when evidence has not been downgraded.

To rate the certainty of evidence from modelling studies, we used the recent guidance developed by the GRADE Working Group (Brozek 2021). As per the guidance, we initially assessed the body of evidence from modelling studies as high certainty and then used the domains described above to assess certainty of model outputs. We then applied the above domains to further downgrade or upgrade certainty of evidence from modelling studies, using tailored interpretations, as specified in the guidance. For example, risk of bias in modelling studies refers to the credibility of the model and its inputs; inconsistency assesses the difference in the results of two or more models; imprecision examines the model point estimate (e.g. predicted event) and the variability of that estimate; indirectness examines model outputs in relation to the prespecified PICO elements of interest; finally, publication bias refers to the likelihood that relevant models have been developed but not made available (Brozek 2021).

To rate the certainty of evidence from observational studies assessing screening at borders in detecting cases (i.e. the proportion of cases detected and the positive predictive value), we used the GRADE guidance for rating the certainty of evidence for diagnostic tests and strategies (Schünemann 2008). In accordance with the guidance, we initially rated the body of evidence from these cross‐sectional studies reporting an appropriate reference standard (e.g. a symptom/exposure‐based screening followed by PCR testing) as high‐certainty evidence. We then applied the five GRADE domains as described above to further downgrade evidence when deemed appropriate.

Results

Results of the search

The PRISMA flow diagram (Moher 2009), shown in Figure 1 describes the study selection process. For this update, we screened 3370 new unique records at the title and abstract screening stage (3033 identified through database searches and 337 through backward citation searches of systematic reviews), in addition to the 3036 unique records screened in the first version (6406 records in total). We screened the full texts of 243 new records, in addition to the 385 records that were screened in the first version (628 records in total). Overall, 88 records met the eligibility criteria for this update (comprising 60 new records in addition to the 28 records focusing on SARS‐CoV‐2/COVID‐19 included in the original review). Reasons for excluding studies at the full‐text screening stage are presented in Figure 1. Ninety‐three of these studies, the exclusion of which was decided in rounds of discussion among the review authors, are further described in the Characteristics of excluded studies tables.


Systematic review PRISMA flow diagram

Systematic review PRISMA flow diagram

Out of the 88 records, we excluded 22 records from the analysis; thus, these did not contribute effects to the data synthesis or inform conclusions. As described in more detail under 'Methods', these comprised observational screening studies with limited data (Chang 2020; Expert‐Taskforce 2020; Gupta 2020; Hayakawa 2020; Ing 2020; Jernigan 2020; Potdar 2020; Sriwijitalai 2020a), observational ecological studies (Arshed 2020; Chaudhry 2020; Jablonska 2020; Koh 2020; Leffler 2020; Liu 2020a; Ogundokun 2020; Stokes 2020; Teixeira da Silva 2020), and modelling studies for which a ‘real‐world’ effect cannot readily be interpreted (Baba 2020; Chen 2020d; Cacciapaglia 2020a; Cacciapaglia 2020b; Jorritsma 2020). The characteristics of these 22 studies are described in Appendix 7.

We included 66 records in the analysis. These represent 62 unique studies, as four records assessed interventions already addressed by other included records (Arima 2020; Bays 2020; Linka 2020a; Yamahata 2020). The characteristics of each of the 62 studies are described in detail in the 'Characteristics of included studies' and summarised below.

We contacted eight study authors requesting additional information. We did not identify any ongoing studies.

Included studies

The 62 studies included in the analysis are described in the following sections.

Setting

We found studies that evaluated or simulated travel‐related control measures in a range of countries across the globe, representing all WHO regions. Countries included Australia (Adekunle 2020; Costantino 2020; Liebig 2020; McLure 2020), Bahrain (Al‐Qahtani 2020), Brunei (Wong J 2020), China, including Hong Kong and Macao (Chen J 2020; Chen T 2020; Lio 2020; Pinotti 2020; Kwok 2020; Wells 2020; Wong MC 2020; Yang 2020; Zhang L 2020), France (Lagier 2020), Germany (Hoehl 2020), Greece (Lytras 2020), India (Mandal 2020), Ireland (Grannell 2020), Japan (Arima 2020; Yamahata 2020), Kenya (Kivuti‐Bito 2020), Lebanon (Deeb 2020), Malaysia (Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020), Mauritius (Nuckchady 2020), New Zealand (Binny 2020; James 2020; Steyn 2020; Wilson 2020), Saudi Arabia (Al‐Tawfiq 2020), Singapore (Chen T 2020; Ng 2020), South Korea (Boldog 2020; Kim 2020; Ryu 2020), Switzerland (Sruthi 2020), Taiwan (Chen Y‐H 2020), Thailand (Boldog 2020), UK (Clifford 2020b; Taylor 2020), and the USA (Boldog 2020; Davis 2020; Nowrasteh 2020; Odendaal 2020). Ten studies assessed measures implemented across multiple countries using a cross‐country comparison (Anderson 2020; Chinazzi 2020; Kang 2020; Linka 2020a; Nakamura 2020; Russell TW 2020; Shi 2020; Utsunomiya 2020; Zhang C 2020; Zhong 2020), while eight modelling studies did not refer to a specific country or setting (Anzai 2020; Ashcroft 2020; Bays 2020; Clifford 2020a; Dickens 2020; Gostic 2020; Quilty 2020; Russell WA 2020). Most studies specified a travel‐related control measure that restricted travel from China (Adekunle 2020; Anzai 2020; Boldog 2020; Chen J 2020; Chinazzi 2020; Costantino 2020; Davis 2020; Hoehl 2020; Kang 2020; Lagier 2020; Liebig 2020; Lio 2020; Mandal 2020; McLure 2020; Ng 2020; Nowrasteh 2020; Odendaal 2020; Pinotti 2020; Ryu 2020; Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020; Shi 2020; Kwok 2020; Wells 2020). Other regions restricted by the travel measures assessed in the studies were Australia (Wilson 2020), Bahrain (Al‐Tawfiq 2020), Canada (Al‐Tawfiq 2020), Dubai (Al‐Tawfiq 2020), Egypt (Al‐Tawfiq 2020), Indonesia (Liebig 2020), Iran (Adekunle 2020; Kim 2020; Liebig 2020; Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020), Ireland (Grannell 2020), Italy (Adekunle 2020; Al‐Tawfiq 2020; Liebig 2020; Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020; Wong MC 2020), Japan (Wong MC 2020), Oman (Al‐Tawfiq 2020), Singapore (Chen J 2020), South Korea (Adekunle 2020; Liebig 2020), Spain (Al‐Tawfiq 2020; Lytras 2020), the UK (Al‐Tawfiq 2020; Lytras 2020), and the USA (Al‐Tawfiq 2020; Linka 2020b). 

Population

Sixty‐two studies assessed the impact of travel‐related control measures in relation to COVID‐19 (Adekunle 2020; Al‐Qahtani 2020; Al‐Tawfiq 2020; Anderson 2020; Anzai 2020; Arima 2020; Ashcroft 2020; Banholzer 2020; Bays 2020; Binny 2020; Boldog 2020; Chen J 2020; Chen T 2020; Chen Y‐H 2020; Chinazzi 2020; Clifford 2020a; Clifford 2020b; Costantino 2020; Davis 2020; Deeb 2020; Dickens 2020; Gostic 2020; Grannell 2020; Hoehl 2020; James 2020; Kang 2020; Kim 2020; Lagier 2020; Liebig 2020; Linka 2020a; Linka 2020b; Lio 2020; Kivuti‐Bito 2020; Lytras 2020; Mandal 2020; McLure 2020; Nakamura 2020; Ng 2020; Nowrasteh 2020; Nuckchady 2020; Odendaal 2020; Pinotti 2020; Quilty 2020; Russell TW 2020; Russell WA 2020; Ryu 2020; Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020; Shi 2020; Sruthi 2020; Steyn 2020; Taylor 2020; Utsunomiya 2020; Kwok 2020; Wells 2020; Wilson 2020; Wong J 2020; Wong MC 2020; Yamahata 2020; Yang 2020; Zhang C 2020; Zhang L 2020; Zhong 2020).

Intervention and comparisons

Included studies referred to a range of travel‐related control measures, which we classified into four categories.

  1. Travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel: studies in this intervention category used models to simulate COVID‐19 outbreak scenarios  (Adekunle 2020; Anderson 2020; Anzai 2020; Banholzer 2020; Binny 2020; Boldog 2020; Chen T 2020; Chinazzi 2020; Costantino 2020; Davis 2020; Deeb 2020; Grannell 2020; Kang 2020; Liebig 2020; Linka 2020a; Linka 2020b; McLure 2020; Nakamura 2020; Nowrasteh 2020; Odendaal 2020; Pinotti 2020; Russell TW 2020; Shi 2020; Sruthi 2020; Utsunomiya 2020; Kwok 2020; Wells 2020; Yang 2020; Zhang C 2020; Zhang L 2020; Zhong 2020). The control measures were often simulated as different levels of reduction in travel volume (e.g. 25% and 75% (Adekunle 2020; Anderson 2020; Anzai 2020; Boldog 2020; Chinazzi 2020; Linka 2020a)). While in practice this may imply a border closure or restriction of travel to varying degrees, such a differentiation would be arbitrary based on the methods used in the studies to simulate these measures. We therefore report these in a combined intervention category.

  2. Screening at borders: studies in this intervention category comprised observational studies and modelling studies reporting data on symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders (e.g. presence of cough and/or fever and/or risk factors (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Bays 2020; Clifford 2020b)) and/or test‐based screening at borders (e.g. PCR testing (Clifford 2020b; Taylor 2020)) (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Al‐Tawfiq 2020; Arima 2020; Bays 2020; Chen J 2020; Clifford 2020a; Clifford 2020b; Dickens 2020; Gostic 2020; Hoehl 2020; Lagier 2020; Lio 2020; Kim 2020; Lytras 2020; Mandal 2020; Ng 2020; Nuckchady 2020; Quilty 2020; Russell WA 2020; Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020; Steyn 2020; Taylor 2020; Wells 2020; Wilson 2020; Wong J 2020; Yamahata 2020). This intervention category included screening with a follow‐up measure, such as testing, self‐isolation or refusal of entry, only for those who screened positive. While a few studies explicitly highlighted the presence of this follow‐up measure, many did not. In some of the observational studies, screening is followed by a 14‐day quarantine, but in intervention category 2 we treat this quarantine period as a way to identify ‘true’ cases, rather than as an intervention in its own right; relevant studies are also included in intervention category 4.

  3. Quarantine: modelling studies in this intervention category assessed voluntary or government‐mandated quarantine of travellers of different duration without any accompanying or follow‐up measures, such as symptom/exposure‐based screening or testing upon arrival or at certain days of the quarantine (Ashcroft 2020; Chen T 2020; Chen Y‐H 2020; Clifford 2020b; Dickens 2020; James 2020; Kivuti‐Bito 2020; Russell WA 2020; Ryu 2020; Steyn 2020; Taylor 2020; Wong MC 2020).

  4. Quarantine and screening at borders: the modelling and observational studies in this intervention category reported data on the combination of quarantine of travellers crossing national borders and screening at borders and/or at different days during quarantine (e.g. day 3, 5, 7, and 14) (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Arima 2020; Ashcroft 2020; Bays 2020; Chen J 2020; Clifford 2020b; Russell WA 2020; Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020; Steyn 2020; Taylor 2020; Wilson 2020). In the observational studies, after the combined 14‐day quarantine and applied screening measures, there is a final PCR testing before release; in intervention category 4 we treat this final PCR testing as a way to identify ‘true’ cases, rather than as an intervention in its own right.

Some included studies were inconsistent and sometimes ambiguous in how they labelled and described travel‐related control measures. The terms “screening” and “testing”, for example, were used inconsistently and often interchangeably without further specification of the procedures. In this review, we use the term “screening” more broadly to refer to any procedure to assess an individual for a potential disease, including an assessment of symptom, exposure and/or testing. Where data allows, we have differentiated between entry and/or exit symptom/exposure‐based screening alone (i.e. screening for symptoms, such as fever or cough and/or screening for risk factors or when “screening” was used without further specification of the procedures) and entry and/or exit test‐based screening. With regard to testing, most studies specified reverse transcription PCR testing (RT‐PCR testing – also referred to as quantitative PCR and a method to measure the amount of RNA) or simply PCR testing, while a few studies did not specify the testing procedure at all. In this review, we use the term "PCR testing" for consistency. Similarly, studies were inconsistent in the use of the terms “quarantine” and “(self‐)isolation” and often used them interchangeably. In this review, we therefore use the term “quarantine” to refer to the separation of travellers at risk of developing the disease, and “(self‐)isolation” to refer to the separation of confirmed cases (HHS 2020).

For this review, we identified the following intervention‐comparator pairs.

  1. Travel‐related control measure (intervention) versus no travel‐related control measure (comparator)

  2. Maintaining travel‐related control measure (intervention) versus relaxing travel‐related control measure (comparator)

  3. More stringent travel‐related control measure (intervention) versus less stringent travel‐related control measure (comparator)

  4. Earlier travel‐related control measure (intervention) versus later travel‐related control measure (comparator)

  5. Combined travel‐related control measure (intervention) versus single travel‐related control measure (control)

Since, in most modelling studies, the comparison to the travel‐related control measure was a scenario in which the measure was not implemented, we have used one 'Summary of findings' table per intervention category to describe the evidence and have not split the evidence based on different comparators used. Meanwhile, we have developed a separate 'Summary of findings' table for the evidence from the modelling studies comparing combined measures with a single measure.

In the observational studies concerned with screening and travel‐related quarantine, the comparison was the counterfactual of not implementing the measure.

Outcomes

Primary outcomes

We included studies assessing three broad categories of primary outcomes.

  1. Cases avoided due to the measure

  2. Shift in epidemic development

  3. Cases detected due to the measure

For category 1, we identified specific outcomes related to the number or proportion of cases in the community (Anderson 2020; Banholzer 2020; Binny 2020; Chen T 2020; Chen Y‐H 2020; Costantino 2020; Deeb 2020; Kang 2020; Linka 2020a; Nowrasteh 2020; Kwok 2020; Wong MC 2020; Yang 2020; Zhang C 2020; Zhong 2020), the number or proportion of imported or exported cases (Adekunle 2020; Anzai 2020; Chen T 2020; Chinazzi 2020; Costantino 2020; Dickens 2020; Liebig 2020; McLure 2020; Russell TW 2020; Wells 2020), the number or proportion of cases seeded by imported cases (Dickens 2020; James 2020; Ryu 2020), the probability of an imported case not infecting anyone (James 2020), the number or proportion of deaths (Binny 2020; Costantino 2020; Kwok 2020), the risk of importation or exportation (Nakamura 2020; Shi 2020; Zhang L 2020), and the proportion of secondary cases (Dickens 2020).

For category 2, we identified outcomes related to the probability of eliminating the epidemic (Binny 2020), the effective reproduction number (Linka 2020a; Sruthi 2020), the time to outbreak (Anzai 2020; Clifford 2020a; Davis 2020; Grannell 2020; Linka 2020b; Kivuti‐Bito 2020; Mandal 2020; Nuckchady 2020; Odendaal 2020; Wilson 2020; Zhong 2020), the risk of an outbreak (Anzai 2020; Boldog 2020; Nuckchady 2020), the number or proportion of cases at peak (Binny 2020; Grannell 2020), the epidemic growth acceleration (Utsunomiya 2020), and the exportation growth rate (Pinotti 2020).

Finally, for category 3, we identified outcomes related to days at risk of transmission (Clifford 2020b; Russell WA 2020), the number or proportion of cases detected (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Al‐Tawfiq 2020; Arima 2020; Bays 2020; Chen J 2020; Gostic 2020; Hoehl 2020; Kim 2020; Lytras 2020; Ng 2020; Quilty 2020; Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020; Taylor 2020; Wilson 2020; Wong J 2020; Yamahata 2020), the positive predictive value (PPV) (Arima 2020; Chen J 2020; Hoehl 2020; Kim 2020; Lytras 2020; Ng 2020; Yamahata 2020), and the probability of releasing an infected individual into the community (Ashcroft 2020; Clifford 2020b; Steyn 2020).

It should be noted that studies were also inconsistent in how they described the specific outcomes. In our classification of the specific outcomes within the broader outcome categories, we have used general terms to enable consistent reporting. For example, we use “outbreak” as a broad term to describe the outcomes labelled in specific studies as “occurrence major epidemic” (Anzai 2020), “beginning of community transmission” (Davis 2020), or “epidemic arrival” (Zhong 2020).

Secondary outcomes

We identified four studies reporting on secondary outcomes related to infectious disease transmission and healthcare utilisation (Ashcroft 2020; Chen Y‐H 2020; Steyn 2020; Kwok 2020). For the first category, one study reported on the probability of cases seeded by infected front‐line workers at quarantine facilities (Steyn 2020), and two studies reported on the number of people quarantined (Ashcroft 2020; Chen Y‐H 2020), with one of the studies reporting a metric defined as “utility of quarantine” and measured as a ratio between the amount of overall transmission prevented and the number of person days spent in quarantine (Ashcroft 2020). For the second category of outcomes, we identified one study reporting on the date on which hospital capacity is reached (Kwok 2020).

Study designs

We identified 49 modelling studies across the four intervention categories (Adekunle 2020; Anderson 2020; Anzai 2020; Ashcroft 2020; Banholzer 2020; Bays 2020; Binny 2020; Boldog 2020; Chen T 2020; Chen Y‐H 2020; Chinazzi 2020; Clifford 2020a; Clifford 2020b; Costantino 2020; Davis 2020; Deeb 2020; Dickens 2020; Gostic 2020; Grannell 2020; James 2020; Kang 2020; Liebig 2020; Linka 2020a; Linka 2020b; Kivuti‐Bito 2020; Mandal 2020; McLure 2020; Nakamura 2020; Nowrasteh 2020; Nuckchady 2020; Odendaal 2020; Pinotti 2020; Quilty 2020; Russell TW 2020; Russell WA 2020; Ryu 2020; Shi 2020; Sruthi 2020; Steyn 2020; Taylor 2020; Utsunomiya 2020; Kwok 2020; Wells 2020; Wilson 2020; Wong MC 2020; Yang 2020; Zhang C 2020; Zhang L 2020; Zhong 2020). Modelling studies varied in the employed modelling approaches; details are presented in the 'Characteristics of included studies'.

We identified 13 observational studies assessing symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Al‐Tawfiq 2020; Arima 2020; Chen J 2020; Hoehl 2020; Kim 2020; Lagier 2020; Lio 2020; Lytras 2020; Ng 2020; Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020; Wong J 2020; Yamahata 2020). Four of these observational studies also assessed quarantine and screening at borders (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Arima 2020; Chen J 2020; Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020).

Risk of bias and quality of included studies

The risk of bias (observational studies) and quality (modelling studies) of included studies is summarised in Table 1 and Table 2; these summaries are stratified by intervention type, consistent with the narrative synthesis.

Open in table viewer
Table 1. Summary of QUADAS‐2 'risk of bias' assessment for screening studies

Study

D1: Traveller selection

D2: Index test

D3: Reference test

D4: Flow and timing

Symptom screening

Al‐Qahtani 2020

Low

Unclear

Low

Unclear

Arima 2020

Unclear

Low

Low

Unclear

Chen J 2020

Low

Unclear

Low

Unclear

Hoehl 2020

Low

Low

Unclear

Unclear

Kim 2020

Low

Low

Unclear

Low

Lytras 2020

Low

Unclear

High

Unclear

Ng 2020

High

Low

Low

Unclear

Wong J 2020

Unclear

Unclear

Unclear

Unclear

Yamahata 2020

Low

Unclear

High

High

PCR test

Arima 2020

Unclear

Low

Low

Unclear

Al‐Qahtani 2020

Low

Low

Low

Unclear

Al‐Tawfiq 2020

High

Low

Low

Low

Lagier 2020

High

Unclear

Low

Unclear

Lio 2020

Unclear

Low

Low

Low

Ng 2020

High

Low

High

Unclear

Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020

Low

Low

Low

Unclear

Combined

Al‐Qahtani 2020

Low

Low

Unclear

Unclear

Arima 2020

Unclear

Low

Low

Unclear

Chen J 2020

Low

Low

Low

Unclear

Lio 2020

Unclear

Low

Low

Low

Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020

Low

Low

Unclear

Unclear

Open in table viewer
Table 2. Summary of quality appraisal for modelling studies

Study

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Q7

Q8

Q9

Q10

Travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel

Adekunle 2020

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Anderson 2020

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Anzai 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Major

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Banholzer 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Binny 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Boldog 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Chen T 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Chinazzi 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Costantino 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Davis 2020

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Moderate

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Deeb 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Grannell 2020

No to minor

Major

Moderate

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

Major

Kang 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Major

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Major

Liebig 2020

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Major

Linka 2020a

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Linka 2020b

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

McLure 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Nakamura 2020

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Nowrasteh 2020

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Major

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Odendaal 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Pinotti 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Russell TW 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Shi 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Sruthi 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Utsunomiya 2020

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

No to minor

Reported

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Kwok 2020

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Wells 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Yang 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Zhang C 2020

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Reported

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Zhang L 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Major

Zhong 2020

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

Moderate

Reported

No to minor

Moderate

Moderate

Screening at borders

Bays 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Clifford 2020a

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Major

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Clifford 2020b

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Dickens 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Gostic 2020

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Mandal 2020

No to minor

Major

Moderate

Major

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Nuckchady 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Major

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Quilty 2020

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Major

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Russell WA 2020

No to minor

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Steyn 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Taylor 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Wells 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Wilson 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Major

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Quarantine of travellers alone

Ashcroft 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Chen Y‐H 2020

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Chen T 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Clifford 2020b

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Dickens 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

James 2020

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Kivuti‐Bito 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Russell WA 2020

No to minor

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Ryu 2020

No to minor

Major

Moderate

Major

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Steyn 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Taylor 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Wong MC 2020

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

Major

Quarantine of travellers and screening combined

Ashcroft 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Bays 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Clifford 2020b

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Russell WA 2020

No to minor

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Steyn 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Taylor 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Wilson 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Major

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

We assessed risk of bias of observational studies concerned with screening or quarantining travellers using QUADAS‐2. Table 1 shows that the selection of the traveller population (D1) was associated with a mix of low, unclear and high risk of bias, the index test (D2) was associated with either low or unclear risk of bias, the reference test (D3) was associated with a mix of low, unclear and high risk of bias, and the flow (D4) was generally associated with an unclear risk of bias. The population generally comprised all passengers (for studies of evacuation flights) or all travellers arriving at the airport of interest (for studies of real‐world screening approaches); concerns related to instances where aspects such as symptom status determined entry into the study (e.g. febrile travellers are refused boarding), or how travellers were treated prior to the study (e.g. where travellers are quarantined prior to travel, and symptomatic travellers are filtered out prior to the study beginning). Uncertainty around the index test existed where studies did not provide a clear threshold for categorising travellers as symptomatic. The reference test approach varied among studies, and included, for example, PCR testing upon arrival and/or symptom observation during a 14‐day quarantine period with PCR testing of those who developed symptoms, PCR testing of all individuals regardless of symptom status, and/or PCR testing at the end of the quarantine period. Concerns with risk of bias were related to whether the combination of measures considered the reference test was likely to detect all infected individuals (so that individuals in asymptomatic or presymptomatic states would be discovered) or whether the intensity of the reference test was dependent on symptom status (e.g. where individuals with symptoms were tested more often and at a later stage of the quarantine period than asymptomatic individuals). Regarding the flow, an underestimation of the effect could occur if individuals were infected after the screening took place, for example during quarantine; here the risk depends on the specific quarantine facility and procedures, and these were often not well described. Individual judgements for each study can be found in Appendix 8.

Furthermore, the QUADAS‐2 tool facilitates an assessment of the applicability of the studies; overall we had substantial concerns regarding the applicability of most studies, notably those conducted for evacuation flights or during a cruise ship outbreak. Thus, it is unclear how applicable the findings regarding these specific populations and screening programmes would be to more generic entry and exit screening measures aiming to screen larger numbers of travellers over an extended period of time. In contrast, we do not have major concerns regarding the applicability of findings derived from the three studies examining larger‐scale screening programmes implemented indiscriminately to all arriving international travellers at an airport (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Al‐Tawfiq 2020; Wong J 2020). Individual judgements related to applicability for each study can be found in Appendix 8.

We appraised the quality of modelling studies using the above‐described bespoke tool. Ratings for each study are found in Table 2. Studies varied widely with regards to quality, although some patterns emerged. For example, in several studies, there were concerns regarding the appropriateness of structural assumptions and input parameters (Q2 and Q4), as well as regarding an inadequate assessment of uncertainty (Q9). A major concern with the structural assumptions of a model could involve, for example, treating travel restrictions implemented in multiple countries at different times as independent of time, place and context, or making unrealistic assumptions about who travels and when they could become infected. Input parameters could be a major concern when a study assumed the sensitivity of a symptom/exposure‐based entry screening measure to be 80% or of a PCR testing upon arrival to be 100%, when most empirical results suggest that these values are much lower. Major concerns with the assessment of uncertainty occurred when, for example, studies provided no assessment of whether altering the assumptions of the model influenced the results. Additionally, many studies did not conduct any validation of their models (Q5‐Q8), although we did not consider this a critical flaw that would lead to ‘major concerns’. Importantly, many studies did not undertake any external validation (i.e. a validation on any collected data), which we considered important with respect to the directness of the findings (see Assessment of the certainty of evidence). Individual judgements for each study can be found in Appendix 9.

Effects of interventions/results of the synthesis

We present the effects on specific outcomes in each of the three broad outcome categories, i.e. cases avoided due to the measure, shift in epidemic development, and cases detected due to the measure.

In the following, we provide a detailed narrative summary of the impact of four broad categories of travel‐related control measures.

  1. Travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel (includes evidence from modelling studies only)

  2. Screening at borders (includes evidence from modelling and observational studies)

  3. Quarantine (includes evidence from modelling studies only)

  4. Quarantine and screening at borders (includes evidence from modelling and observational studies)

For each intervention‐outcome we have structured the results as follows: a full summary of findings, including a narrative summary of the effects, potential effect moderators, as well as the certainty of evidence, which can be found in the corresponding 'Summary of findings tables'. This information is also more concisely summarised in the text below. All data from the individual studies underlying these summaries can be found in the corresponding Appendices (Appendix 10; Appendix 11; Appendix 12; Appendix 13; Appendix 14).

Given that potential effect moderators were generally only assessed in individual studies (for modelling studies) or were based on limited data (for observational studies), we aimed to be cautious in our description of these below, and these data should be interpreted with caution. Although we could not explicitly assess how methodological and contextual differences across studies impacted the results, we consider these very important, and they should be kept in mind when interpreting the results described below.

1. Travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel

We identified 31 modelling studies contributing evidence to travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel, modelling different levels of reduction in travel volume. Twenty‐two studies reported on the cases avoided due to the measure, 12 studies on the shift in epidemic development, and no studies on the cases detected due to the measure. A study‐by‐study overview of the evidence contributing to each of these outcomes is presented in Appendix 10. summary of findings Table 1 presents the GRADE 'Summary of findings' for this body of evidence. While we observed a largely consistent, usually positive direction of effect, we assessed the certainty of evidence for all of these outcomes as low or very low because of risk of bias (quality), indirectness, and imprecision in the bodies of evidence.

1.1. Outcome category: cases avoided due to the measure
Number or proportion of cases in the community

Thirteen modelling studies reported on the number or proportion of cases (Anderson 2020; Banholzer 2020; Binny 2020; Chen T 2020; Costantino 2020; Deeb 2020; Kang 2020; Linka 2020a; Nowrasteh 2020; Kwok 2020; Yang 2020; Zhang C 2020; Zhong 2020) (very low‐certainty evidence). Ten of these studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases resulting from various travel restrictions (Anderson 2020; Banholzer 2020; Binny 2020; Chen T 2020; Costantino 2020; Deeb 2020; Kang 2020; Linka 2020a; Kwok 2020; Zhong 2020). These positive effects ranged from a 1.8% (95% confidence interval (CI) ‐21.9% to 17.5%) reduction in Binny 2020 to a 97.8% reduction in Kang 2020. The remaining three studies reported mixed effects, observing that a positive effect, but also no effect or even a negative effect were possible (Nowrasteh 2020; Yang 2020; Zhong 2020). Insights from specific studies highlight aspects that may influence the magnitude of effect of implementing or relaxing travel restrictions. Effects were dependent, for example, on the level of community transmission (Anderson 2020; Kwok 2020), the implementation of community‐based interventions, such as a stay‐at‐home order, extensive testing and contact tracing (Binny 2020), and the countries restricted by the measure, with the most effective measures being those that prevented passengers from exiting regions or countries with high community transmission, such as Wuhan, China and Italy in the early stages of the pandemic (Zhong 2020).

Number or proportion of imported or exported cases

Nine modelling studies reported on the number or proportion of imported or exported cases (Adekunle 2020; Anzai 2020; Chen T 2020; Chinazzi 2020; Costantino 2020; Liebig 2020; McLure 2020; Russell TW 2020; Wells 2020) (very low‐certainty evidence). Eight of these reported reductions in importations or exportations (Anzai 2020; Chen T 2020; Chinazzi 2020; Costantino 2020; Liebig 2020; McLure 2020; Russell TW 2020; Wells 2020). These positive effects ranged from an 18% reduction (Liebig 2020) to a 99% reduction (Chen T 2020) in importations or exportations. One study reported mixed effects, observing both positive effects and no effect (Adekunle 2020). Insights from specific studies suggest reasons for the observed variation in the magnitude and direction of effect. For example, earlier implementation of restrictions was shown to lead to more pronounced reductions (Liebig 2020). Travel volumes also played a role, with the proportion of countries in which imports would have contributed to over 10% of cases ranging from 56% to 75%, depending on whether flight volumes during the pandemic, in the hypothetical absence of travel restrictions, were assumed to be similar to previous years, or substantially lower (Russell TW 2020). The magnitude and direction of effect varied with the countries under study (Adekunle 2020), and the comprehensiveness and severity of the measure implemented (Costantino 2020; McLure 2020).

Number or proportion of deaths

Three modelling studies reported on the number or proportion of deaths (Binny 2020; Costantino 2020; Kwok 2020). All these studies reported reductions in deaths (very low‐certainty evidence). These positive effects ranged from a 4.3% (95% CI ‐39.1% to 39.1%) reduction (Binny 2020) to a 98% reduction in deaths (Costantino 2020). Several aspects described in specific studies may contribute to this variation. For example, the effects were reported to depend on the presence or absence of community‐based interventions, such as a stay‐at‐home order, extensive testing, and contact tracing (e.g. 1187 deaths when implementing quarantine of incoming travellers and border closure (except to returning residents and citizens) only and 23 deaths when implementing these interventions followed by other community‐based measures (Binny 2020)). Travel restrictions implemented at higher and lower levels of community transmission led to only a slightly different proportion of deaths avoided (14% and 12% reductions, respectively (Kwok 2020)).

Risk of importation or exportation

Three modelling studies assessed the risk of importation or exportation of cases (Nakamura 2020; Shi 2020; Zhang L 2020) (very low‐certainty evidence). Two of these studies reported reductions in the risk of importing and/or exporting cases, however without providing effect estimates (Nakamura 2020; Zhang L 2020). One study reported an increased risk of importation at some airports, but decreased risk at other airports around the world as a result of loosening travel restrictions (Shi 2020). One study suggested that the country’s connectedness to the international travel network and the level of community transmission are likely to play a role in the effects (Nakamura 2020).

1.2 Outcome category: shift in epidemic development
Probability of eliminating the epidemic

One modelling study assessed the probability of eliminating the epidemic (Binny 2020). The study reported mixed effects on the probability of eliminating the epidemic: the probability would be higher (66%) for border restrictions followed by strict community measures than for a delayed border closure (55% probability), and the same as early implementation of border restrictions, such as quarantine of incoming travellers (66% probability) (very low‐certainty evidence). The effect of these travel restrictions were suggested to depend on the existence of community‐based interventions, such as a stay‐at‐home order, extensive testing, and contact tracing (0% probability of eliminating the epidemic when implementing travel restrictions without community measures).

Effective reproduction number

Two modelling studies reported on changes in the effective reproduction number (Rt) (Linka 2020a; Sruthi 2020) (very low‐certainty evidence). One study reported a beneficial change (i.e. break point) in Rt after the implementation of travel restrictions in European Union countries (mean duration time to the inflection point: 12.6 days) (Linka 2020a). The other study reported mixed effects (Sruthi 2020), reporting that complete border closures would lead to a 0.045 reduction in Rt, partial relaxation through the opening of land borders would lead to a 0.177 increase in Rt, while further relaxation allowing for international travel followed by quarantine upon arrival would not lead to a change in Rt.

Time to outbreak

Six modelling studies assessed the time to outbreak (Anzai 2020; Davis 2020; Grannell 2020; Linka 2020b; Odendaal 2020; Zhong 2020) (very low‐certainty evidence). Four of these studies reported reductions in the time to outbreak (Anzai 2020; Davis 2020; Linka 2020b; Odendaal 2020) (very low‐certainty evidence). These positive effects ranged from a delay of less than one day (Anzai 2020) to 85 days (Linka 2020b). Two studies reported mixed effects, suggesting both positive effects and no effect (Grannell 2020; Zhong 2020). In specific studies, magnitude and direction of effects were reported to depend on the presence or absence of community‐based interventions and the level of community transmission (e.g. delays of 58 and 85 days for Rt=1.35 and Rt=1.16, respectively (Linka 2020b)), the timing of the implementation (e.g. travel restrictions imposed on China implemented one week earlier would have led to an additional delay in community transmission (Davis 2020)), and the countries restricted by the measure, with the most effective measures being those that prevented passengers from exiting regions or countries with high levels of community transmission, such as Wuhan (China) and Italy in the early stages of the pandemic (Zhong 2020).

Risk of outbreak        

Two modelling studies assessed the risk of an outbreak (Anzai 2020; Boldog 2020) (very low‐certainty evidence). One study reported reductions in the risk of an outbreak resulting from travel restrictions with effects ranging from 1% to 37% reductions (Anzai 2020). The other study reported mixed effects, including both a positive effect and no effect (Boldog 2020). As the studies demonstrate, the variation in the magnitude and direction of effect might be explained by methodological differences between studies, as well as differences in the levels of community transmission, the number of cases in the country of departure, the severity of the travel restriction, co‐interventions, and the percentage of contacts being traced. For example, larger effects were found for lower R0 and higher proportion of contacts traced (Anzai 2020). Similarly, at lower numbers of cases in China, 25%, 50%, and 75% travel reductions resulting from restrictions implemented in Canada yielded a risk of a major outbreak of 35%, 30% and 15%, respectively; at higher numbers of cases in China, these risks were 80%, 70%, and 45%, respectively (Boldog 2020).

Number or proportion of cases at peak

Two modelling studies reported on the number of daily cases at the epidemic peak (Binny 2020; Grannell 2020). Both studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases at peak (low‐certainty evidence). These positive effects ranged from a 0.3% reduction (Grannell 2020) to a 8% reduction (Grannell 2020). As reported in the studies, the magnitude of effect is likely to vary with the implementation of effective community‐based interventions, such as a stay‐at‐home order, extensive testing, and contact tracing (e.g. 47,592 daily cases at peak when implementing quarantine of incoming travellers and border closure only and 80 cases when implementing these interventions followed by other community‐based measures (Binny 2020).

Epidemic growth acceleration

One modelling study assessed the epidemic growth acceleration (Utsunomiya 2020). It reported that international travel controls would lead to a decrease in the growth acceleration of the epidemic progression across 62 countries (−6.05% change, P < 0.0001) (low‐certainty evidence).

Exportation growth rate

One modelling study assessed the exportation growth rate (Pinotti 2020). The results suggested that both the lockdown of Hubei, resulting in a ban of all travel, as well as travel restrictions on China as a whole, led to a decrease in the growth rate of cases exported from Hubei and the rest of China to the rest of the world (low‐certainty evidence).

1.3 Outcome category: cases detected due to the measure

No studies were found to contribute evidence to this outcome category.

1.4 Secondary outcomes

We identified one modelling study contributing evidence to travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel on secondary outcomes related to healthcare utilisation (Kwok 2020). This study shows that even with border closure between Hong Kong in China in place, with higher levels of community transmission (Rt = 2.2) hospitals were predicted to reach capacity by the end of March 2020. Only with low community transmission (Rt = 1.6), were hospitals predicted not to reach capacity.

2. Screening at borders

We identified 13 modelling studies contributing evidence to screening at borders, with screening modelled to reflect symptom/exposure‐based screening or test‐based screening and only those screening positive receiving a follow‐up measure, such as self‐isolation or refusal of entry. Two studies reported on the cases avoided due to the measure, four studies on the shift in epidemic development, and seven studies on the cases detected due to the measure. A study‐by‐study overview of the evidence contributing to each of these outcomes is presented in Appendix 11.

Additionally, 13 observational studies reported data on screening at borders. All these reported data only on cases detected due to the measure. A study‐by‐study overview of the evidence contributing to these outcomes, including a description of the approaches to identify cases and study data is presented in Appendix 12.

summary of findings Table 2 presents the GRADE 'Summary of findings' for this body of evidence. Here we have separated bodies of evidence that reported on symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders (screening for symptoms such as fever or cough and/or screening for risk factors, or when “screening” was used without further specification of the procedures) and test‐based screening at borders (specifically PCR testing, when specified). While we observed a mostly consistent and positive direction of effect, we assessed the certainty of evidence for all of the outcomes as moderate (one outcome only), low, or very low because of risk of bias (quality), indirectness, and imprecision in the bodies of evidence.

2.1. Outcome category: cases avoided due to the measure
Symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders

We identified one modelling study assessing the impact of symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders on the cases avoided due to the measure (Wells 2020).

Proportion of cases exported

One modelling study assessed the number or proportion of cases exported (Wells 2020). The results suggested that putting screening measures in place across the world would reduce the number of cases exported per day from China would be reduced by 82% (95% CI 72% to 95%), under the assumption of only 35.7% of symptomatic individuals being detected (moderate‐certainty evidence).

Test‐based screening at borders

We identified one modelling study assessing the impact of test‐based screening at borders on the cases avoided due to the measure (Dickens 2020).

Proportion of secondary cases

One modelling study examined the proportion of secondary cases due to international travel (Dickens 2020). PCR testing all incoming travellers upon arrival, followed by isolation of test‐positives and requiring a negative test at the end of the isolation would lead to a reduction in secondary cases of 88% (95% CI 87% to 89%) for a 7‐day isolation period and 92% (95% CI 92% to 93%) for a 14‐day isolation period (very low‐certainty evidence).

Proportion of imported cases

One modelling study assessed the proportion of imported cases (Dickens 2020). PCR testing all incoming travellers upon arrival, followed by isolation of test‐positives and requiring a negative test at the end of the isolation would lead to a reduction of 90% of imported cases for a 7‐day isolation period and 92% for a 14‐day isolation period (very low‐certainty evidence). Testing all incoming travellers and refusing entry to test‐positives would lead to a reduction of 77%.

2.2 Outcome category: shift in epidemic development
Symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders

We identified four modelling studies assessing the impact of symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders on the shift in epidemic development (Clifford 2020a; Mandal 2020; Nuckchady 2020; Wilson 2020).

Time to outbreak

Four modelling studies assessed time to outbreak (Clifford 2020a; Mandal 2020; Nuckchady 2020; Wilson 2020). All studies reported that entry and/or exit screening alone would delay an outbreak (very low‐certainty evidence). These positive effects ranged from 2.7‐day delay (from 45 days to 47.7 days in reaching 1000 cases) (Mandal 2020) to 0.5‐year delay (from 1.7 years (95% CI 0.04 to 6.09) to 2.2 years (95% CI 0.6 to 8.11)) (Wilson 2020). Insights from specific studies highlight aspects that may influence the magnitude of effect of entry and/or exit screening. For example, effects were reported to depend on the timing of the implementation (Clifford 2020a), the number of incoming travellers (Wilson 2020), the percentage of asymptomatic travellers screened (Mandal 2020), and the sensitivity of the screening (e.g. entry or exit screening with a sensitivity of 64% would delay an outbreak by 9.7 days, while screening with a sensitivity of 100% would delay an outbreak by 20 days (Nuckchady 2020)).

Risk of outbreak

One modelling study assessed the risk of outbreak (Nuckchady 2020). The results suggested that under the assumption of one infected person entering Mauritius per 100 days, entry screening with 100% sensitivity would reduce the probability of an outbreak within 3 months to 10% and screening with 50% sensitivity would reduce the probability to 48% (low‐certainty evidence).

Test‐based screening at borders

We did not identify any study assessing the impact of test‐based screening at borders on the shift in epidemic development.

2.3 Outcome category: cases detected due to the measure
Symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders

We identified four modelling studies (Bays 2020; Gostic 2020; Quilty 2020; Taylor 2020) and nine observational studies (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Arima 2020; Chen J 2020; Hoehl 2020; Kim 2020; Lytras 2020; Ng 2020; Wong J 2020; Yamahata 2020) assessing the impact of symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders on the cases detected due to the measure.

Number or proportion of cases detected

Four modelling studies reported on the number or proportion of cases detected (Bays 2020; Gostic 2020; Quilty 2020; Taylor 2020). All studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases detected (very low‐certainty evidence). These positive effects ranged from detecting 0.8% (95% CI 0.2% to 1.6%) of cases (Taylor 2020) to detecting 53% (95% CI 35% to 72%) cases (Quilty 2020). Insights from specific studies suggest relevant sources of variation in the magnitude of effect. For example, the number or proportion of cases detected was reported to be influenced by the time window in which the exposure may have occurred and the duration of the flight with longer flights increasing the likelihood that symptoms develop during the flight and thus are detected (Bays 2020). The effects were also reported to depend on the percentage of asymptomatic cases in the population (Gostic 2020), the combination of entry and exit screening measures (Gostic 2020; Quilty 2020), and the sensitivity of screening (e.g. assuming a sensitivity of 86% for thermal scanner‐based screening and 17% of asymptomatic cases being undetectable, entry and exit screening combined and entry screening alone would both detect 53% (95% CI 35% to 72%) of cases (Quilty 2020)).

Proportion of cases detected and positive predictive value

Nine observational studies provided data on symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders (e.g. focused on the presence of fever and/or cough and/or shortness of breath) (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Arima 2020; Chen J 2020; Hoehl 2020; Kim 2020; Lytras 2020; Ng 2020; Wong J 2020; Yamahata 2020); each of these measures also involved subsequently quarantining all travellers for fourteen days, independent of whether these were screened positively or negatively, usually with some form of symptom observation and sometimes further testing. For this body of evidence on symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders, however, this quarantine period is not considered part of the intervention, but instead serves as a way to identify the ‘true’ number of cases in the study population; although even with these features, false positives and false negatives remain possible. These studies reported data, which allowed for the calculation of the proportion of cases detected by the measure. Six of these studies also reported data allowing for the calculation of the positive predictive value (PPV) (Arima 2020; Hoehl 2020; Kim 2020; Lytras 2020; Ng 2020; Yamahata 2020).

The proportion of cases detected by the screening measure varied widely (very low‐certainty evidence). One study reported that the measure detected 100% of cases (Kim 2020); this was, however, an outlier, with the rest of studies reporting substantially lower proportions of cases detected. The proportion of cases detected by symptom/exposure screening is summarised in Figure 2 (top panel). The PPV, calculated only for studies assessing symptom/exposure screening, also varied widely between studies (very low‐certainty evidence).


Summary of the proportions of cases detected by the measure from observational studies. Measures portrayed include exit and/or entry screening (top panel) and PCR tests (middle panel), as well as for combined measures exit and/or entry screening with quarantine and further screening, in the form of symptom observation and/or PCR tests (bottom panel).Notes:Yamahata 2020 employed a form of symptom screening aboard a cruise ship, thus representing a very different context than all other studies.Ng 2020 employed a delayed PCR test on day 3.Lagier 2020 and Lio 2020 employed a PCR test on arrival and on day 2, respectively, however given that they did not identify cases they are not portrayed in this figure.The five evacuation flights assessed in Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020 had very different COVID‐19 prevalences, with no cases associated with three flights, but with 2/104 and 80/124 on the remaining two flights.

Summary of the proportions of cases detected by the measure from observational studies. Measures portrayed include exit and/or entry screening (top panel) and PCR tests (middle panel), as well as for combined measures exit and/or entry screening with quarantine and further screening, in the form of symptom observation and/or PCR tests (bottom panel).

Notes:

Yamahata 2020 employed a form of symptom screening aboard a cruise ship, thus representing a very different context than all other studies.

Ng 2020 employed a delayed PCR test on day 3.

Lagier 2020 and Lio 2020 employed a PCR test on arrival and on day 2, respectively, however given that they did not identify cases they are not portrayed in this figure.

The five evacuation flights assessed in Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020 had very different COVID‐19 prevalences, with no cases associated with three flights, but with 2/104 and 80/124 on the remaining two flights.

The individual screening measures themselves and the context in which they were implemented are important aspects to consider in interpreting these results. Among the symptom/exposure screening measures, the screening approaches (e.g. screening for fever, for any kind of respiratory symptoms and/or for contact with COVID‐19 cases in the past days with these measures being performed prior to departure, upon arrival, or both), as well as the approaches for determining cases vary across studies, and for many studies it was unclear what threshold was used for determining whether an individual was symptomatic. Most studies reported on measures implemented in very specific settings, i.e. either as part of evacuation flights or on a cruise ship, while only two studies assessed national‐level border control measures (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Al‐Tawfiq 2020).

Test‐based screening at borders

We identified three modelling (Clifford 2020b; Russell WA 2020; Steyn 2020) studies and five observational studies (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Al‐Tawfiq 2020; Arima 2020; Ng 2020; Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020) assessing the impact of entry and/or exit test‐based screening on the cases detected due to the measure.

Days at risk of transmitting the infection into community

Two modelling studies reported on the days that travellers, upon release, remain at risk of transmitting the infection into the community (Clifford 2020b; Russell WA 2020). Both studies reported that a single PCR test upon arrival would reduce the days at risk of transmission (low‐certainty evidence). These positive effects ranged from 0.1 fewer days (Clifford 2020b) to 0.3 fewer days at risk of transmission (Russell WA 2020).

Probability of releasing an infected individual into the community

Two modelling studies reported on the probability of releasing an infected individual into the community (Clifford 2020b; Steyn 2020). Both studies reported reductions in the probability of releasing an infected individual into the community as a result of PCR testing (low‐certainty evidence). These positive effects included a risk ratio of 0.55 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.83) (Clifford 2020b) and probabilities of releasing an infected individual ranging from 48% to 53% for scenarios with different risks of transmission while travelling (Steyn 2020).

Proportion of cases detected and positive predictive value

Five observational studies provided data on PCR testing (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Al‐Tawfiq 2020; Arima 2020; Ng 2020; Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020); four studies conducted the test within 24 hours, one study after a delay of three days (Ng 2020). Each measure also involved subsequently quarantining all travellers for fourteen days, independent of whether these tested positively or negatively, usually with some form of symptom observation and a test for all individuals at the end of the quarantine period. As described for the symptom/exposure screening above, for this body of evidence this quarantine period is not considered part of the intervention, but instead serves as a way to identify the ‘true’ number of cases in the study population, although even with these features, false positives and false negatives remain possible. These studies reported data, which allowed for the calculation of the proportion of cases detected by the measure; two further studies (Lagier 2020; Lio 2020), which conducted tests within 24 hours and two days after arrival, respectively, identified no cases, meaning that we could not report the proportion of cases detected.

The proportion of cases detected by testing varied (58.3% to 90.2%) (low‐certainty evidence). The proportion of cases detected by testing is summarised in Figure 2 (middle panel). The PPV was not calculated for studies assessing PCR testing, as those with a positive PCR test at a given point were considered true cases; no data were available to determine false positives.

The individual testing measures themselves and the context in which they were implemented are important aspects to consider in interpreting these results. For example, the proportions of cases detected for Al‐Qahtani 2020 and Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020 were 58.3% and 90.2%, respectively. The prevalences differed, however, with 188 of 2714 (6.9%) and 82 of 432 (19.0%), respectively, being infected. Looking further, Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020 examined five flights; no cases were identified for three of the flights, while 2 of 104 (2.0%) and 80 of 124 (65.0%) on the remaining two flights. The screening approaches varied somewhat, for example with respect to timing of test provision; most of the studies tested within the first 24 hours, while one study tested on day 3 (Ng 2020). Most studies reported on measures implemented in very specific settings, i.e. as part of evacuation flights, while only two studies assessed national‐level border control measures (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Al‐Tawfiq 2020).

3. Quarantine

We identified 12 modelling studies assessing the quarantine of travellers alone, comprising voluntary or government‐mandated quarantine of travellers of different duration without any accompanying or follow‐up measures. Six studies reported on cases avoided due to the measure, one study on the shift in epidemic development, and five studies on the cases detected due to the measure. A study‐by‐study overview of the evidence contributing to each of these outcomes is presented in Appendix 13. summary of findings Table 3 presents the GRADE summary of findings for this body of evidence. While we observed a consistent, largely positive direction of effect, we assessed the certainty of evidence for all of the outcomes as low or very low because of risk of bias (quality), indirectness, and imprecision in the bodies of evidence.

3.1 Outcome category: cases avoided due to the measure
Number or proportion of cases in the community

Three modelling studies examined the number or proportion of cases (Chen T 2020; Chen Y‐H 2020; Wong MC 2020). All studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases (very low‐certainty evidence). These positive effects ranged from 450 fewer cases in Wong MC 2020 to 64,028 fewer cases in Chen T 2020 during the first wave of the pandemic. Insights from specific studies suggest that the effects might depend on the target group (e.g. quarantining all inbound travellers versus only those that are symptomatic, with the former predicting larger reductions in the number of cases (Chen T 2020)).

Proportion of imported cases

One modelling study assessed the proportion of imported cases (Dickens 2020). The study reported that quarantining all incoming travellers would reduce the proportion of imported cases by 55% for a 7‐day quarantine period and by 91% for a 14‐day quarantine period (very low‐certainty evidence).

Number or proportion of cases seeded by imported cases

Three modelling studies reported on the number of cases seeded by imported cases (Dickens 2020; James 2020; Ryu 2020). All studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases seeded by imported cases as a result of quarantine of travellers (very low‐certainty evidence). These positive effects in James 2020 ranged from 26% (95% CI 19% to 37%) reduction to 100% (95% CI 62% to 100%) reduction. Reductions were larger when the quarantine was government‐mandated (James 2020), for the elderly compared with adults (James 2020), and for longer quarantine periods (Dickens 2020).

Probability of an imported case not infecting anyone

One modelling study assessed the probability of an imported case not causing further infections (James 2020). The study reported that a 14‐day self‐isolation of all international arrivals in New Zealand would lead to 4% and 14% increase in the probability that an imported case would not infect anyone among adults and the elderly, respectively. The increase in the probability would be higher when a 14‐day government‐mandated quarantine is required (31% and 36% among adults and the elderly, respectively).

3.2 Outcome category: shift in epidemic development
Time to outbreak

One modelling study reported on the time to outbreak (Kivuti‐Bito 2020). The study reported that increasing the effectiveness of quarantine of travellers to 80% and 90% from the base case of 75% effectiveness would delay the peak in active cases and deaths by 3.5 and 5.5 days, respectively (low‐certainty evidence).

3.3 Outcome category: cases detected due to the measure
Days at risk of transmitting the infection into community

Two modelling studies assessed the days that travellers will be at risk of transmitting the infection into the community (Clifford 2020b; Russell WA 2020). Both studies reported reductions in the numbers of days at risk of transmission resulting from quarantine (low‐certainty evidence). These positive effects ranged from 0.1 fewer days (Clifford 2020b) to 2.1 fewer days at risk (Clifford 2020b). The studies reported that the variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by the length of quarantine with longer quarantine periods predicting larger effect (e.g. 2‐day quarantine: 1.8 days at risk (95% CI 1.6 to 2.2); 14‐day quarantine: 0.53 days at risk (95% CI 0.46 to 0.60) (Russell WA 2020)).

Proportion of cases detected

One modelling study examined the proportion of cases detected (Taylor 2020). The study reported that requiring travellers to quarantine upon arrival in the UK would lead to detecting different proportion of cases, with the magnitude increasing with the number of days in quarantine (7‐day quarantine: 51% (95% CI 47% to 56%); 14‐day quarantine: 78% (95% CI 74% to 82%)) (very low‐certainty evidence). These proportions are higher than those for screening alone (with either thermal imaging scanners or health checks detecting 0.78% and 1.13% of cases, respectively).

Probability of releasing an infected individual into the community

Three modelling studies examined the probability of releasing an infected individual into the community (Ashcroft 2020; Clifford 2020b; Steyn 2020). All studies reported reductions in the risk or probability of releasing an infected individual (very low‐certainty evidence). These positive effects included a risk ratio ranging from 0.00 (95% CI 0.00 to 0.01) to 0.59 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.85) (Clifford 2020b) and probabilities of releasing an infected individual ranging from 0% (Steyn 2020) to 85% (Ashcroft 2020). Insights from these studies suggest that the magnitude of effects might depend on the length of the quarantine period (Clifford 2020b), duration of travel (Ashcroft 2020), and the risk of transmission within quarantine settings (Steyn 2020).

3.4 Secondary outcomes

We identified three modelling studies contributing evidence to quarantine only on secondary outcomes related to infectious disease transmission (Ashcroft 2020; Chen Y‐H 2020; Steyn 2020).

One study assessed quarantine utility as a ratio of the amount of transmission prevented to the number of person days spent in quarantine, predicting that for long‐duration travel (i.e. 7 days or longer), shorter quarantine provides a better balance between preventing infection and the burden of quarantining individuals than a longer quarantine duration. For short duration travel, however, this relationship is reversed (Ashcroft 2020). One study reported that with test‐and‐isolation, contact tracing, and general public mask‐wearing and other social measures in place, strict quarantine of travellers (one daily infection imported) in Taiwan would ensure that the number of individuals needed to quarantine in the community remains low (4092) over 90 days. Without quarantine (10 daily infections imported), the number of individuals needed to quarantine in the community would increase steadily (40810) over the same time period (Chen Y‐H 2020). One study suggests that there is a risk that front‐line workers from quarantine facilities seed outbreaks in the community. With weekly testing of front‐line workers from quarantine facilities, there is a high probability that a case will be detected in the front‐line worker as opposed to later in a secondary case in the community. With less frequent or no testing of front‐line workers, the probability increases that the case is not detected until a secondary case is infected (Steyn 2020).

4. Quarantine and screening at borders

We identified seven modelling studies assessing quarantine of travellers and screening at borders and/or at different days during quarantine. No studies reported on the cases avoided due to the measure, one study reported on the shift in epidemic development, and six studies reported on the cases detected due to the measure. A study‐by‐study overview of the evidence contributing to each of these outcomes is presented in Appendix 14

Additionally, we found four observational studies contributing data to this intervention category, all reporting on the cases detected due to the measure. A study‐by‐study overview of this evidence, including a description of the approaches to identify cases and study data is presented in Appendix 12.

summary of findings Table 4 presents the GRADE summary of findings for this body of evidence. While we observed a consistent and positive direction of effect, we assessed the certainty of evidence for all of these outcomes as low or very low because of risk of bias (quality), indirectness, and imprecision in the bodies of evidence.

4.1 Outcome category: cases avoided due to the measure

No studies were found to contribute evidence to this outcome category.

4.2 Outcome category: shift in epidemic development
Time to outbreak

One modelling study reported on the time to outbreak (Wilson 2020). The study reported delays in outbreak resulting from quarantine and screening at borders measures. Under the assumption of one flight per day (7.1% of normal travel volume) and 50% sensitivity, the time to outbreak would vary greatly for different combinations of measures ranging from 3.5 years (95% CI 0.09 to 12.9) to 34.1 years (95% CI 0.86 to 126) to outbreak (very low‐certainty evidence). Combination of measures, such as exit screening, in‐flight wearing of masks, PCR testing of arriving travellers and quarantine would lead to larger delays of outbreak.

4.3 ​​​​​​Outcome category: cases detected due to the measure
Days at risk of transmitting the infection into community

Two modelling studies assessed days that the travellers remain at risk of transmitting the infection into the community (Clifford 2020b; Russell WA 2020). Both studies reported that the combination of quarantine and testing would reduce days at risk of transmission compared with single measures (low‐certainty evidence). These positive effects ranged from 0.01 fewer days (Russell WA 2020) to 2.0 fewer days (Clifford 2020b) at risk of transmission. Requiring two tests before releasing from quarantine showed slightly improved, yet largely comparable effects to the effects of quarantine with a single test at the end (Clifford 2020b).

Probability of releasing an infected individual into the community

Three modelling studies assessed the probability of releasing an infected individual into the community (Ashcroft 2020; Clifford 2020b; Steyn 2020) (very low‐certainty evidence). All three studies reported positive effects resulting from a combination of screening and quarantine. These positive effects included a reduction in the probability of releasing an infected individual ranging from 2% to 48% (Steyn 2020). Studies reported that the variation in the magnitude of effect could be explained by the length of quarantine, with shorter periods predicting smaller effects (e.g. risk ratio (RR) for a 3‐day quarantine with a single test: 0.22 (95% CI 0.02 to 0.48) and RR for a 14‐day quarantine with a single test: 0.01 (95% CI 0.00 to 0.03)) (Clifford 2020b), the single measure comparison used (e.g. quarantine alone or PCR testing upon entry alone), day(s) on which the test is administered (Ashcroft 2020), or the risk of transmission within quarantine (Steyn 2020).

Proportion of cases detected

Two modelling studies reported on the proportion of cases detected (Bays 2020; Taylor 2020). Both studies reported that the combination of quarantine and testing would further increase case detection compared with single measures (very low‐certainty evidence). The positive effects ranged from 41% (Bays 2020) to 99% of cases detected (Bays 2020). Adding a second test suggested only a slight improvement in the effect (Taylor 2020). Insights from specific studies suggest that the observed variation in the magnitude of effect may be explained by the length of the quarantine period with longer quarantine increasing the detection rate (Bays 2020; Taylor 2020), and the duration of travel and stay in the country of departure (Bays 2020).

Proportion of cases detected and PPV

Four observational studies provided data on quarantine and screening at borders (Al‐Qahtani 2020; Arima 2020; Chen J 2020; Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020). Each of these studies began with an entry and/or exit screening measure, comprising symptom screening in one study (Chen J 2020), and PCR testing upon arrival in the other three. Each measure also involved subsequently quarantining all travellers for fourteen days; all but one study (Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020), additionally monitored symptoms of all travellers and tested those who developed symptoms. Above, we considered this quarantine period as part of the way to identify the ‘true’ number of cases; for this body of evidence, however, we consider this as a ‘combined measures’ intervention. Each study also provided PCR testing before release from quarantine; we treat this final PCR test as the way to identify the ‘true’ number of cases. These studies reported data, which allowed for the calculation of the proportion of cases detected by the measure.

The proportion of cases detected by these combined measures, comprising quarantine of travellers and screening, is summarised in Figure 2 (bottom panel). As visible in the figure, across the studies, in comparison to exit and/or entry screening only, a subsequent 14‐day quarantine period with symptom monitoring and further testing led to the detection of additional cases that would have been missed by the initial screening measure. Only one study did not detect further cases after the initial entry and/or exit screening measure (Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020) (low‐certainty evidence). The PPV was not calculated for studies assessing PCR testing, as those with a positive PCR test at a given point were considered true cases; no data were available to determine false positives.

The individual measures themselves and the context in which they were implemented are important aspects to consider in interpreting these results. As described above, one study employed symptom screening (Chen J 2020), while the others used PCR testing upon arrival. Measures employed during the quarantine itself differed as well; while most studies monitored for the development of symptoms and tested those developing symptoms, one study did not (Al‐Qahtani 2020); the intensity with which symptoms were monitored could also be important. Three studies reported on measures implemented in very specific settings, i.e. as part of evacuation flights, while only one study assessed a national‐level border control measure.

Discussion

Summary of main findings

To inform decisions on containing the COVID‐19 pandemic, we updated our previous review (Burns 2020), with the aim of identifying and synthesising the evidence on the effectiveness of international travel‐related control measures during coronavirus outbreaks on infectious disease transmission and screening‐related outcomes. We identified a much expanded and heterogeneous evidence base, with studies focusing on a range of real or simulated travel‐related control measures aiming to contain the COVID‐19 pandemic. In the original review we assessed studies on SARS and MERS (Burns 2020); in this update, we focus on COVID‐19 studies.

We found 31 modelling studies on travel restrictions reducing cross‐border travel, all modelling a range of reductions in travel across real or simulated countries. Studies reported on various outcomes related to cases avoided due to the measure and shift in epidemic development. Across outcomes, most studies predicted a positive effect; some studies, however, observed mixed effects, including positive and negative effects. Very low‐ to moderate‐certainty evidence limits our confidence in these findings.

We found 13 modelling studies and 13 observational studies on screening at borders. Screening measures covered symptom/exposure‐based screening and/or PCR test‐based screening before departure or upon or soon after arrival. Regarding symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders, modelling studies assessed several different outcomes related to shift in epidemic development and cases detected due to the measure; observational studies assessed outcomes related to cases detected due to the measure. For all outcomes, the observed findings showed positive effects, although some of these effects were very small; effects were dependent on factors, such as the sensitivity of screening measures. Regarding test‐based screening at borders, modelling studies assessed outcomes related to cases avoided and cases detected due to the measure; observational studies assessed cases detected due to the measure. Across these outcomes, the findings showed positive effects with magnitudes varying, depending, for example, on the timing of testing. Although a wide range of positive effects was observed, these were generally larger than for symptom/exposure‐based screening alone. Very low to moderate‐certainty evidence limits our confidence in the findings on screening measures.

We found 12 modelling studies on quarantine. Studies assessed multiple outcomes related to cases avoided due to the measure, shift in epidemic development and cases detected due to the measure. Included studies all showed positive effects ranging from small to large in magnitude, depending on the quarantine duration and compliance. Very low‐ to low‐certainty evidence limits our confidence in these findings.

We found seven modelling studies and four observational studies on quarantine and screening at borders. Studies assessed outcomes related to shift in epidemic development and cases detected. Most studies showed positive effects for the combined measures with varying magnitudes of effect depending on how the measures were combined (e.g. the length of the quarantine period and days when the test was conducted in quarantine). Very low‐ to low‐certainty evidence limits our confidence in these findings.

Overall completeness and applicability of the evidence

Consistent with the original review (Burns 2020), we identified studies assessing a broad range of travel‐related control measures to contain the COVID‐19 pandemic. They examined outcomes across all three a priori specified outcome categories, and were conducted across multiple world regions. There were, however, some gaps in the evidence base, notably in relation to populations, settings and interventions.

Population

Modelling studies across all categories of travel‐related control measures generally considered nonspecific populations, using data both observed in and/or modelled upon a travelling population or the general population. Observational studies of screening at borders measures used data observed from travelling populations. Many studies assessed or modelled all modes of travel or did not specify the mode (29 studies); air travellers (33 studies) were much more frequently represented than those travelling by ship (one study) or by land (one study).

Setting

We identified studies from all world regions. In contrast to the original review, this update also found studies from the African and Eastern Mediterranean regions; however, these make up only a small share of the evidence base (one study and three studies, respectively). Moreover, the screening at borders measures assessed here were largely implemented in very specific settings, such as on evacuation flights or during cruise ship outbreaks. We did, however, further identify three studies from Bahrain, Brunei and Saudi Arabia evaluating measures at a population‐level, such as all travellers arriving at a specific airport or a large population of workers returning from work abroad. While likely more policy‐relevant than those in very specific settings, the populations studied were small, in the order of a few thousand, and an opportunity for undertaking much larger and thus more policy‐relevant studies exists. Importantly, much of the evidence relates to the implementation of travel‐related control measures at the beginning of the COVID‐19 pandemic, although some studies were conducted during later phases.

Intervention

With much of the evidence deriving from modelling studies – notably for travel restrictions reducing cross‐border travel and quarantine of travellers – there is a lack of 'real‐world' evidence for many of these measures. Compared to the original review, however, we identified modelling studies on screening at borders measures that more closely matched the current policy discussions. For example, whereas earlier studies asked very generic questions such as ‘Is screening effective at detecting infected travellers?’, some of the more recent studies asked more nuanced questions such as ‘Does a PCR test upon arrival perform better than symptom/exposure screening?’ and ‘How many more cases are detected if a PCR test is given after a quarantine of 3, 7 or 14 days?’. Consistent with the original review, little evidence was found on the relaxation of travel‐related control measures; as various countries consider when it is safe to lift restrictions, it will be important that studies assessing this aspect are conducted.

Outcomes

Within our primary outcome categories comprising infectious disease transmission and screening‐related outcomes, studies assessed a range of outcomes; notably studies identified in the update addressed a larger number of outcomes. In the original review, studies assessing entry and/or exit screening and quarantine of travellers focused only on the proportion of infected individuals detected by the measure; newer studies also assessed the number of infectious individuals released into the community and the amount of time an individual is infectious after arrival and after being quarantined for different durations. Regarding secondary outcomes, few studies reported on the impact of travel‐related control measures on the number of cases seeded by frontline workers, the number of hospitalisations and the number of individuals needing to quarantine/isolate in the community. While it is possible that travel‐related control measures generate signalling effects in terms of raising general awareness of the risk of infection or deterring effects in terms of stopping sick individuals from travelling, we did not identify any evidence on these outcomes.

No studies included in this update assessed outcomes concerned with the human and financial resources required to implement the measures or adverse effects in terms of health (e.g. isolation), as well as broader social and economic implications (e.g. stigmatisation, inability to work, economic impacts). This represents a major limitation regarding the completeness of the evidence, as this information is important to assess the benefits and harms of the measures. At the outset, it was decided in consultation with the WHO that the most pressing question at this point was the effectiveness of travel‐related control measures and that this review should thus focus primarily on studies assessing effectiveness in relation to infectious disease transmission and screening‐related outcomes; if included studies also reported on harms, these data would also be examined. In addition, a separate, currently ongoing, scoping review of the health, social sciences, and environmental literature seeks to map the various unintended consequences and potential adverse health effects and broader societal harms of travel‐related control measures (osf.io/7gyxe).

It is important to note that this is a fast‐moving research field. Since 13 November 2020, when we conducted our searches, we have identified two further relevant studies: a modelling study on border screening approaches using various testing strategies in the USA (Kiang 2020), and an observational study of test‐based screening at borders using PCR testing in New Zealand (Swadi 2021). As these studies were not identified as part of our systematic searches and were published after the final searches, we have not incorporated them into this review. They highlight, however, that the evidence base is growing further, and that a future update will be important.

Sources of heterogeneity

As part of the narrative synthesis, we documented potential sources of heterogeneity that may have influenced intervention effectiveness. Modelling studies across all intervention categories differed in the methods they employed and they assessed a broad range of potential factors.

  • COVID‐19 pandemic: studies suggest that the level of community transmission in both the implementing country and the restricted country, and the proportion of asymptomatic cases play a role.

  • Broader context of travel: the baseline number of travellers, the interconnectedness of the region with the travel measure in place and the restricted region, how much flight volumes are likely to rebound in the absence of restrictions, the duration the duration of travel and stay in the country of departure were all relevant factors.

  • Other public health measures: whether other public health measures, such as a stay‐at‐home order and testing and contact tracing, are in place in the region where the travel measure is implemented.

  • Implementation of the intervention: factors related to the earlier or later timing of implementation of the intervention, the exact specification of the intervention (e.g. duration of quarantine of travellers), and compliance with the measures all influenced effectiveness.

Looking across the observational studies of screening at borders, the measure itself was important, with test‐based screening generally performing better than symptom‐ or exposure‐based screening. There were also some differences regarding the timing of the interventions; while most measures were implemented at departure or immediately upon arrival, a few studies assessed testing within one or two days of arrival.

Certainty of the evidence

The certainty of evidence was moderate for one outcome and either low or very low for the rest of the body of evidence we assessed; thus, we cannot be confident in the findings. The true effects may therefore be (or are likely to be) substantially different from the estimates of effect described. We downgraded the certainty of evidence due to risk of bias (for observational studies) and quality (for modelling studies), as well as for imprecision and indirectness.

Observational studies contributed evidence to the intervention categories entry and/or exit screening alone and quarantine of travellers alone. We judged most domains across observational studies assessing entry and/or exit screening measures to be at low or unclear risk of bias. There were, however, some studies at high risk of bias for the selection of travellers, the reference test and the flow (where, for example, travellers were potentially infected while in quarantine, after the screening took place).

Modelling studies contributed evidence to all four intervention categories. Although modelling studies differed in quality, most bodies of evidence comprising modelling studies were downgraded due to serious concerns about the quality of the modelling. Quality concerns were diverse, but included inappropriate or unrealistic assumptions related to model structure and input data, the lack of assessment of uncertainty and incomplete technical documentation. Problematic assumptions for any of these aspects could lead to results that do not reflect reality and are thus of limited utility.

We used four reasons for downgrading evidence based on imprecision. We downgraded evidence for imprecision when a body of evidence comprised a single modelling study, as it limits our confidence in the predictions being a precise estimate of true effects, or when multiple studies provided a wide range of plausible effects (e.g. no effect versus large reductions in the number of cases). Furthermore, a few of the modelling studies provided no estimates of effect (e.g. data presented in a diagram or a map), and many studies provided estimates of effect (e.g. 85 deaths avoided) with insufficient information on the precision of the estimates. Given the nature of the data and models, it is plausible that the uncertainty in estimates is wide, and such information would be necessary for an appropriate interpretation of the study findings.

In this update, we applied two reasons for downgrading based on indirectness. Where exit and entry screening measures were implemented in very specific settings, such as on evacuation flights or during cruise ship outbreaks, we considered this as indirect evidence with regards to informing more general entry and exit screening measures at national borders. Additionally, for bodies of evidence based on modelling studies, we downgraded evidence for indirectness when there was no external validation of the model(s), as it created uncertainties in assessing how directly the model outputs relate to real‐world outcomes and consequently to our review question. External validation may be challenging, especially in the context of a pandemic, but it is important to ensure that the findings are generalisable to the real‐world situation.

Potential biases in the review process

In this update, consistent with the original review, we applied systematic and transparent methods throughout the phases of the review process. We defined our review objective and scope informed by a previously conducted evidence map (Movsisyan 2021), and in consultation with the WHO – a key end‐user that specifically requested the review to inform WHO recommendations on travel‐related control measures for COVID‐19. Our protocol was reviewed and approved by Cochrane (see Appendix 1). In order to describe the emerging evidence in relation to COVID‐19, we included a wide range of study designs and publication types, including modelling studies and preprint publications. We synthesised this evidence narratively, but applied GRADE to assess the certainty of evidence for all primary outcomes. We did, however, encounter challenges in dealing with this complex evidence base, and some decisions we made may have introduced bias into the review process.

Although we used a comprehensive search strategy designed by an information specialist, we conducted searches in only two major databases and two COVID‐specific databases and used specific search terms tightly defined around travel‐related control measures. While our chosen sources include records from a wide range of databases, as well as grey literature, such as preprints, it is possible that our searches missed some studies, especially if these were not appropriately indexed in the journals and preprint servers or conducted in languages other than English (e.g. Chinese literature). This also concerns our lack of findings regarding implementation outcomes and adverse effects. Had we searched a broader range of multi‐disciplinary databases and had we undertaken systematic searches of the grey literature (e.g. government reports), we might have identified some of these outcomes – albeit at the cost of a much lengthier and more complex review process.

As described above, our review included many modelling studies: in the specific context of a global pandemic, models developed to make predictions about the future often represent the only available evidence and are therefore crucial in informing decision making. Many modelling studies did not provide comprehensive reporting of key assumptions and model parameters, which created challenges in assessing their eligibility and validity, for example in decisions on whether the model used disease parameters of relevance for our review. Given the lack of a validated tool to assess the quality of modelling studies, we had developed a bespoke quality appraisal tool and implemented two post‐protocol adaptations in the original review. We used the same tool for the present update, and also included modelling experts within our review team throughout the review process.

We applied a structured method for the narrative synthesis that relied on defining the direction of effect for each individual study, drawing on recent guidance for conducting synthesis without meta‐analysis (Campbell 2020; Hilton Boon 2020). We described this method clearly, applied it consistently across all studies, and reported the results consistently for all bodies of evidence. Due to the nature of the outcomes, our consideration of any effect greater than the null effect being potentially relevant, and the analytical methods applied in the included studies, however, this method may bias the results towards a positive effect. A study that evaluates the proportion of infected travellers detected by a screening measure, for example, will always detect some proportion of infected travellers greater than zero; this means that a screening measure detecting 1% of cases would be considered a 'positive' effect, as it detects a higher proportion of cases than would be detected with no measure in place (0%). By reporting effect ranges and providing the underlying data, however, we have aimed to be clear and transparent that some 'positive' effects are very small.

Further, we experienced some difficulty with applying the GRADE guidance for assessing the certainty of evidence based on modelling studies (Brozek 2021). Most importantly, because it does not offer guidance for operationalising the assessment of risk of bias/quality, indirectness, imprecision, inconsistency and publication bias for a body of evidence comprising multiple models. Notably, applying the criteria of inconsistency and imprecision were challenging. With inconsistency, it was challenging because travel‐related control measures by design generally show at least a slight positive or no effect, not a negative effect. With imprecision, it was challenging because high‐quality models vary and use a large number of parameters and scenarios, often leading to wide confidence intervals; poor‐quality models do not even allow for an assessment of imprecision due to lack of reporting of effect estimates or confidence intervals. Furthermore, we used external model validation as a key criterion to help in our judgments on indirectness of the evidence, which is, however, not currently specified and operationalised as such in the GRADE guidance on modelling studies. Finally, it should be noted that there are simply more opportunities for larger bodies of evidence to be downgraded than those with only a small number of contributing studies, or even only one contributing study, as additional studies were likely to contribute further issues on risk of bias, indirectness, and imprecision to the body of evidence. Thus, a body of evidence with one study, for example, could potentially be assessed as moderate‐certainty evidence, while a body of evidence with 13 contributing studies had very little chance of being assessed as higher than very low‐certainty evidence.

While we made a case in the review for the methodological and contextual differences across the studies to impact the results and for their consideration when interpreting the review findings, we were not able to formally assess these potential moderators through subgroup analyses. Our statements regarding these moderators were therefore largely based on their assessment in individual modelling studies or limited data from observational studies.

Finally, we used abridged procedures of systematic reviewing at certain stages, to enable rapid completion of this review. Specifically, we did not conduct double data extraction and assessment of risk of bias or quality appraisal. However, we had a second experienced review author check all the extracted and appraised data, and discussed and resolved any uncertainties with the wider team. With a large author team potentially introducing heterogeneity in the process, we set up smaller groups of review authors working on each specific task (e.g. screening, extraction) to minimise inconsistencies. We also organised calls and discussions within these groups, where needed, to discuss any issues and harmonise the review process.

Systematic review PRISMA flow diagram
Figures and Tables -
Figure 1

Systematic review PRISMA flow diagram

Summary of the proportions of cases detected by the measure from observational studies. Measures portrayed include exit and/or entry screening (top panel) and PCR tests (middle panel), as well as for combined measures exit and/or entry screening with quarantine and further screening, in the form of symptom observation and/or PCR tests (bottom panel).Notes:Yamahata 2020 employed a form of symptom screening aboard a cruise ship, thus representing a very different context than all other studies.Ng 2020 employed a delayed PCR test on day 3.Lagier 2020 and Lio 2020 employed a PCR test on arrival and on day 2, respectively, however given that they did not identify cases they are not portrayed in this figure.The five evacuation flights assessed in Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020 had very different COVID‐19 prevalences, with no cases associated with three flights, but with 2/104 and 80/124 on the remaining two flights.
Figures and Tables -
Figure 2

Summary of the proportions of cases detected by the measure from observational studies. Measures portrayed include exit and/or entry screening (top panel) and PCR tests (middle panel), as well as for combined measures exit and/or entry screening with quarantine and further screening, in the form of symptom observation and/or PCR tests (bottom panel).

Notes:

Yamahata 2020 employed a form of symptom screening aboard a cruise ship, thus representing a very different context than all other studies.

Ng 2020 employed a delayed PCR test on day 3.

Lagier 2020 and Lio 2020 employed a PCR test on arrival and on day 2, respectively, however given that they did not identify cases they are not portrayed in this figure.

The five evacuation flights assessed in Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020 had very different COVID‐19 prevalences, with no cases associated with three flights, but with 2/104 and 80/124 on the remaining two flights.

Summary of findings 1. Travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel

Disease: COVID‐19

Interventions: implementing travel restrictions reducing/stopping cross‐border travel; maintaining the measure; early implementation of the measure; implementing a highly stringent measure

Comparators: no measure; relaxation of the measure; late implementation of the measure; implementing a less stringent measure

Outcome

Number of studies

Summary of findings

Certainty of evidence

Outcome category: cases avoided due to measure

Number or proportion of cases in the community

13 modelling studies

Ten out of 13 studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases resulting from various travel restrictions. These positive effects ranged from a 1.8% (95% CI ‐21.9% to 17.5%) reduction to a 97.8% reduction. The remaining three studies reported mixed effects, including a positive effect,no effect or even a negative effect. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by the level of community transmission, implementation of community‐based interventions, and the countries restricted by the measure.

Very low a,b,c

⨁◯◯◯

Number or proportion of imported or exported cases

9 modelling studies
 

Eight out of nine studies reported reductions in importations or exportations. These positive effects ranged from a 18% reduction to a 99% reduction. One study reported mixed effects, observing both positive effects and no effect. The variation in the magnitude and direction of effect might be explained by differences in travel volumes, the timing of implementation, the comprehensiveness and severity of the measure implemented.

Very lowb,c,d

⨁◯◯◯

Number or proportion of deaths

3 modelling studies
 

All studies showed reductions in deaths. These positive effects ranged from a 4.3% (95% CI ‐39.1% to 39.1%) reduction to a 98% reduction in deaths. The variation in the magnitude of effect across studies might be explained by differences in the implementation of community‐based interventions.

Very lowb,c,e

⨁◯◯◯

Risk of importation or exportation

3 modelling studies
 

Two studies reported reductions in the risk of importing and/or exporting cases as a result of travel restrictions; however, no effect estimates were available. The other study reported mixed effects, including an increased risk of importation at some airports, but decreased risk at other airports as a result of lessening travel restrictions. One study suggested that connectedness to the international travel network and the level of community transmission might explain that variation in the effect direction.

Very lowc,f,g

⨁◯◯◯

Outcome category: shift in epidemic development

Probability of eliminating the epidemic

1 modelling study

The study reported mixed effects: the probability would be higher (66% probability) for border restrictions followed by strict community measures than for a delayed border closure (55% probability), and the same as early implementation of border restrictions (66% probability).

Very low h,i,j

⨁◯◯◯

Effective reproduction number

2 modelling studies

One study reported a beneficial change (i.e. break point) in Rt after the implementation of travel restrictions in European Union countries (mean duration 12.6 days). The other study reported mixed effects, suggesting that complete border closures would lead to a 0.045 reduction in Rt, partial relaxation through the opening of land borders would lead to a 0.177 increase in Rt, while further relaxation allowing for international travel followed by quarantine upon arrival would not lead to a change in Rt.

Very low c,e,i

⨁◯◯◯

Time to outbreak

6 modelling studies
 

Four out of six studies reported reductions in the time to outbreak. These positive effects ranged from a delay of less than one day to 85 days. Two studies reported mixed effects, suggesting both positive effects and no effect. The variation in the direction and magnitude of effect across studies might be explained by differences in the levels of community transmission, the timing of implementation, and the countries restricted by the measure.

Very lowb,c,d

⨁◯◯◯

Risk of outbreak

2 modelling studies
 

One study reported reductions in the risk of an outbreak resulting from travel restrictions with effects ranging from a 1% to a 37% reduction. The other study reported mixed effects, including both a positive effect and no effect. The variation in the magnitude and direction of effect might be explained by differences in the levels of community transmission, the number of cases in the country of departure, the severity of the travel restriction, co‐interventions, and the percentage of contacts being traced.

Very low c,i,j

⨁◯◯◯

Number or proportion of cases at peak

2 modelling studies

Both studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases at peak. These positive effects ranged from a 0.3% reduction to a 8% reduction. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by differences in the implementation of community‐based interventions.

Lowk,l

⨁⨁◯◯

Epidemic growth acceleration

1 modelling study

The study reported that international travel controls would lead to a decrease in the growth acceleration of the epidemic progression across 62 countries (−6.05% change, P < 0.0001).

Low h,m

⨁⨁◯◯

Exportation growth rate

1 modelling study

The study reported that both the lockdown of Hubei, resulting in a ban of all travel, as well as travel restrictions imposed on China led to a decrease in the growth rate of cases exported from Hubei and the rest of China, to the rest of the world.

Low h,m

⨁⨁◯◯

Outcome category: cases detected due to the measure

No contributing study

aDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural elements, the input parameters, and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.
bDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to a wide range of plausible effects.
cDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in some studies and/or concerns with reporting of external validation in others.
dDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural elements, the input parameters, the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty, and incomplete technical documentation.
eDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural elements and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.
fDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural elements, the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty and the lack of technical documentation.
gDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to effect estimates being unavailable.
hDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to only one contributing study.
iDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to insufficient data reported to enable assessment of precision.
jDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model's structural elements and input parameters.
kDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the models's structural elements.
lDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in all included studies.
mDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

Figures and Tables -
Summary of findings 1. Travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel
Summary of findings 2. Screening at borders

Disease: COVID‐19

Interventions: implementing entry and/or exit symptom/exposure‐based screening; implementing entry and/or exit test‐based screening; implementing a highly stringent screening measure

Comparators: no measure; implementing an alternative measure; implementing a less stringent screening measure

Outcome

Number of studies

Summary of findings

Certainty of evidence

Symptom/exposure‐based screening at borders

Outcome category: cases avoided due to the measure

Number or proportion of cases exported

1 modelling study

The study reported that putting screening measures in place across the world would reduce the number of cases exported per day from China would be reduced by 82% (95% CI 72% to 95%),  under the assumption of only 35.7% of symptomatic individuals being detected.

Moderatea

⨁⨁⨁◯

Outcome category: shift in epidemic development

Time to outbreak

4 modelling studies

All studies reported that entry and/or exit screening alone would delay an outbreak. These positive effects ranged from 2.7‐day delay (from 45 days to 47.7 days in reaching 1000 cases) to 0.5‐year delay (from 1.7 years (95% CI 0.04 to 6.09) to 2.2 years (95% CI 0.6 to 8.11)). The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by differences in the timing of implementation, the number of arriving travellers, the percentage of asymptomatic cases screened, and the sensitivity of screening.

Very lowb,c,d

⨁◯◯◯

Risk of outbreak

1 modelling study

The study reported that under the assumption of one infected person entering Mauritius per 100 days, entry screening with 100% sensitivity would reduce the probability of an outbreak within 3 months to 10% and screening with 50% sensitivity would reduce the probability to 48%.

Lowa,b

⨁⨁◯◯

Outcome category: cases detected due to the measure

Number or proportion of cases detected

4 modelling studies

All studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases detected. These positive effects ranged from detecting 0.8% (95% CI 0.2% to 1.6%) of cases to detecting 53% (95% CI 35% to 72%) of cases. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by the time window in which the exposure may have occurred, flight duration, the percentage of asymptomatic cases in the population, the combination of entry and exit screening measures, and the sensitivity of screening.

Very lowb,c,e

⨁◯◯◯

Proportion of cases detected

9 observationalstudies

Across studies, the proportion of cases detected by entry and/or exit screening measures ranged from 0 to 100%. For symptom and temperature screening, one study reported that the measure detected 100% of cases; however, all other studies reported substantially lower proportions of cases detected, ranging from 0% to 53%. Across studies, the variation in effects could be due to the specific measure; for example, some symptom/exposure screening procedures may have been more thorough than others.

Very lowc,f,g

⨁◯◯◯

Positive predictive value (PPV)

6 observationalstudies

The PPV ranged from 0 to 100% in studies assessing symptom/exposure screening. This is likely highly dependent on how exactly symptoms are defined in studies, however this is poorly described in most included studies.

Very lowc,f,g

⨁◯◯◯

Test‐based screening at borders

Outcome category: cases avoided due to the measure

Proportion of secondary cases

1 modelling study

The study reported that PCR testing all incoming travellers upon arrival, followed by isolation of test‐positives and requiring a negative test at the end of the isolation would lead to a reduction in secondary cases of 88% (95% CI 87% to 89%) for a 7‐day isolation period and 92% (95% CI 92% to 93%) for a 14‐day isolation period.

Very lowa,e,h

⨁◯◯◯

Proportion of imported cases

1 modelling study

The study reported that PCR testing all incoming travellers upon arrival, followed by isolation of test‐positives and requiring a negative test at the end of the isolation would lead to a reduction of 90% of imported cases for a 7‐day isolation period and 92% for a 14‐day isolation period. Testing all incoming travellers and refusing entry to test‐positives would lead to a reduction of 77%.

Very low a,e,h

⨁◯◯◯

Outcome category: shift in epidemic development

No contributing study.

Outcome category: cases detected due to the measure

Days at risk of transmitting the infection into the community

2 modelling studies

Both studies showed that a single PCR test upon arrival would reduce the days that travellers, upon release, remain at risk of transmitting the infection into the community. These positive effects ranged from 0.1 fewer days to 0.3 fewer days at risk of transmission.

Low e,i

⨁⨁◯◯

Proportion of cases detected

5 observationalstudies

The proportion of cases detected ranged from 58% to 90%. The timing of certain procedures could play a role in the variation of effect, with PCR tests conducted two days after arrival potentially being more effective in detecting cases than those conducted immediately upon arrival.

Lowc,g

⨁◯◯◯

Probability of releasing an infected individual into the community

2 modelling studies

Both studies showed reductions in the probability of releasing an infected individual into the community as a result of PCR testing. These positive effects included a risk ratio of 0.55 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.83) and probabilities of releasing an infected individual ranging from 48% to 53% for scenarios with different risks of transmission while travelling.

Lowc,e

⨁⨁◯◯

aDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to only one contributing study.

bDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural elements, the input parameters, and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

cDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to a wide range of plausible effects

dDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in some studies and concerns with reporting of external validation in others.

eDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in all included studies.

fDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to concerns with traveller selection, the reference test, and the flow and timing of procedures.

gDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, as travellers on evacuation flights and cruise ships comprised most of the studies; these are likely not representative of usual travels.

hDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural elements and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

iDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

Figures and Tables -
Summary of findings 2. Screening at borders
Summary of findings 3. Quarantine

Disease: COVID‐19

Interventions: implementing quarantine; implementing a highly stringent quarantine

Comparators: no measure; implementing an alternative measure (e.g. screening); implementing a less stringent quarantine

Outcome

Number of studies

Summary of findings

Certainty of evidence

Outcome category: cases avoided due to the measure

Number or proportion of cases in the community

3 modelling studies

All studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases. These positive effects ranged from 450 fewer cases to 64028 fewer cases during the first wave of the pandemic. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by differences in the population group targeted by the measure.

Very lowa,b,c

⨁◯◯◯

Proportion of imported cases

1 modelling study

The study reported that quarantining all incoming travellers would reduce the proportion of imported cases by 55% for a 7‐day quarantine period and by 91% for a 14‐day quarantine period.

Very lowb,d,e,f

⨁◯◯◯

Number or proportion of cases seeded by imported cases

3 modelling studies

All studies reported reductions in the number or proportion of cases seeded by imported cases as a result of quarantine of travellers. These positive effects ranged from a 26% (95% CI 19% to 37%) reduction to a 100% reduction. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by enforcement of the quarantine, age, and the length of the quarantine period.

 Very low c,g,h

⨁◯◯◯

Probability of an imported case not infecting anyone

1 modelling study

The study reported that a 14‐day quarantine of all international arrivals in New Zealand would lead to a 4% increase in probability in adults and a 14% in the elderly that an imported case would not infect anyone among adults and the elderly. The increase in the probably would be larger when a 14‐day government‐mandated quarantine is required (31% and 36% among adults and the elderly, respectively).

Very low e,f,i

⨁◯◯◯

Outcome category: shift in epidemic development

Time to outbreak

1 modelling study

The study reported that increasing the effectiveness of quarantine to 80% and 90% from the base case of 75% effectiveness would delay the peak in active cases and deaths by 3.5 and 5.5 days, respectively.

Lowe,b

⨁⨁◯◯

Outcome category: cases detected due to the measure

Days at risk of transmitting the infection into the community

2 modelling studies

Both studies reported reductions in the numbers of days that travellers, upon release, remain at risk of transmitting the infection into the community. These positive effects ranged from 0.1 fewer days to 2.1 fewer days at risk of transmission. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by the length of quarantine.

Lowf,h

⨁⨁◯◯

Proportion of cases detected

1 modelling study

The study reported that requiring travellers to quarantine upon arrival in the UK would lead to detecting different proportions of cases, with the magnitude increasing with the number of days in quarantine (7‐day quarantine: 51% (95% CI 47% to 56%); 14‐day quarantine: 78% (95% CI 74% to 82%)). These proportions are higher than those for screening alone (with either thermal imaging scanners or health checks detecting 0.78% and 1.13% of cases, respectively).

Very low a,e,f

⨁◯◯◯

Probability of releasing an infected individual into the community

3 modelling studies

All studies reported reductions in the risk or probability of releasing an infected individual into the community. These positive effects included a risk ratio ranging from 0.00 (95% CI 0.00 to 0.01) to 0.59 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.85) and probabilities of releasing an infected individual ranging from 0% to 85%. The variation in the magnitude of effect might be explained by the length of the quarantine period and the risk of transmission within quarantine settings.

Very lowf,h,i

⨁◯◯◯

aDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty and incomplete technical documentation.

bDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to insufficient data reported to enable assessment of precision.

cDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in some studies and concerns with reporting of external validation in others.

dDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the models’ structural assumptions and adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

eDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to only one contributing study.

fDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in included studies.

gDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the models’ structural assumptions, the input parameters and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

hDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to a wide range of plausible effects.

IDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

Figures and Tables -
Summary of findings 3. Quarantine
Summary of findings 4. Quarantine and screening at borders

Disease: COVID‐19

Interventions: implementing quarantine and screening measures combined

Comparators: implementing a single measure of quarantine or screening

Outcome

Number of studies

Summary of findings

Certainty of evidence

Outcome category: cases avoided due to the measure

No contributing study.

Outcome category: shift in epidemic development

Time to outbreak

1 modelling study

The study reported delays in outbreak resulting from combination of screening and quarantine compared with a single measure. Under the assumption of one flight per day (7.1% of normal travel volume) and 50% sensitivity of screening, the time to outbreak would vary greatly for different combinations of measures ranging from 3.5 years (95% CI 0.09 to 12.9) to 34.1 years (95% CI 0.86 to 126) to outbreak.

Very low a,b,c

⨁◯◯◯

Outcome category: cases detected due to measure

Days at risk of transmitting the infection into the community

2 modelling studies

Both studies reported that the combination of quarantine and testing would reduce days that travellers, upon release, remain at risk of transmitting the infection into the community compared with a single measure. These positive effects ranged from 0.01 fewer days to 2.0 fewer days at risk of transmission.

Low b,c

⨁⨁◯◯

Probability of releasing an infected individual into community

3 modelling studies

All studies reported positive effects resulting from a combination of screening and quarantine. These positive effects included a reduction in the probability of releasing an infected individual ranging from 2% to 48%. The variation in the magnitude of effect could be explained by the length of the quarantine period, day(s) on which the test is conducted in quarantine or the risk of transmission within quarantine.

Very lowb,c,d

⨁◯◯◯

Proportion of cases detected

2 modelling studies

Both studies reported that the combination of quarantine and testing would further increase case detection compared with single measures. These positive effects ranged from 41% to 99% of cases detected. The variation in the magnitude of effect may be explained by the length of the quarantine period with longer quarantine and the duration of travel and stay in the country of departure.

Very low b,c,e

⨁◯◯◯

Proportion of cases detected

4 observational studies

All studies reported that the combination of quarantine and testing would further increase case detection compared with single measures. The proportion of cases detected ranged from 68.8% to 90.2%. The type of initial exit and/or entry screening could play a role; while most employed a PCR test upon arrival, one study employed symptom screening. Whether travellers in quarantine were monitored for the development of symptoms, and the intensity of this monitoring may also have been important.

Lowb,f

⨁⨁◯◯

aDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural assumptions, the input parameters, and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

bDowngraded ‐1 for imprecision, due to a wide range of plausible effects.

cDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, due to no reporting of external validation in included studies.

dDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

eDowngraded ‐1 for risk of bias, due to major quality concerns in some studies related to the appropriateness of the model’s structural assumptions and the adequacy of assessment of the model’s uncertainty.

fDowngraded ‐1 for indirectness, as travellers on evacuation flights comprised most of the studies; these are likely not representative of usual travels.

Figures and Tables -
Summary of findings 4. Quarantine and screening at borders
Table 1. Summary of QUADAS‐2 'risk of bias' assessment for screening studies

Study

D1: Traveller selection

D2: Index test

D3: Reference test

D4: Flow and timing

Symptom screening

Al‐Qahtani 2020

Low

Unclear

Low

Unclear

Arima 2020

Unclear

Low

Low

Unclear

Chen J 2020

Low

Unclear

Low

Unclear

Hoehl 2020

Low

Low

Unclear

Unclear

Kim 2020

Low

Low

Unclear

Low

Lytras 2020

Low

Unclear

High

Unclear

Ng 2020

High

Low

Low

Unclear

Wong J 2020

Unclear

Unclear

Unclear

Unclear

Yamahata 2020

Low

Unclear

High

High

PCR test

Arima 2020

Unclear

Low

Low

Unclear

Al‐Qahtani 2020

Low

Low

Low

Unclear

Al‐Tawfiq 2020

High

Low

Low

Low

Lagier 2020

High

Unclear

Low

Unclear

Lio 2020

Unclear

Low

Low

Low

Ng 2020

High

Low

High

Unclear

Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020

Low

Low

Low

Unclear

Combined

Al‐Qahtani 2020

Low

Low

Unclear

Unclear

Arima 2020

Unclear

Low

Low

Unclear

Chen J 2020

Low

Low

Low

Unclear

Lio 2020

Unclear

Low

Low

Low

Shaikh Abdul Karim 2020

Low

Low

Unclear

Unclear

Figures and Tables -
Table 1. Summary of QUADAS‐2 'risk of bias' assessment for screening studies
Table 2. Summary of quality appraisal for modelling studies

Study

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Q7

Q8

Q9

Q10

Travel restrictions reducing or stopping cross‐border travel

Adekunle 2020

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Anderson 2020

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Anzai 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Major

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Banholzer 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Binny 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Boldog 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Chen T 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Chinazzi 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Costantino 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Davis 2020

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Moderate

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Deeb 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Grannell 2020

No to minor

Major

Moderate

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

Major

Kang 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Major

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Major

Liebig 2020

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Major

Linka 2020a

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Linka 2020b

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

McLure 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Nakamura 2020

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Nowrasteh 2020

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Major

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Odendaal 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Pinotti 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Russell TW 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Shi 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Sruthi 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

Utsunomiya 2020

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

No to minor

Reported

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Kwok 2020

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Wells 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Yang 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Zhang C 2020

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Reported

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Zhang L 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Major

Zhong 2020

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

Moderate

Reported

No to minor

Moderate

Moderate

Screening at borders

Bays 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Clifford 2020a

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Major

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Clifford 2020b

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Dickens 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Gostic 2020

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Mandal 2020

No to minor

Major

Moderate

Major

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Nuckchady 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Major

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Quilty 2020

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Major

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Russell WA 2020

No to minor

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Steyn 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Taylor 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Wells 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Wilson 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Major

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Quarantine of travellers alone

Ashcroft 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Chen Y‐H 2020

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Chen T 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

Moderate

Clifford 2020b

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Dickens 2020

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

James 2020

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Kivuti‐Bito 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Russell WA 2020

No to minor

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Ryu 2020

No to minor

Major

Moderate

Major

Reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Steyn 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Taylor 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Wong MC 2020

Moderate

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Reported

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Moderate

Major

Quarantine of travellers and screening combined

Ashcroft 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Bays 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Clifford 2020b

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Russell WA 2020

No to minor

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

No to minor

No to minor

Steyn 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Taylor 2020

No to minor

No to minor

No to minor

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

No to minor

Wilson 2020

No to minor

Major

No to minor

Major

Not reported

Moderate

Not reported

Moderate

Major

Moderate

Figures and Tables -
Table 2. Summary of quality appraisal for modelling studies