Abstract
When I am said to have done something of my own free will it is implied that I could have acted otherwise; and it is only when it is believed that I could have acted otherwise that I am held to be morally responsible for what I have done. For a man is not thought to be morally responsible for an action that it was not in his power to avoid. But if human behaviour is entirely governed by causal laws, it is not clear how any action that is done could ever have been avoided. It may be said of the agent that he would have acted otherwise if the causes of his action had been different, but they being what they were, it seems to follow that he was bound to act as he did. Now it is commonly assumed both that men are capable of acting freely, in the sense that is required to make them morally responsible, and that human behaviour is entirely governed by causal laws: and it is the apparent conflict between these two assumptions that gives rise to the philosophical problem of the freedom of the will.
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© 1972 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Ayer, A.J. (1972). Freedom and Necessity. In: Philosophical Essays. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00132-3_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00132-3_12
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-01714-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-00132-3
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