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International and Canadian Space Activities

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Space Regulation in Canada: Past, Present and Potential

Part of the book series: Space Regulations Library ((SPRL,volume 12))

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Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information related to the importance and ubiquity of space as well as to highlight the ongoing and intensifying trend of commercialisation. The chapter weaves parallel narratives related to space activities from a general, global perspective as well as from a Canadian perspective. In particular, the chapter focuses on the significant historical developments that have led to the current manifestation of the Canadian space program as well as some of the various players who are maintaining the Canadian presence in space. Given the highly evolutive character of space activities, the discussions and references in this chapter are current to March 2020.

The chapter begins with a discussion of historical space activities, highlighting specifically the role of large government agencies in carrying out nascent, but nevertheless ambitious, space programs. The chapter then focuses on the current trend of commercialisation where space activities are transitioning from the domain of public institutions to private companies, with a prioritisation on economic growth as opposed to scientific discovery; the chapter grants specific attention to select companies currently leading this transition in Canada. The chapter then considers the various emerging technologies and novel applications likely to be deployed in the near- and long-term, especially those gaining widespread acceptance on the basis of their potential feasibility, while also highlighting the growing importance and trends related to international cooperation in space. The chapter culminates with brief remarks related to the future of space activities and the challenges they pose.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For example, Wernher von Braun developed the V2 rocket for Adolf Hitler, the chief instrument used in the bombing of London during WWII. Already in 1952, while working for NASA, von Braun published Das Marsprojekt on space travel (a document still highly relevant and instructional today) establishing exactly what was needed to land humans on Mars. Although NASA never followed through on the proposal, he predicted many of the technological developments needed to undertake his vision that have since come to fruition, such as the Space Shuttle and SpaceX’s reusable rockets. Petranek (2015), pp. 13–15.

  2. 2.

    Garber (2007).

  3. 3.

    Wellerstein (2017).

  4. 4.

    Redd (2012).

  5. 5.

    Loff (2017).

  6. 6.

    National Coordination Office (2017).

  7. 7.

    Howell (2018d).

  8. 8.

    Mann (2012).

  9. 9.

    Shepherd and Kruchio (2008), p. 33.

  10. 10.

    Shepherd and Kruchio (2008), pp. 33–35.

  11. 11.

    Shepherd and Kruchio (2008), p. 85.

  12. 12.

    Shepherd and Kruchio (2008), p. 13.

  13. 13.

    Shepherd and Kruchio (2008), pp. 86–89; Godefroy (2017), pp. 13–16.

  14. 14.

    “[Canadian scientists and engineers] were also considered world experts in the study of the effects of the upper atmosphere on electronics and communication, a field that Canadian researchers had seriously pursued since the beginning of the twentieth century.” Godefroy (2017), pp. 7–8.

  15. 15.

    Solandt (1967), p. 19.

  16. 16.

    Solandt (1967), p. 19.

  17. 17.

    Chapman et al. (1967), p. 5.

  18. 18.

    “By virtue of having a monopoly of the locations for certain observations Canada has perhaps acquired a moral obligation to make them.” Solandt (1967), p. 16.

  19. 19.

    Chapman et al. (1967), p. 219.

  20. 20.

    Chapman et al. (1967), pp. 217–218.

  21. 21.

    Godefroy (2017), pp. 90–91. Following the loss of funding and declining interest by the Canadian and US governments, Bull went on to continue designing and building large-bore guns for other States, namely South Africa and Iraq. He was assassinated by an unknown assailant in 1990 while living in Belgium.

  22. 22.

    Chapman et al. (1967), pp. 14–17; Godefroy (2017), p. 74.

  23. 23.

    Chapman et al. (1967), p. 11. For a more in-depth analysis of the Chapman Report, as well as a discussion of its value to the Canadian space sector, see Chap. 4, Canadian Space Policy.

  24. 24.

    Canadian Space Agency (2012).

  25. 25.

    Godefroy (2017), p. 71. More than 1200 papers and scientific reports have been published on the basis of Alouette-I’s data and in 1987 it was recognised as one of the ten most outstanding Canadian engineering achievements over the previous 100 years. Gibbs and Evans (2017a).

  26. 26.

    Chapman et al. (1967), p. 11.

  27. 27.

    Chapman et al. (1967), p. 11.

  28. 28.

    Chapman et al. (1967), pp. 12–13.

  29. 29.

    van Praet (2012).

  30. 30.

    Gibbs and Evans (2017a).

  31. 31.

    Godefroy (2017), p. 126; Gibbs and Evans (2017a).

  32. 32.

    Godefroy (2017), p. 128; Canadian Space Agency (2014a).

  33. 33.

    Godefroy (2017), p. 126.

  34. 34.

    Godefroy (2017), p. 124.

  35. 35.

    Gibbs and Evans (2017b).

  36. 36.

    Godefroy (2017), p. 124.

  37. 37.

    Kirton (1990), p. 66.

  38. 38.

    Godefroy (2017), p. 200.

  39. 39.

    Canadian Space Agency (2017e).

  40. 40.

    Godefroy (2017), pp. 200–203; Canadian Space Agency (2014b).

  41. 41.

    Canadian Space Agency (2017d).

  42. 42.

    Godefroy (2017), p. 141.

  43. 43.

    Howell (2013).

  44. 44.

    Kirton (1990), p. 67.

  45. 45.

    Godefroy (2017), pp. 163–164.

  46. 46.

    Canadian Space Agency (2017a).

  47. 47.

    Godefroy (2017), p. 209.

  48. 48.

    Bryce Space (2017), p. 3.

  49. 49.

    Bryce Space (2018).

  50. 50.

    There have been calls from the European Commission to significantly increase spending on space in the coming years. de Selding (2018).

  51. 51.

    Bryce Space (2017), pp. 3–4.

  52. 52.

    Bryce Space (2017), pp. 3–4.

  53. 53.

    Satellite Industry Association (2017), pp. 4–5.

  54. 54.

    Satellite Industry Association (2017), p. 7.

  55. 55.

    Bryce Space (2018).

  56. 56.

    Satellite Industry Association (2017), p. 8.

  57. 57.

    Bryce Space (2017), p. 11.

  58. 58.

    Foust (2018g). For example, in 2018, EarthNow publicised that it had received investments from Bill Gates, Softbank, Airbus and OneWeb to promote the development and maturation of its technologies. Although the amount of the investment was not made public, it was likely considerable. Boyle (2018a).

  59. 59.

    CosmiCapital (2019).

  60. 60.

    Werner (2018a).

  61. 61.

    Keith (2015), p. 1. A separate but related study was conducted in 2018 but did not provide the same kind of economic analysis as the 2015 report. See Keith (2018).

  62. 62.

    Keith (2015), p. 38.

  63. 63.

    This is assuming that GDP is a measure of the value generated by a particular industry after its costs—so, a $5.37 billion industry generated $2.9 billion in profits after costs. Keith (2015), p. 32.

  64. 64.

    Keith (2015), II.

  65. 65.

    Keith (2015), pp. 20–21.

  66. 66.

    Keith (2015), II.

  67. 67.

    Keith (2015), p. 10.

  68. 68.

    Canadian Space Agency (2018d), p. 4.

  69. 69.

    Canadian Space Agency (2018d), p. 16.

  70. 70.

    Canadian Space Agency (2018d), p. 16.

  71. 71.

    Canadian Space Agency (2015).

  72. 72.

    Keith (2015), p. 19.

  73. 73.

    Boucher (2018b).

  74. 74.

    “The current federal government has inherited a problem from its predecessor: about 15 years of flat or declining space budgets of about one-seventh of what NASA gets, taking population into account.” Reid (2018).

  75. 75.

    “[T]he government has thrown very limited money at a handful of specific projects - the equivalent of addressing universal poverty by opening shelters in one city.” Reid (2018).

  76. 76.

    Canadian Space Agency (2019b).

  77. 77.

    Canadian Space Agency (2019a).

  78. 78.

    Reid (2018).

  79. 79.

    Boucher (2019a).

  80. 80.

    Davies (2005), p. 1025.

  81. 81.

    Pugliese (2016).

  82. 82.

    The Public Sector Pension Investment Board is a Crown corporation that invests the pensions of the Canadian Public Service as well as that of the Armed Forces, Reserve Forces and the RCMP. Public Service Pension (2018).

  83. 83.

    Loral Space & Communications is a US satellite service provider, based in New York, with an ownership interest of 62.7% in Telesat as well as 56% of Xtar, a provider of satellite services to various governments on the X band. Loral Space & Communications (2018).

  84. 84.

    Although Loral Space & Communications owns 62.7% ownership of Telesat, it only has 32.7% voting rights; PSPIB holds the remainder. This has become a particularly distressing arrangement for both sides recently, as the two parties have been unable to agree on a strategic direction forward for Telesat (complicated by the fact that XTAR’s revenues have dropped significantly and is behind on its lease payments, of which Telesat is a collector). Henry (2018c).

  85. 85.

    Lord (2018).

  86. 86.

    Henry (2018e).

  87. 87.

    Lemack (2018).

  88. 88.

    Sali (2019) and Telesat (2018a).

  89. 89.

    Telesat (2018d).

  90. 90.

    Telesat (2018c).

  91. 91.

    Telesat (2018b) and Russell (2018).

  92. 92.

    Telesat (2019).

  93. 93.

    Sali (2019).

  94. 94.

    Urthecast (2018a).

  95. 95.

    Boucher (2017a).

  96. 96.

    Urthecast (2018b).

  97. 97.

    Howell (2018c).

  98. 98.

    Howell (2018c).

  99. 99.

    ORBCOMM (2018).

  100. 100.

    SpaceQuest (2018).

  101. 101.

    Spire (2018).

  102. 102.

    Goh (2018).

  103. 103.

    Jakhu and Kerkonian (2019).

  104. 104.

    ExactEarth (2015), pp. 60–61.

  105. 105.

    GHGSat (2018b).

  106. 106.

    GHGSat (2018a).

  107. 107.

    GHGSat (2018b).

  108. 108.

    In January 2019, GHGSat noticed significant methane leaks from gas pipelines near Turkmenistan that had hitherto gone unnoticed. The Economist (2020).

  109. 109.

    GHGSat (2018a).

  110. 110.

    Kepler (2018).

  111. 111.

    Jackson (2017).

  112. 112.

    Although Keppler originally intended to launch aboard an Indian PSLV, launch delays forced it to use the Chinese service provider. Boucher (2018e). The opportunity to launch on a Chinese launch provider was possible because Canada has a “friendly nation status” with China that the United States does not. As such, strict International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) prevent American firms from contracting with Chinese launch providers. Although Canada’s export controls largely mimic the US’, there are some distinctions. Foust (2018f).

  113. 113.

    Boucher (2020a) and Henry (2020b).

  114. 114.

    Henry (2020b).

  115. 115.

    Foust (2018f).

  116. 116.

    For example, experiments related to the study of materials that go into everyday rubber tires as well as studies on the behaviour of water in microgravity were just two industry-sponsored investigations that took place on the ISS. Goodyear (2018) and Delta Faucet Company (2018).

  117. 117.

    The Internet existed for years before its potential ubiquity became clear. No one could have expected the birth of social media, the sale of goods and services from anywhere to anywhere in the world, the limitless exchange of information or the hundreds of other disruptions it has caused.

  118. 118.

    In a political sense, since space activities were often carried out by only the wealthiest of nations or the largest of corporations, very few entities had a say in what or how space activities were carried out. Now, with a reduction in cost and the commercialisation of such activities, many more entities are engaging with the domain of space. This increase in the number of participants can be appreciated as the democratising effect of NewSpace.

  119. 119.

    Safyan (2020).

  120. 120.

    Boucher (2018g). This gives hope to the many young Canadians developing the skills to design and build rockets but currently without a domestic site from where to launch them. Hunter (2018).

  121. 121.

    In the early 1990s, Akjuit Aerospace signed a 30-year lease at the Churchill Rocket Research Range and established “SpacePort Canada”. The intention was to purchase repurposed Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) from Russia and launch them for paying customers. In April 1998, Akjuit launched a CSA science payload from SpacePort Canada but, two weeks later, announced it could not secure funding to sustain its operation. Mullen and Angell (1995) and Braga (2014).

  122. 122.

    Associated Press (2018). Astra Space was scheduled to conduct a series of test launches of its dedicated smallsat launcher in early 2020 but failed to meet the deadline established by the DARPA Launch Challenge. Foust (2018a) and Wall (2020a).

  123. 123.

    Grush (2020).

  124. 124.

    One such provider, of the seeming countless, is OneSpace. Jones (2018).

  125. 125.

    Foust (2018f). Although some argue of unfair competition related to Chinese commercial launch providers receiving what can be characterised as State subsidies, there is no bilateral or multilateral agreements between nations (similar to those in aviation, for example) that prohibit such State support.

  126. 126.

    Berger (2020b).

  127. 127.

    SpaceX (2018a, b).

  128. 128.

    SpaceX has landed the first stage of its Falcon 9 rocket at least 49 times. Berger (2020a).

  129. 129.

    SpaceX (2018b).

  130. 130.

    Specifically, Blue Origin is attempting to compete with existing players United Launch Alliance and SpaceX and so its rockets must reach nine specific orbits so as to qualify for US Air Force launch contracts. Henry (2018a).

  131. 131.

    Cofield (2017).

  132. 132.

    Grush (2019b).

  133. 133.

    Grush (2018a), Foust (2018e) and Berger (2020b).

  134. 134.

    Virgin Galactic (2018).

  135. 135.

    Foust (2018h), O’Kane and Welch (2019) and Foust (2020).

  136. 136.

    Thompson (2020).

  137. 137.

    Space Ryde (2020).

  138. 138.

    Vance (2018) and Wall (2020b).

  139. 139.

    Starfire Scientific (2020).

  140. 140.

    Pandey et al. (2018) and Jones (2019).

  141. 141.

    Union of Concerned Scientists (2019).

  142. 142.

    Of course, the long-debated question of where airspace ends and where outer space begins remains undefined—notwithstanding, the general consensus (albeit non-legally binding) is 100 km with Australia, Kazakhstan and Denmark concretising this altitude in their national legislations. See Chap. 7, Comprehensive Regulation of Commercial Space Activities.

  143. 143.

    Davenport et al. (2018).

  144. 144.

    Foust (2018b).

  145. 145.

    Foust (2018b).

  146. 146.

    Finkleman (2014), p. 31.

  147. 147.

    Lockheed Martin (2018).

  148. 148.

    Boucher (2018m).

  149. 149.

    SpaceRef (2018a).

  150. 150.

    For example, Canada Near-Earth Object Surveillance Satellite (NEOSSat) simultaneously tracks objects (such as operational satellites and space debris) in Earth’s orbit as well as monitors the areas around Earth for potential asteroids. Canadian Space Agency (2018c). Canada’s Sapphire military satellite also monitor’s Earth’s orbits for space debris and provides the data to the USAF. Canadian Space Agency (2017c).

  151. 151.

    Svitak (2018).

  152. 152.

    Svitak (2018).

  153. 153.

    Henry (2018f).

  154. 154.

    Henry (2018g).

  155. 155.

    OneWeb (2020).

  156. 156.

    Fernholz (2018).

  157. 157.

    Grush (2019a).

  158. 158.

    Grush (2019a).

  159. 159.

    Telesat (2019).

  160. 160.

    Henry (2018d).

  161. 161.

    Henry (2018b).

  162. 162.

    Skywatch, a company based in Waterloo, Ontario, through its EarthCache platform, offers customers Earth observation data that it aggregates from multiple sources totalling 225 satellites. In January 2020 it had 100 customers but expects that number to grow to 1000 by the end of the year. Boucher (2020b, c).

  163. 163.

    Canadian Space Agency (2020).

  164. 164.

    Scutti (2018).

  165. 165.

    Although some of the information released was notable, it is extremely limited in its informative value at this stage and as the studies continue. Drake (2018).

  166. 166.

    Gwozdecky (2018).

  167. 167.

    McClelland (2017).

  168. 168.

    McClelland (2017).

  169. 169.

    Cowing (2018).

  170. 170.

    Marikar (2018).

  171. 171.

    Marikar (2018).

  172. 172.

    Moskowitz (2009).

  173. 173.

    Boyle (2018b).

  174. 174.

    Bergin (2018).

  175. 175.

    Bergin (2018).

  176. 176.

    Drake (2016, 2017).

  177. 177.

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2018).

  178. 178.

    Howell (2015).

  179. 179.

    Howell (2018b).

  180. 180.

    Boucher (2018a).

  181. 181.

    Boucher (2018a).

  182. 182.

    Boyle (2019a).

  183. 183.

    Foust (2018d).

  184. 184.

    Boyle (2018c).

  185. 185.

    ConsenSys seems to have used Planetary Resources’ space-based expertise to develop a blockchain technology-driven application that uses amateur observers to track satellites. Boyle (2019b).

  186. 186.

    Natural Resources Canada (2019), pp. 31–32.

  187. 187.

    Abrahamian (2019).

  188. 188.

    Boucher (2018d).

  189. 189.

    QS Top Universities (2019).

  190. 190.

    Boyce (2018).

  191. 191.

    Glaser (1968), pp. 98–103.

  192. 192.

    National Security Space Office (2007).

  193. 193.

    Mankins (2014).

  194. 194.

    Jakhu et al. (2016).

  195. 195.

    Eenmaa (2018).

  196. 196.

    Effective Space (2018).

  197. 197.

    Foust (2018c).

  198. 198.

    Foust (2018c).

  199. 199.

    Boucher (2018i).

  200. 200.

    Werner (2018b).

  201. 201.

    Northrop Grumman (2020).

  202. 202.

    Howell (2020).

  203. 203.

    International Launch Services (2018).

  204. 204.

    Surrey Space Center (2020).

  205. 205.

    Reichhardt (2018).

  206. 206.

    Parks (2020).

  207. 207.

    Reichhardt (2018).

  208. 208.

    Astroscale (2019a) and Henry (2020a).

  209. 209.

    Astroscale (2019b) and Goh (2017).

  210. 210.

    Henry (2020a).

  211. 211.

    Henry (2019).

  212. 212.

    Office for Outer Space Affairs (2018a).

  213. 213.

    President Obama extended funding for the ISS through to 2024, but President Trump is considering not renewing the US’ financial contributions past 2024 in favour of privatisation. Grush (2018b). It remains unclear whether the US can privatise its contributions to the ISS. Mortillaro (2018).

  214. 214.

    International Space Exploration Coordination Group (2016).

  215. 215.

    Department of State (2016).

  216. 216.

    International Space Exploration Forum-2 (2018).

  217. 217.

    Smith (2018).

  218. 218.

    Canadian Space Agency (2017b).

  219. 219.

    Trade Arabia (2018).

  220. 220.

    Goh (2018).

  221. 221.

    Brown (2018).

  222. 222.

    Indeed, the statements made by the representatives of States negotiating Resolution 1874 and later the Outer Space Treaty demonstrate that all parties involved, from developed to developing, space faring to non-space faring, wanted the new environment of outer space to reflect an international cooperation that was often ignored or side-stepped on Earth. Valters (1970), p. 58.

  223. 223.

    Howell (2016).

  224. 224.

    Worner (2019).

  225. 225.

    Worner (2019).

  226. 226.

    President Trump’s budgeting proposal for establishing a cislunar orbiting platform changed the name of the “Deep Space Gateway” to “Lunar Orbital Platform - Gateway”. Sloss (2018).

  227. 227.

    Beairsto (2017).

  228. 228.

    Canada is expected to contribute a medical facility which would both allow CSA astronauts to visit the space platform and provide priceless experience in performing distance-based medicine, expertise that can be used in treating Canada’s northern rural communities. Semeniuk (2018).

  229. 229.

    Hambleton (2017).

  230. 230.

    European Space Agency (2016).

  231. 231.

    Hollingham (2015).

  232. 232.

    Boucher (2018f).

  233. 233.

    UNOOSA’s recently released guidelines on how, as an organ of the United Nations, it can better work together with private actors in space represents a similar recognition. Office for Outer Space Affairs (2018b).

  234. 234.

    Boucher (2018f).

  235. 235.

    International Charter Space and Major Disasters (2020).

  236. 236.

    Henry (2015).

  237. 237.

    Werner (2018c).

  238. 238.

    Werner (2018c).

  239. 239.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019).

  240. 240.

    Adamowski (2018).

  241. 241.

    Adamowski (2018).

  242. 242.

    Adamowski (2018).

  243. 243.

    Ibeh (2019b).

  244. 244.

    Space in Africa (2019).

  245. 245.

    Ibeh (2019a).

  246. 246.

    Ibeh (2019a).

  247. 247.

    The White House (2017).

  248. 248.

    Dreir (2017).

  249. 249.

    Wang (2017).

  250. 250.

    Dreir (2017).

  251. 251.

    Foust (2018i).

  252. 252.

    Erwin (2018).

  253. 253.

    The White House (2018) and SpaceRef (2018b).

  254. 254.

    Boucher (2018k).

  255. 255.

    The Canadian Press (2018).

  256. 256.

    Governor General (2017).

  257. 257.

    The Canadian Press (2017).

  258. 258.

    Clark (2018) and Howell (2018a).

  259. 259.

    Semeniuk (2018).

  260. 260.

    Canadian Space Agency (2018a).

  261. 261.

    Berger (2018).

  262. 262.

    Semeniuk (2018).

  263. 263.

    Semeniuk (2018).

  264. 264.

    Semeniuk (2018).

  265. 265.

    Emerson (2012), p. 1.

  266. 266.

    “Those space sector players nimble enough to meet the aggressive schedules of these new explorers will reap substantial rewards. Companies and countries that do not will find themselves increasingly pushed to the margins. Survival requires innovation, focus and a long term vision. At the federal government level, Canada’s long term vision has long since expired.” Aerospace Industries Association of Canada (2016), p. 13.

  267. 267.

    Canadian Space Agency (2019c).

  268. 268.

    Gibbs (2017).

  269. 269.

    Boucher (2017b).

  270. 270.

    Boucher (2018j).

  271. 271.

    Boucher (2017b).

  272. 272.

    Space Advisory Board (2017a).

  273. 273.

    Space Advisory Board (2017b).

  274. 274.

    Boucher (2018n).

  275. 275.

    Howell (2018e).

  276. 276.

    Department of Finance (2018).

  277. 277.

    Thirsk (2018).

  278. 278.

    Department of Finance (2018), p. 118. While the language used in the budget does not specifically mention space, it does reference a need for targeted reviews of regulations that deal with emerging technologies. Given that almost all aspects of space are considered a part of emerging fields, Canada’s space related regulations could fall within this ambit. Indeed, the 2017 independent review of the Canadian Remote Sensing Space Systems Act, undertaken by McGill University’s Institute of Air and Space Law, made exactly this suggestion. Jakhu and Kerkonian (2019).

  279. 279.

    Howells (2018).

  280. 280.

    Boucher (2018l).

  281. 281.

    Boucher (2018j).

  282. 282.

    Boucher (2018j).

  283. 283.

    Boucher (2018j).

  284. 284.

    Boucher (2018j). The Canadian Space Society never published such a paper.

  285. 285.

    Boucher (2018j).

  286. 286.

    Boucher (2018j).

  287. 287.

    Boucher (2018j).

  288. 288.

    Canadian Space Agency (2019c).

  289. 289.

    For a more detailed analysis of the 2019 Strategy and its similarity to previous national space policy documents, see Chap. 4, Canadian Space Policy. For a discussion on the lack of details regarding the potential regulatory reforms discussed in the space strategy, see Kerkonian (2019).

  290. 290.

    Stojak (2019).

  291. 291.

    Boucher (2019c).

  292. 292.

    Stojak (2019).

  293. 293.

    Careless (2020).

  294. 294.

    Boucher (2018h).

  295. 295.

    Maritime Launch Services (2019).

  296. 296.

    Reaction Dynamics (2019).

  297. 297.

    Space Horizon (2019). Space Horizon is currently structured as a launch services company, liaising between launch providers and satellite operators. Nevertheless, Space Horizon’s ultimate goal is to build and launch its own rockets and it is using its current position as a launch services company to develop relationships and build out a network that it can leverage in the future once its rockets are online. Boucher (2019b).

  298. 298.

    C6 Launch (2020).

  299. 299.

    Loonify (2019).

  300. 300.

    NorthStar (2019).

  301. 301.

    CB2.0 Communications (2019).

  302. 302.

    Helios Wire (2019).

  303. 303.

    Wyvern (2019).

  304. 304.

    Aireon (2019).

  305. 305.

    Boucher (2018c).

  306. 306.

    Canadian Space Agency (2018b).

  307. 307.

    Don’t Let Go Canada (2019).

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Kerkonian, A.D. (2021). International and Canadian Space Activities. In: Space Regulation in Canada: Past, Present and Potential. Space Regulations Library, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68692-5_2

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