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On Provable Security for Conventional Cryptography

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Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC’99 (ICISC 1999)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1787))

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Abstract

Many previous results on the provable security of conventional cryptography have been published so far. We provide here handy tools based on Decorrelation Theory for dealing with them and we show how to make their proof easier. As an illustration we survey a few of these results and we (im)prove some by our technique.

This paper covers results on pseudorandomness of some block cipher constructions and on message authentication code constructions.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Swiss Federal Institute of Technologies (EPFL),  

    Serge Vaudenay

Authors
  1. Serge Vaudenay
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Computer Science, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea

    JooSeok Song

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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Vaudenay, S. (2000). On Provable Security for Conventional Cryptography. In: Song, J. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC’99. ICISC 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1787. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/10719994_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/10719994_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-67380-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45568-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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