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Biolaw, Liberalism and Cognitive Enhancement: Identifying Harms

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Biolaw and Policy in the Twenty-First Century

Part of the book series: International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine ((LIME,volume 78))

Abstract

In this chapter, some of the articulated criticisms against cognitive enhancement through the use of pharmacological agents as well as some ways of counteracting them will be examined. In the argumentation , the institutional apparatus of a liberal democracy of capitalist production will be supossed. While each of these factors (liberalism , democracy , and capitalism ) admits different interpretations, the argument is not played in their specification . One important conclusion will be that uncertainty about the consequences of cognitive enhancement in health should also be considered in the equation. If there is no damage in its use, there is no reason to restrict access. But if it causes harm , or is likely to produce it, this consideration may change. As a general rule: the more dangerous the enhancement , or the more uncertain the health consequences, the better it is to control and restrict access. However, if it has no serious consequences on health, there would be no reason , from a liberal perspective , to restrict its use.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    According to empirical research on the prevalence of cognitive enhancement , breeders are now widely used by academics, as well as college and university students, to improve their cognitive abilities. For an overview of its use, compare Repantis et al (2010), Glannon (2008), Chatterjee (2004), Dubljevic (2012, 2013); Jotterand and Dubljevic (2016). For a review of the literature on use in Latin America , compare Loewe (2016).

  2. 2.

    Questions about margins are difficult. There are the synchronous margins. As is known here are humans who are not—still or will never be—persons (fetuses, severe mentally deficient, etc.), and persons who are not human (exemplarily the case of nonhuman animals ). In addition, there are the diachronic margins, which refer to persons who do not yet exist and even do not exist, and perhaps to those who no longer exist. Here the themes of intergenerational and anamnética justice arise. While I have addressed these issues (Loewe 2010b, 2011a, 2014, 2015a), the arguments in this text do not suppose or prejudge any answers to those questions.

  3. 3.

    For this line of argument against enhancement , compare Sandel (2007).

  4. 4.

    According to a survey by the National Academy of Sports Medicine in Chicago, 195 of 198 performance athletes surveyed would have no reserves in doping. To the question, “would you take a prohibited substance that would make you gain all the powers in the next five years, even though it later makes you die?” More than half of the athletes responded positively (Sport Illustrated, April 1977, quoted in Gesang 2007: 90).

  5. 5.

    This implies that cognitive enhancers can promote equal opportunity as a kind of compensation for impaired natural cognitive abilities. For an argument for enhancement that is grounded in considerations of egalitarian justice , compare Loewe (2016).

  6. 6.

    The application of the fair principle of equal opportunities is also criticized. Buchanan, for example, proposes a model of normal limited function of equal opportunities. According to this conception, the goal of medicine is to keep individuals close to normal functioning. The disease is morally relevant because “limits on the most serious cases, at least by preventing persons from developing the threshold of abilities necessary for being a “normal competitor” in social cooperation .” (Buchanan 1995; Buchanan et al. 2000: 74). For a discussion of this model , compare Loewe (2016).

  7. 7.

    Even the Chicago School of Economics recognizes that there must be something like “self-paternalism .” Something like I want to be forced to do something (enter a social insurance, use a motorcycle helmet, etc.), because I know, that if I were not forced, I would opt for short and not long term maximizations. Just as Odysseus attaches himself to the mast, people can choose to self-bond. For a critical position against the paternalism of the Chicago School, compare Kronman and Posner (1979).

  8. 8.

    In this respect I follow Raz (1988).

  9. 9.

    Sandel criticizes human enhancement by reference to the “ethics of the given” (2007). A critique of this position in Loewe (2010a). I will return to this argument in Sect. 6.

  10. 10.

    The usual demonstrations resort to mental experiments. Compare the well-known machine of experiences presented by Nozick (1974: 42–45). A discussion in Loewe (2011b).

  11. 11.

    For a discussion on these arguments , compare Loewe (2015b).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Adolfo Ibáñez University, Santiago, Chile

    Daniel Loewe

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  1. Daniel Loewe
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Correspondence to Daniel Loewe .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. International Network of Biolaw, Washington, DC, USA

    Erick Valdés

  2. Center for Bioethics, Universidad del Desarrollo, Santiago, Chile

    Juan Alberto Lecaros

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Loewe, D. (2019). Biolaw, Liberalism and Cognitive Enhancement: Identifying Harms. In: Valdés, E., Lecaros, J. (eds) Biolaw and Policy in the Twenty-First Century. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 78. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05903-3_17

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