Skip to main content

Parametric Timed Model Checking for Guaranteeing Timed Opacity

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis (ATVA 2019)

Abstract

Information leakage can have dramatic consequences on systems security. Among harmful information leaks, the timing information leakage is the ability for an attacker to deduce internal information depending on the system execution time. We address the following problem: given a timed system, synthesize the execution times for which one cannot deduce whether the system performed some secret behavior. We solve this problem in the setting of timed automata (TAs). We first provide a general solution, and then extend the problem to parametric TAs, by synthesizing internal timings making the TA secure. We study decidability, devise algorithms, and show that our method can also apply to program analysis.

This work is partially supported by the ANR national research program PACS (ANR-14-CE28-0002) and by ERATO HASUO Metamathematics for Systems Design Project (No. JPMJER1603), JST.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    In fact, the fresh clock \(x_{ abs }\) and parameter \(p_{ abs }\) can be shared to save two variables, as \(x_{ abs }\) is never reset, and both PTAs enter \(\ell _f\) at the same time, therefore both “copies” of \(x_{ abs }\) and \(p_{ abs }\) always share the same values.

  2. 2.

    Sources, models and results are available at doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3251141.

  3. 3.

    https://github.com/Apogee-Research/STAC/.

References

  1. Abbasi, I.H., Lodhi, F.K., Kamboh, A.M., Hasan, O.: Formal verification of gate-level multiple side channel parameters to detect hardware Trojans. In: Artho, C., Ölveczky, P.C. (eds.) FTSCS 2016. CCIS, vol. 694, pp. 75–92. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53946-1_5

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Alur, R., Dill, D.L.: A theory of timed automata. TCS 126(2), 183–235 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3975(94)90010-8

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  3. Alur, R., Henzinger, T.A., Vardi, M.Y.: Parametric real-time reasoning. In: Kosaraju, S.R., Johnson, D.S., Aggarwal, A. (eds.) STOC, pp. 592–601. ACM, New York (1993). https://doi.org/10.1145/167088.167242

  4. André, É.: What’s decidable about parametric timed automata? STTT 21(2), 203–219 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10009-017-0467-0

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. André, É., Chatain, T., Encrenaz, E., Fribourg, L.: An inverse method for parametric timed automata. IJFCS 20(5), 819–836 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1142/S0129054109006905

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  6. André, É., Fribourg, L., Kühne, U., Soulat, R.: IMITATOR 2.5: a tool for analyzing robustness in scheduling problems. In: Giannakopoulou, D., Méry, D. (eds.) FM 2012. LNCS, vol. 7436, pp. 33–36. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32759-9_6

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Barbuti, R., Francesco, N.D., Santone, A., Tesei, L.: A notion of non-interference for timed automata. FI 51(1–2), 1–11 (2002)

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  8. Benattar, G., Cassez, F., Lime, D., Roux, O.H.: Control and synthesis of non-interferent timed systems. Int. J. Control 88(2), 217–236 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1080/00207179.2014.944356

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  9. Cassez, F.: The dark side of timed opacity. In: Park, J.H., Chen, H.-H., Atiquzzaman, M., Lee, C., Kim, T., Yeo, S.-S. (eds.) ISA 2009. LNCS, vol. 5576, pp. 21–30. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02617-1_3

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Chattopadhyay, S., Roychoudhury, A.: Scalable and precise refinement of cache timing analysis via model checking. In: RTSS, pp. 193–203 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1109/RTSS.2011.25

  11. Chu, D., Jaffar, J., Maghareh, R.: Precise cache timing analysis via symbolic execution. In: RTAS, pp. 293–304 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1109/RTAS.2016.7461358

  12. Doychev, G., Feld, D., Köpf, B., Mauborgne, L., Reineke, J.: Cacheaudit: a tool for the static analysis of cache side channels. In: King, S.T. (ed.) USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 431–446. USENIX Association (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Gardey, G., Mullins, J., Roux, O.H.: Non-interference control synthesis for security timed automata. ENTCS 180(1), 35–53 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2005.05.046

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  14. Hune, T., Romijn, J., Stoelinga, M., Vaandrager, F.W.: Linear parametric model checking of timed automata. JLAP 52–53, 183–220 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1016/S1567-8326(02)00037-1

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Jovanović, A., Lime, D., Roux, O.H.: Integer parameter synthesis for real-time systems. TSE 41(5), 445–461 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2014.2357445

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Kocher, P.C.: Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In: Koblitz, N. (ed.) CRYPTO 1996. LNCS, vol. 1109, pp. 104–113. Springer, Heidelberg (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  17. Lv, M., Yi, W., Guan, N., Yu, G.: Combining abstract interpretation with model checking for timing analysis of multicore software. In: RTSS, pp. 339–349. IEEE Computer Society (2010). https://doi.org/10.1109/RTSS.2010.30

  18. Nielson, F., Nielson, H.R., Vasilikos, P.: Information flow for timed automata. In: Aceto, L., Bacci, G., Bacci, G., Ingólfsdóttir, A., Legay, A., Mardare, R. (eds.) Models, Algorithms, Logics and Tools. LNCS, vol. 10460, pp. 3–21. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63121-9_1

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  19. Vasilikos, P., Nielson, F., Nielson, H.R.: Secure information release in timed automata. In: Bauer, L., Küsters, R. (eds.) POST 2018. LNCS, vol. 10804, pp. 28–52. Springer, Cham (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89722-6_2

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  20. Wang, C., Schaumont, P.: Security by compilation: an automated approach to comprehensive side-channel resistance. SIGLOG News 4(2), 76–89 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1145/3090064.3090071

    Article  Google Scholar 

  21. Wu, M., Guo, S., Schaumont, P., Wang, C.: Eliminating timing side-channel leaks using program repair. In: Tip, F., Bodden, E. (eds.) ISSTA, pp. 15–26. ACM (2018). https://doi.org/10.1145/3213846.3213851

  22. Zhang, J., Gao, P., Song, F., Wang, C.: SCInfer: refinement-based verification of software countermeasures against side-channel attacks. In: Chockler, H., Weissenbacher, G. (eds.) CAV 2018. LNCS, vol. 10982, pp. 157–177. Springer, Cham (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96142-2_12

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We thank Sudipta Chattopadhyay for helpful suggestions, Jiaying Li for his help with preliminary model conversion, and a reviewer for suggesting Remark 1.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Étienne André .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

André, É., Sun, J. (2019). Parametric Timed Model Checking for Guaranteeing Timed Opacity. In: Chen, YF., Cheng, CH., Esparza, J. (eds) Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis. ATVA 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11781. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31784-3_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31784-3_7

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-31783-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-31784-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics