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On the Security of Reduced Versions of 3-Pass HAVAL

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2384))

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Abstract

HAVAL is a dedicated hash function of the MD family which was proposed by Zheng et al. In this paper, we study the security of reduced versions of 3-pass HAVAL. We find a 256-bit collision of the first two passes of 3-pass HAVAL and of the last two passes of 3-pass HAVAL.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. National Security Research Institute, Korea

    Sangwoo Park & Seongtaek Chee

  2. Department of Applied Mathematics, Pai Chai University, Korea

    Soo Hak Sung

  3. Center for Information Security Technologies(CIST), Korea University, Korea

    Jongin Lim

Authors
  1. Sangwoo Park
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  2. Soo Hak Sung
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  3. Seongtaek Chee
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  4. Jongin Lim
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Rusden Campus, Deakin University, Burwood Road, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

    Lynn Batten

  2. Department of Computer Science, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Jennifer Seberry

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Park, S., Sung, S.H., Chee, S., Lim, J. (2002). On the Security of Reduced Versions of 3-Pass HAVAL. In: Batten, L., Seberry, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2384. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45450-0_31

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45450-0_31

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-43861-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45450-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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