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Encrypted Message Authentication by Firewalls

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Public Key Cryptography (PKC 1999)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1560))

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Abstract

Firewalls typically filter network traffic at several different layers. At application layer, filtering is based on various security relevant information encapsulated into protocol messages. The major obstacle for efficient verification of authenticity of messages at application layer is the difficulty of verifying digital signatures without disclosure of content protected by encryption. This is due to a traditional paradigm of generating a digital signature of a message and then encrypting the signature together with the message to preserve confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and authenticity. To overcome this limitation, a scheme shall be proposed for enabling signature verification without disclosing the content of messages. To provide maximum efficiency, the scheme is based on digital signcryption.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Peninsula School of Computing and Information Technology, Monash University, McMahons Road, Frankston, Vic, 3199, Australia

    Chandana Gamage, Jussipekka Leiwo & Yuliang Zheng

Authors
  1. Chandana Gamage
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  2. Jussipekka Leiwo
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  3. Yuliang Zheng
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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Gamage, C., Leiwo, J., Zheng, Y. (1999). Encrypted Message Authentication by Firewalls. In: Public Key Cryptography. PKC 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1560. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49162-7_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49162-7_6

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-65644-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-49162-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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