Abstract
Authentication protocols are designed to work correctly in the presence of an adversary that can prompt honest principals to engage in an unbounded number of concurrent executions of the protocol. This paper establishes a bound on the number of protocol executions that could be useful in attacks. The bound applies to a large class of protocols, which contains versions of some well-known authentication protocols, including the Yahalom, Otway-Rees, and Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocols.
The author gratefully acknowledges the support of NSF under Grant CCR-9876058 and the support of ONR under Grants N00014-99-1-0358 and N00014-01-1-0109. This work was started while the author was at Indiana University in Bloomington.
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Stoller, S.D. (2002). A Bound on Attacks on Authentication Protocols. In: Baeza-Yates, R., Montanari, U., Santoro, N. (eds) Foundations of Information Technology in the Era of Network and Mobile Computing. IFIP — The International Federation for Information Processing, vol 96. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-35608-2_48
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-35608-2_48
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