Abstract
The Rao-Nam scheme is discussed and generalized to Fq. It is shown that the scheme is insecure against a chosen-plaintext attack for practical code lengths. Based on observations an improved scheme is given, which is not vulnerable to the chosen-plaintext attacks as described.
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© 1988 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Struik, R., van Tilburg, J. (1988). The Rao-Nam Scheme is Insecure Against a Chosen-Plaintext Attack. In: Pomerance, C. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’87. CRYPTO 1987. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 293. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48184-2_40
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48184-2_40
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