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Waller, S., de Haan, J. (2005). Credibility and Transparency of Central Banks: New Results Based on Ifo’s World Economic Survey . In: Sturm, JE., Wollmershäuser, T. (eds) Ifo Survey Data in Business Cycle and Monetary Policy Analysis. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-7908-1605-1_9
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