Abstract
All moments of profound constitutional change are extraordinary: the choice to replace or overhaul an existing text may be spurred by a variety of circumstances, including perceived failure of a previous iteration of the state, the end of an authoritarian regime, the cessation of internal or inter-state conflict, a ‘coming together’ of various political units into a larger federal entity, or conversely, secession of one unit from a larger state. All produce a highly charged political environment, which inevitably impacts the constitutional reform process. The chapters in this section, throwing open a window onto this subject in its theoretical, legal, political, and comparative complexity, emphasise that moments of wholesale constitutional renewal under extreme conditions render what is already a difficult and complex process a legal, political, social, practical and logistical challenge of the highest order.
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- 1.
See e.g. the website of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), a key policy actor in the constitutional reform process: http://www.cpalanka.org/.
- 2.
See e.g. Thompson (2016).
- 3.
See Al-Ali Z (2017) Report: Libya’s final draft constitution – A contextual analysis. 4 October 2017 http://bit.ly/2BZsyRd. See generally ‘Libya’ in Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018: Events of 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2017).
- 4.
Landau (2012).
- 5.
See Andreas Braune’s chapter below. See also Partlett (2012).
- 6.
- 7.
See e.g. Suteu (2015).
- 8.
See e.g. ‘Hungary’s iPad Constitution’ Common Sense Society 11 March 2011 http://bit.ly/2GKMkDz.
- 9.
Abbiate et al. (2017).
- 10.
See Hammady (2017).
- 11.
See Ojielo (2013).
- 12.
As Oscar Vilhena Vieira states: “The participation of social movements, civil society organisations and interest groups was massive. More than 20 000 people circulated through the [Constituent] Assembly every day, in a process that is considered the most democratic moment of Brazilian political life.” Vilhena Vieira (2013).
- 13.
See Sunstein (1993).
- 14.
See Ginsburg (2017).
- 15.
Bell et al. (2007).
- 16.
The list of opinions is available on the Venice Commission website at http://bit.ly/2E1Clbd.
- 17.
See the chapter ‘Overview of the Constitution-Making Process’ in Devereux (2015).
- 18.
CDL-AD(2017)005-e Turkey – Opinion on the amendments to the Constitution adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017 and to be submitted to a National Referendum on 16 April 2017 (Venice, 10–11 March 2017) http://bit.ly/2n04vhN.
- 19.
Cherif (2017).
- 20.
Devereuz (2015).
- 21.
See Daly (2017).
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Daly, T.G. (2020). Introduction: Constitution-Making and Constitutional Change. In: Albert, R., Roznai, Y. (eds) Constitutionalism Under Extreme Conditions. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 82. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49000-3_19
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