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Harnessing the Power of Deception in Attack Graph-Based Security Games

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Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec 2020)

Abstract

We study the use of deception in attack graph-based Stackelberg security games. In our setting, in addition to allocating defensive resources to protect important targets from attackers, the defender can strategically manipulate the attack graph through three main types of deceptive actions. We show that finding the optimal deception and defense strategy is at least NP-hard. We provide two techniques for efficiently solving this problem: a mixed-integer linear program for layered directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and neural architecture search for general DAGs. We empirically demonstrate that using deception on attack graphs gives the defender a significant advantage, and the algorithms we develop scale gracefully to medium-sized problems.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For space, we omit the full proof for hiding edges. We follow a similar construction.

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Acknowledgements

This research was sponsored by the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Army Research Laboratory and was accomplished under Cooperative Agreement Number W911NF-13-2-0045 (ARL Cyber Security CRA). The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Combat Capabilities Development Command Army Research Laboratory or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Government purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation here on.

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Appendix

Appendix

We modify the DE [61] variant DE/rand/1/bin [42]. To initialize the population, we randomly choose the sequence of deceptive actions to consider. For each type, we determine the maximum number of components that can be altered (e.g., edges to add) for this individual. If allowed, we then modify the graph with randomly-selected modifications of that type. We also add a new termination condition based on the known optimal utility (0) for the defender if the defender has infinite protective and deceptive budgets. If any solution yields this utility, then we stop early and select it as the final solution. We also use a more compact solution representation: the full solution takes space \( m_e (2 |N| + 1) + |N| + 2 |E|\), where \(m_e\) indicates the maximum number of edges that can be added to the graph given \(B^d\). Each edge to be added takes space 2|N|. To indicate that an edge is to be added, we take the \({{\,\mathrm{arg\,max}\,}}\) over the effort allocated in the first N and last N slots. The resulting indices ij indicate the endpoints of the edge. If the summed effort at ij is greater than a threshold, the edge is added. We further compact the representation when the defender cannot add or hide any edges without violating constraints by removing these parts of the solution, so each strategy uses space \(|E| + |N|\).

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Milani, S. et al. (2020). Harnessing the Power of Deception in Attack Graph-Based Security Games. In: Zhu, Q., Baras, J.S., Poovendran, R., Chen, J. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12513. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64793-3_8

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