Abstract
In the early years of this century the debate as to the nature of judgment was a central issue dividing British philosophers. What a philosopher said about judgment was not independent of what he said about perception, the distinction between the a priori and empirical, the distinction between external and internal relations, the nature of inference, truth, universals, language, the reality of the self and so on.1
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© 1974 The Royal Institute of Philosophy
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Stock, G. (1974). Wittgenstein on Russell’s Theory of Judgment. In: Understanding Wittgenstein. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15546-0_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15546-0_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-17149-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-15546-0
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