Abstract
In this article we introduce the concept for a distributed railway control system and present the specification and verification of the main algorithm used for safe distributed control. Our design and verification approach is based on the RAISE method, starting with highly abstract algebraic specifications which are transformed into directly implementable distributed control processes by applying a series of refinement and verification steps. Concrete safety requirements are derived from an abstract version that can be easily validated with respect to soundness and completeness. Complexity is further reduced by separating the system model into a domain model describing the physical system in absence of control and a controller model introducing the safety-related control mechanisms as a separate entity monitoring observables of the physical system to decide whether it is safe for a train to move or for a point to be switched.
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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Haxthausen, A.E., Peleska, J. (1999). Formal development and verification of a distributed railway control system. In: Wing, J.M., Woodcock, J., Davies, J. (eds) FM’99 — Formal Methods. FM 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1709. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48118-4_32
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48118-4_32
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