Abstract
I was asked, as a philosopher, to address an audience primarily of psychobiologists about the nature of consciousness. Many people—among them, quite likely, many readers of the present volume—might find this a little strange: After all, would a conference of physicists really invite a philosopher to address them on the nature of matter? Or of biologists on the nature of life? Perhaps; but why not? Let me first say something about the sort of thing a philosopher may legitimately have to say, before going on to make what I hope will be some useful, substantive claims of my own.
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Rey, G. (1983). A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness. In: Davidson, R.J., Schwartz, G.E., Shapiro, D. (eds) Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-9317-1_1
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