Contradictions and Rationality: An Analysis of Two Biblical Cases

Abstract

In this chapter, I want to read particular biblical cases as a means for examining two philosophical problems; namely, how to deal logically with contradictions and the consequences that follow from the alternatives examined regarding the notion of rationality. Considering a perspective according to which rationality is closely connected to a certain idea of logicity, my aim is to show that, on the one hand, in the story of Susanna and the Elders, Daniel’s belief in Susanna’s chastity can be understood as supported by a reasoning that is grounded on classical logic and thus fits perfectly into the classical model of rationality. The narrations of Jesus’s resurrection on the other hand would require a different approach both to contradictions and to the relationship between contradictions and rationality. Otherwise, there is a risk of either shaking up important parts of the Christian creed—such as the idea that God has a salvific plan that is made possible precisely by the resurrection of Jesus—or accepting that believing in the resurrection is irrational. It is worthy to take into account that, for fideists, accepting a religious belief as irrational is no problem because they hold that religious beliefs are a question of faith, and faith is either independent of or adversarial toward reason in the sense that it is not founded, nor can it be founded, on arguments. Something different happens with those who adhere to more rationalistic traditions like natural theology, which attempts to give a rational support to the belief of the existence of God. The Christian believer to which I refer in this work stands on the latter, more rationalistic side. With regard to the rationality of the belief in the resurrection, I contend that in order to be considered rational, one who believes in the resurrection could support that belief with a reasoning grounded on some form of paraconsistent logic. I focus here on da Costa’s C₁ system and on the LFI1 system of Carnielli, Marcos and de Amo, but other paraconsistent systems could also be used. In the last section of the chapter, I present some problems that emerge when a perspective like the one proposed here is adopted.

A previous version of this chapter was discussed with colleagues and friends at the Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios and at the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogota, Colombia. It was published as part of the book Racionalidad, lenguaje y acción. Aproximaciones analíticas (2016) with the title “Contradicciones y Racionalidad: Susana y los viejos jueces y la resurreción de Jesús. Un estudio de casos.” Regarding the present version, I am thankful to the anonymous referees for their useful comments and to the people who contributed to the enrichment of the ideas developed here through the discussion of some central thoughts and technical proceedings. Among them I include Evandro Luis Gomes, Tomás Barrero, Jose Andrés Forero, Miguel Ángel Pérez, Carlos Miguel Gómez and Luis Fernando Múnera. I am especially grateful to Professor Graham Priest for inviting me to participate as a visiting research scholar in the academic community of CUNY, where several of the ideas presented here were refined and reformulated. Finally, as always, I am more than grateful to God, the Virgin Mary, the angels and the saints for everything.