Abstract
Economic thought is a branch of intellectual history. While there is no alchemy involved in seeing the history of economics as intellectual history and although the two aspects obviously run together and are not always readily or conclusively disentangled, there are aspects of the subject which derive from it being the history of economics and aspects which derive from it being the history of ideas; aspects, that is, which reflect the nature (or differential perceptions) of the economy and aspects which reflect the impact of and assume the character of ideational systems. The general objective of this article is to suggest opportunities for creative research that flow from contemplating the history of economic thought as intellectual history. It is primarily concerned with the form rather than the content of the history of economic thought, with characteristics which inform and channel economic enquiry but represent modes of thought rather than economic analysis per se. More specifically, the article attempts to set forth some of the diverse facets that confront the historian of economic thought who considers the subject a branch of intellectual history. A second and correlative objective is to suggest a strategy of inquiry that promises to enrich both the work of the historian of economic thought and the discipline of economics.
The person who would study the history of ideas must have a kind of curiosity about the human mind and its workings that is not common. He must be willing to treat ideas that seem silly or superstitious and that are perhaps obsolete with the same care as he would give to established truths. For the history of ideas tells us among other things how we got to think the way we do — and if that is not of importance, one wonders what is.
George Boas
The history of science, by its nature as part of the history of ideas, has got to be a discipline which helps actual scientists to get a deeper insight into the real nature of their own science.
Margaret Mastennan
Among other considerations, this article will abstract from such important and relevant topics as these: the sociology of knowledge; the functionalism-teleology controversy; the mathematization of economics; the problem of the scope of economics; the theory-empiricism controversy; the absolutism-relativism controversy; the role, nature, and structure of scientific revolutions; the relevance and usefulness of general linguistics, psycholinguistics, and general semantics; conceptions of social meaning; the transmission, diffusion, and reception of ideas, the process of redefmition and reinterpretation of received ideas; biography; filtration systems; and the social-psychological dynamics of theoretical innovation.
The article was originally published in the History of Political Economy, vol. 6 (1974), Fall, pp. 305–23.
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Notes
Inter alia, see May Brodbeck (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), sec. 4;
and Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York, 1961), pp. 535ff.
C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems (New York, 1971), ch. 10;
and Margaret A. Boden, Purposive Explanation in Psychology (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), on which see the perceptive review by William P. Alston, in Science, vol. 7 (21 July 1972), pp. 251–2.
Nagel (see note 1, above), passim; and Sherman Roy Krupp (ed.), The Structure of Economic Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966), pp. 68–82. To go a step further, it is not unrealistic to suggest that there are probably three (rather than C. P. Snow’s two) cultures — natural science, the humanities, and social science — with the third characterized by an amorphous blend of types of social thought. The social sciences have not merely emulated the physical.
Paul Diesing, Reason in Society (Urbana, III., 1962). In connection with still other aspects of intellectual history, see also his Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences (Chicago, 1971).
Ibid., p. 17. Nonetheless there is a deeply personal element in the adoption of the general cosmology by individuals, as has been stressed by Michael Polanyi. For an important relevant discussion, see Laurence H. Tribe, ‘Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 2 (1972), p. 77 and passim.
More in the area of the sociology of knowledge, but relevant here as well, is Georges Gurvitch, The Social Frameworks of Knowledge (New York, 1971).
Merle Curti, The Growth of American Thought, 3rd edn (New York, 1964), p. x.
See, inter alia, Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory (Cambridge, Mass., 1955);
Vincent J. Tarascio, ‘Value Judgments in Economic Science’, Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 5, pp. 98— 102 (1971);
Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy (Chicago, 1962);
Warren J. Samuels, ‘Welfare Economics, Power, and Property’, in Gene Wunderlich and W. L. Gibson, Jr (eds), Perspectives of Property (University Park, Pa., 1972), pp. 93ff., which deals with the complex ethical character of the Pareto criterion; and the issue of the American Journal of Sociology, vol. 78 (July 1972) devoted to the varieties of political expression in sociology.
The role of authority among historians of economic thought is at least as great as in the development of economic thought. For a relatively recent statement, building upon the famous essay by W. Stanley Jevons, see Royall Brandis, ‘On the Noxious Influence of Authority’, Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, vol. 7 (1967), pp. 37–44.
See also A. W. Coats, ‘The Role of Authority in the Development of British Economics’, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 7 (1965), pp. 85–106;
and N. B. de Marchi, ‘The Noxious Influence of Authority: A Correction of Jevons’s Charge’, ibid., vol. 16 (1973), pp. 179–89.
See generally Fritz Machlup, Essays on Economic Semantics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1963),
and L. M. Fraser, Economic Thought and Language (London, 1937).
An excellent source of insight is Joseph Dorfman’s The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 5 vols (New York, 1947–59).
See also Roy Harrod, Sociology, Morals and Mystery (New York, 1971).
Frank H. Knight, ‘The Role of Principles in Economics and Politics’, American Economic Review vol. 41 (1951), reprinted in his On the History and Method of Economics (Chicago, 1956), ch. 11.
Robert L. Heilbroner, The Limits of American Capitalism (New York, 1965), pp. 65–6 and passim.
G. L. S. Shackle, The Years of High Theory (New York, 1967), p. 286.
George Boas, The History of Ideas (New York, 1969), p. 35.
John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York, 1929).
See, inter alia, Daniel J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law (Boston, 1958).
Raymond A. Bauer, ‘Social Psychology and the Study of Policy Formation’, American Psychologist, vol. 21 (1966), p. 925.
Joseph J. Spengler, ‘Economics: Its History, Themes, Approaches’, Journal of Economic Issues vol. 2 (1968), pp. 5–30.
Leo Rogin, The Meaning and Validity of Economic Theory (New York, 1956), ch. 1; and Lawrence Nabers, in Krupp, Structure, pp. 68–82.
For a broader perspective, see Edward L. Brady and Lewis M. Branscomb, ‘Information for a Changing Society’, Science, vol. 175 (3 March 1972), pp. 961–6.
Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York, 1936).
An alternative conception could be Parrington’s ‘critical realism’; see Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought: Vol. 3. The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America, 1860–1920 (New York, 1958).
Joseph J. Spengler and William R. Allen (eds), Essays in Economic Thought (Chicago, 1960), pp. 9–11 and passim.
See the discussion in Maurice Natanson (ed), Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York, 1963), pp. 186–7, 264,
and passim; and Lewis A. Coser, Masters of Sociological Thought (New York, 1971), pp. 220–1, 245–7, 452. Also very useful was Thomas McCarthy, ‘On Misunderstanding “Understanding”’, revision of a paper presented at the meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association, Lansing, Mich., 27–29 October 1972.
Felix S. Cohen, The Legal Conscience (New Haven, Conn., 1960).
Vincent J. Tarascio, ‘Some Recent Developments in the History of Economic Thought in the United States’, History of Political Economy, vol. 3 (1971), pp. 419–31.
Craufurd D. Goodwin, ‘Economic Theory and Society: A Plea for Process Analysis’, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 62 (1972), pp. 409–15.
Oskar Morgenstern, ‘Descriptive, Predictive and Normative Theory’, Kyklos, vol. 25 (1972), p. 107.
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Samuels, W.J. (1992). The History of Economic Thought as Intellectual History. In: Essays in the History of Heterodox Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12263-9_3
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