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Explorations in Archaeology and Philosophy pp 171–195Cite as

Theory of Mind, System-2 Thinking, and the Origins of Language

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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 433))

Abstract

There is growing acceptance among language evolution researchers that an increase in our ancestors’ theory of mind capacities was critical to the origins of language. However, little attention has been paid to the question of how those capacities were in fact upgraded. This article develops a novel hypothesis, grounded in contemporary cognitive neuroscience, on which our theory of mind capacities improved as a result of an increase in our System-2 thinking capacities, in turn based in an increase in our working memory capacities. I contrast this hypothesis with what would appear to be the default position among language evolution researchers, namely, that our theory of mind became more powerful as a result of genetic change to a domain-specific mindreading system which we share with other great apes. While the latter hypothesis is not implausible, it arguably enjoys less empirical support at present than does the alternative hypothesis I develop.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Within this camp, there is, however, a good deal of heterogeneity regarding the specific type of theory of mind capacities that were relevant, as well as the specific role those capacities played in language origins. For a nice overview of this issue, see Moore (2018).

  2. 2.

    This is a nice term Peter Carruthers has coined. As I shall use it, an ‘innately-channeled’ trait is one that is in part, and possibly in large part, genetically specified.

  3. 3.

    Chimpanzees do a bit better on this task.

  4. 4.

    I assume my readership is well-versed in the logic of this test. If not: a participant watches as another agent places an item in a particular place. The agent then leaves, and the item is moved to a new location in their absence. The question the participant must answer is where the agent will look for the object. The participant must attribute a false belief to the agent that the object is at its original location if they are to reliably answer correctly.

  5. 5.

    See Wellman et al. (2001) for a meta-review of this research.

  6. 6.

    See also Bartsch and Wellman (1995). They show that, from 2 years old, children regularly explain others’ behavior in terms of desires and emotions.

  7. 7.

    I refer the reader to Carruthers (2015) for citations, though I include the most crucial ones here.

  8. 8.

    See Carruthers (2015) for a discussion of how working memory, so conceived, relates to the traditional model originally proposed in Baddeley and Hitch (1974).

  9. 9.

    As per the usual convention in philosophy, I use small caps when referring to mental content.

  10. 10.

    In addition to these two networks, there are well-known subcortical networks that influence attention. These networks that are responsible for the reflexive reorientation of attention to high-intensity stimuli (e.g., a sudden loud noise). Unlike the bottom-up attentional network, these networks are capable of directly seizing control of the long-range connections that are part of the top-down attentional network; they do not have to ‘make their case’ to the top-down system in order for attention to be reallocated, as does the bottom-up system. When attention has been shifted by a subcortical network, the prefrontal cortex evaluates whether the novel attentional target is indeed highly relevant, and if not, attention is typically shifted back to the original target.

  11. 11.

    Or more strictly speaking, that it will result in percepts consistent with that object’s having been indented.

  12. 12.

    There is an obvious connection with predictive processing models of cognition here. I take no stand in this chapter on the plausibility of the latter as an overarching theory of cognitive architecture.

  13. 13.

    Construed broadly. This representation could be a rule, a strategy, etc.

  14. 14.

    As such, System-2 thinking is inherently a mix of conscious and unconscious states and processes. One can think of it like an iceberg (to use an old metaphor): the ‘tip’ consists in the contents of working memory, which are conscious, the ‘submerged portion’ is all the processing that takes place in System-1, which is unconscious.

  15. 15.

    There are passages in Carruthers (2015) that suggest he thinks all System-2 thinking begins in the former way. This is especially true in some of his earlier work (e.g., Carruthers 2009). Other passages are consistent with the interpretation provided here. This view seems more extensionally adequate to me.

  16. 16.

    Here it is crucial that the brain somehow manages to keep separate its representations of the actual state of the world from its representations of the state of the world conditional upon the action being performed. The latter have to be ‘tagged’ as hypothetical. As Carruthers himself admits, how the brain might achieve this is not obvious. However, we can, I think, take some consolation in the fact that the brain already does something like this in distinguishing between predicted sensory effects and observed ones. Moreover, the problem is not just Carruthers’; all researchers in this area owe an explanation of hypothetical reasoning at the end of the day.

  17. 17.

    There is an interesting connection here with the phenomenological character of episodic memory and prospection. By definition, these states involve projecting the self through time. This may be necessary in order for these states to produce feelings which modulate our desires. We may have to imagine ourselves doing or experiencing various things. I leave this issue for another day, however.

  18. 18.

    Exactly how turns out to be a complex issue. Suffice it to say that Carruthers’ own account underestimates some of the complexities. I plan to take up this issue in future work.

  19. 19.

    The main argument here can be developed without this assumption. I make this assumption mainly to simplify the exposition (though I also think it is plausible). If the representations accepted by the System-1 mindreading system were in fact high-level conceptual ones, then there would have to be some system that maps imagistic representations involving agents to amodal ones about agents.

  20. 20.

    The System-1 mindreading system may have also been involved at early steps in this process.

  21. 21.

    For a Gricean-inspired skeptical reply, see Bar-On and Moore (2017). I myself have more sympathy for the view than they do.

  22. 22.

    See Cheney and Seyfarth (2008) for an excellent summary of this work.

  23. 23.

    Kanzi’s abilities are detailed in Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993).

  24. 24.

    A classic example is the carbon dioxide produced by animals that mosquitoes use to locate them.

  25. 25.

    Whether by sustaining a concurrent perceptual representation, allowing for it to be processed more thoroughly, or by recalling a past episode.

  26. 26.

    Including whether or not we must conceive of communication involving the joint exercise of flexible mindreading as ‘Gricean’ or ‘ostensive-inferential’ communication. I have argued we need not (e.g., Planer 2017a; Planer and Godfrey-Smith 2020; Planer and Sterelny forthcoming).

  27. 27.

    They outperform all monkeys on inhibitory control tests, for example (Amici et al. 2008; MacLean et al. 2014).

  28. 28.

    It is a further question, and not one I will take up here, whether and to what extent the enhanced self-control of humans is genetically based. For the purposes of the present argument, it would not necessarily be a problem if that control was to a significant extent (or even entirely, though that is very unlikely) socially learned. There would only be a problem if one could not explain the evolution of enhanced self-control in humans without appeal to language. I see no reason to think that would be the case.

  29. 29.

    Moreover, as Carruthers (2015) points out, understanding episodic memory as based in working memory is highly explanatory. It is now widely accepted that episodic memory is constructive in nature. What this means, basically, is that episodic remembering is always in part a process of inferring what happened at some past time. We do not directly call forth a record of that event which was written to our brain at that time. Rather, the brain generates a version of that event using various bits of information (some particular to that event, some more general), along with its current desires, feelings, values, and so on. Relatedly, it is also widely accepted that there is a tendency for episodic memories to be enriched over time. These features of episodic memory can be neatly explained if we assume such memories make constitutive use of working memory, and hence are globally broadcast. For recall that, globally broadcast representations are available for processing by a large number and range of System-1 systems. That includes systems responsible for categorization and inference, but also affective systems. The constructive nature of episodic memory reflects the operation of System-1 systems which serve to fill in additional detail about the event. (Some of this may simply involve making explicit information that is implicit in the memory.) These alterations to the content of the memory come to be associated with it, and are recalled with the memory in the future.

  30. 30.

    For a nice overview of this research (and much else), see Rosati (2017).

  31. 31.

    This fact about communication is important, as it strongly suggests global broadcasting of the information. The information is available to the ‘language’ production system, among others.

  32. 32.

    Suppose my friend often goes hiking. And suppose he also often goes fishing. These facts support my beliefs that he likes to hike and that he likes to fish, respectively. However, now suppose I acquire the concept of an outdoor sport. Then I might infer that my friend likes outdoor sports. This belief makes different predictions about how my friend will behave under various counterfactual circumstances than either of the foregoing beliefs taken alone or together. For example, it predicts that were I to propose that we go mountain biking next weekend, my friend may well agree.

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    Ronald J. Planer

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Planer, R.J. (2021). Theory of Mind, System-2 Thinking, and the Origins of Language. In: Killin, A., Allen-Hermanson, S. (eds) Explorations in Archaeology and Philosophy. Synthese Library, vol 433. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61052-4_10

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