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Why Economics Must Abandon its Theory of the Firm

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Economics: Complex Windows

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Finance, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, Australia

    S. Keen

Authors
  1. S. Keen
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università di Salerno, Italy

    Massimo Salzano

  2. GREQAM/EHESS, Université d’Aix-Marseille III, France

    Alan Kirman

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Italia

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Keen, S. (2005). Why Economics Must Abandon its Theory of the Firm. In: Salzano, M., Kirman, A. (eds) Economics: Complex Windows. New Economic Windows. Springer, Milano. https://doi.org/10.1007/88-470-0344-X_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/88-470-0344-X_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Milano

  • Print ISBN: 978-88-470-0279-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-88-470-0344-6

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