Abstract
In this chapter, the third component of the “Fair CEO Compensation” octagonal framework, namely, “Compensation according to Risk of the Firm”, is discussed. First, the definitions and existing research are presented, and then the theoretical and practical implications are set forth.
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Aldogan Eklund, M. (2019). Compensation According to Risk of the Firm. In: Fairness of CEO Compensation. Contributions to Management Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33554-0_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33554-0_5
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