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Universally Verifiable MPC and IRV Ballot Counting

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Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11598))

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Abstract

We present a very simple universally verifiable MPC protocol. The first component is a threshold somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem that permits an arbitrary number of additions (in the source group), followed by a single multiplication, followed by an arbitrary number of additions in the target group. The second component is a black-box construction of universally verifiable distributed encryption switching between any public key encryption schemes supporting shared setup and key generation phases, as long as the schemes satisfy some natural additive-homomorphic properties. This allows us to switch back from the target group to the source group, and hence perform an arbitrary number of multiplications. The key generation algorithm of our prototypical cryptosystem, which is based upon concurrent verifiable secret sharing, permits robust re-construction of powers of a shared secret.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For example, the use of a “stop” candidate by [20] remedies the case that a ballot is exhausted prematurely.

  2. 2.

    From http://pastvtr.elections.nsw.gov.au/SGE2015/la-home.htm.

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Acknowledgement

Olivier Pereira is grateful to the Belgian Fund for Scientific Research (F.R.S.- FNRS) for its financial support provided through the SeVoTe project, to the European Union (EU) and the Walloon Region through the FEDER project USERMedia (convention number 501907-379156), and to the Melbourne School of Engineering for its fellowship.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computing and Information Systems, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

    Kim Ramchen, Chris Culnane, Olivier Pereira & Vanessa Teague

  2. ICTEAM, UCLouvain, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Olivier Pereira

  3. Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Clayton, Australia

    Kim Ramchen

Authors
  1. Kim Ramchen
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  2. Chris Culnane
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  3. Olivier Pereira
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  4. Vanessa Teague
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Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Kim Ramchen or Vanessa Teague .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada

    Ian Goldberg

  2. Tandy School of Computer Science, University of Tulsa, Tulsa, USA

    Tyler Moore

A Appendix

A Appendix

Appendices are in the full version of the paper on the IACR eprint archive at https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/246.

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© 2019 International Financial Cryptography Association

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Ramchen, K., Culnane, C., Pereira, O., Teague, V. (2019). Universally Verifiable MPC and IRV Ballot Counting. In: Goldberg, I., Moore, T. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11598. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32101-7_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32101-7_19

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