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Key Lessons for the Design of Consumer Protection Legislation

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Law and Economics of Regulation

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 11))

Abstract

Legislation, even when well-intended, sometimes fails to provide the desired results. By design, the legislative process suffers from “noise” and is typically driven by diverse motives. Inevitably, then, the legislative process generates some mistakes. In spite of these mistakes, the legal discussion of the mechanics of the legislative process is partial and underdeveloped. Focusing on consumer protection legislation, this chapter aims to fill some of this gap. It makes two complementary arguments. Descriptively, the chapter succinctly points to some predominant weaknesses in the legislative process. It illustrates how consumer protection laws may not only fail to achieve their desired results but can also backfire and harm consumers. Normatively and prescriptively, the chapter calls for a nuanced and holistic attitude to consumer protection legislation. It argues for more cautious and tailored consumer protection legislation, which benefits from healthy skepticism. The chapter identifies four principles for improving the process of consumer law-making. First is a more careful approach to legislation, where legislatures progress in a gradual and moderate way. The second proposed principle is to approach the legislative process from a multi-disciplinary, evidence-based , empirical perspective. The third principle suggests adopting a humble decision-making process, which employs temporary consumer protection laws. Finally, the fourth principle offers diffusing and delegating some, or perhaps more, legislative and policy responsibility to administrative agencies and consumer organisations. The chapter draws on consumer protection examples from Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Israel. However, it is largely general in nature. If proven successful, the proposed design principles may be scaled up and implemented in additional jurisdictions and other domains.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Hayek (1945).

  2. 2.

    Schuck (2014).

  3. 3.

    Baxter (1994), p. 128.

  4. 4.

    Cf. Ben-Shahar and Bar Gill (2013), p. 114.

  5. 5.

    Becher (2008), p. 759; Romano (2014), p. 27.

  6. 6.

    See generally Calabresi (1982).

  7. 7.

    Willis (2015), p. 1327.

  8. 8.

    Bregman (2014).

  9. 9.

    Chabris and Simons (2010).

  10. 10.

    Schuck (2014), pp. 154–160.

  11. 11.

    Eskridge et al. (2007) and Stancil (2008).

  12. 12.

    Stancil (2008), p. 1277.

  13. 13.

    Eskridge et al. (2007), pp. 48–53.

  14. 14.

    Eskridge et al. (2007), pp. 50–51.

  15. 15.

    O’Connor (2001), p. 370; Gillette (2005), p. 1008.

  16. 16.

    Gillette (2005), p. 1007, n. 122; Gillette (1996), p. 196.

  17. 17.

    Letsou (1995).

  18. 18.

    Kripke (1982), p. 583.

  19. 19.

    Baxter (1994), p. 125; Boss (1994), p. 94; Rubin (1993), p. 761.

  20. 20.

    Rubin (1993), p. 787.

  21. 21.

    Eskridge et al. (2007), p. 57.

  22. 22.

    Eskridge et al. (2007), p. 57.

  23. 23.

    Eskridge et al. (2007), p. 58.

  24. 24.

    Eskridge et al. (2007), p. 59.

  25. 25.

    Eskridge et al. (2007), p. 59.

  26. 26.

    Goyens (2018), p. 16.

  27. 27.

    Sullivan et al. (2010).

  28. 28.

    Braucher (1988), p. 403; Silber (1997), p. 235.

  29. 29.

    Schuck (2014), p. 204

  30. 30.

    Letsou (1995), p. 620.

  31. 31.

    Ben-Shahar and Bar Gill (2013), p. 110.

  32. 32.

    Bar-Gill (2012) and Becher et al. (2021).

  33. 33.

    Pinheiro and Ronen (2016), pp. 95–96.

  34. 34.

    Bar-Gill (2015).

  35. 35.

    Romano (2014), p. 27.

  36. 36.

    Romano (2014), pp. 27–28.

  37. 37.

    Bar-Gill (2015), pp. 469–470..

  38. 38.

    Bar-Gill (2015), pp. 469–470..

  39. 39.

    Becher (2007), pp. 167–177; Davis and Davis (1996), p. 279.

  40. 40.

    Ben-Shahar and Schneider (2014), pp. 105–106.

  41. 41.

    Hillman (2006), pp. 849–850.

  42. 42.

    Black and Rayner (1992), pp. 3–9; Jones and Richardson (2007); Grunert et al. (2010); Prepared Foods (2016), https://www.preparedfoods.com/articles/118201-do-consumers-read-the-nutrition-facts-label [accessed 5 March 2020]; Hennessy (2014), https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2014/03/03/How-much-do-consumers-use-and-understand-nutrition-labels. Accessed 5 March 2020.

  43. 43.

    Jones and Richardson (2007), p. 238.

  44. 44.

    Jones and Richardson (2007), p. 243.

  45. 45.

    Cf. Willis (2015), p. 1327.

  46. 46.

    Bar-Gill et al. (2019).

  47. 47.

    Bar-Gill et al. (2019), p. 213.

  48. 48.

    Bar-Gill et al. (2019), p. 220.

  49. 49.

    Bar-Gill et al. (2019), p. 209.

  50. 50.

    Ringold (2002), pp. 51–52.

  51. 51.

    Lindstrom (2008) and Siegel (2011).

  52. 52.

    Bushman (1998), pp. 99–100.

  53. 53.

    Brehm (1966).

  54. 54.

    Clee and Wicklund (1980), p. 389.

  55. 55.

    Wilkinson-Ryan (2014).

  56. 56.

    Wilkinson-Ryan (2017).

  57. 57.

    Zettler et al. (2018), pp. 1947–1951.

  58. 58.

    Zettler et al. (2018), p. 1935.

  59. 59.

    Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2012) (defining a tobacco product).

  60. 60.

    Food and Drug Administration (2020).

  61. 61.

    Vassey et al. (2020).

  62. 62.

    Vassey et al. (2020).

  63. 63.

    Vassey et al. (2020).

  64. 64.

    Vassey et al. (2020).

  65. 65.

    Health Star Rating (2020).

  66. 66.

    Becher et al. (2021, 2019).

  67. 67.

    Becher et al. (2021, 2019).

  68. 68.

    DiNardo and Lemieux (2001), p. 994.

  69. 69.

    Tokely (2014), p. 30, n. 135.

  70. 70.

    Palmer (2014), pp. 496–499.

  71. 71.

    Felstiner et al. (1980–81).

  72. 72.

    Ramsay (1981).

  73. 73.

    Galanter (1974), p. 103.

  74. 74.

    Conley and O’Barr (1990), pp. 26–27.

  75. 75.

    Becher and Klein (2010), p. 349.

  76. 76.

    Becher and Klein (2010), p. 349.

  77. 77.

    Becher and Klein (2010), pp. 354–366.

  78. 78.

    Becher and Klein (2010), p. 359.

  79. 79.

    Niblett and Yoon (2017), p. 6.

  80. 80.

    Niblett and Yoon (2017), pp. 34–35.

  81. 81.

    15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2012); 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2018); Fair Trading Act 1986 pt 4A s 36M (NZ).

  82. 82.

    Becher and Zarsky (2010), pp. 129–150; Borges and Irlenbusch (2007), pp. 85–86.

  83. 83.

    Ben-Shahar and Posner (2011), pp. 141–144.

  84. 84.

    Becher and Zarsky (2011).

  85. 85.

    Sovern (2014).

  86. 86.

    Becher and Zarsky (2011), p. 80.

  87. 87.

    Becher and Zarsky (2011), p. 80.

  88. 88.

    Becher and Zarsky (2011), p. 80.

  89. 89.

    Becher and Zarsky (2011), p. 82.

  90. 90.

    Hocking (2011).

  91. 91.

    This is true in math, art, physics, human rights, and many other disciplines. It is also reflected in the idea of “standing on the shoulders of giants.”

  92. 92.

    Hirshman (2012).

  93. 93.

    Cf. Kay (2011), pp. 187–195.

  94. 94.

    Levmore (2010), pp. 816–817.

  95. 95.

    See Trufelman (2017).

  96. 96.

    See Trufelman (2017); see also Klein (2016), p. 8.

  97. 97.

    See Trufelman (2017).

  98. 98.

    Trufelman (2017).

  99. 99.

    Trufelman (2017).

  100. 100.

    At the first stage the legislature attempts to examine how Basic Income affects those who receive it. See Trufelman (2017).

  101. 101.

    Abramowicz et al. (2011), p. 1005; Romano (2014), p. 28.

  102. 102.

    Dubner (2016).

  103. 103.

    See discussion supra Part II.

  104. 104.

    CEBMa (2018).

  105. 105.

    CEBM (2018).

  106. 106.

    Lunn and Frances (2013).

  107. 107.

    World Health Organization (2014).

  108. 108.

    Reidel (2015).

  109. 109.

    Bar-Gill et al. (2019), p. 209.

  110. 110.

    Bar-Gill and Ferrari (2010), p. 109; Sovern (2006), p. 1703.

  111. 111.

    Taha and Mercer (2015).

  112. 112.

    Taha and Mercer (2015).

  113. 113.

    Art 26(2)(a) read in conjunction with art. 9(1)(1) FIR.

  114. 114.

    C-363/18 Organisation juive européenne, Vignoble Psagot Ltd v Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances [2019] ECL 954.

  115. 115.

    European Financial Services Round Table (2004), p. 31.

  116. 116.

    European Financial Services Round Table (2004), p. 31; see European Commission (2020).

  117. 117.

    Fair Trading Act 1986, pt 1 s 12A (NZ).

  118. 118.

    Fair Trading Act 1986, pt 1 s 12A (NZ).

  119. 119.

    Willis (2015), pp. 1349–1350.

  120. 120.

    Bartholomew (2018).

  121. 121.

    Bartholomew (2018), p. 526.

  122. 122.

    GDPR, Article 7, 12.1; Recital 39, 42, 58.

  123. 123.

    Becher and Benoliel (2020).

  124. 124.

    Aridor et al. (2020).

  125. 125.

    Arbesman (2012).

  126. 126.

    Cf. Gersen (2007).

  127. 127.

    Listokin (2008), pp. 522–533; Ginsburg et al. (2014), p. 294; Romano (2014), p. 28.

  128. 128.

    Gersen (2007), p. 248.

  129. 129.

    Kahneman (2011), pp. 304–305; Thaler and Sunstein (2008), pp. 34–35.

  130. 130.

    Schuck (2014), pp. 172–182.

  131. 131.

    Ritov and Baron (1992).

  132. 132.

    Arbesman (2012), p. 30.

  133. 133.

    Gersen (2007), p. 298.

  134. 134.

    Gersen (2007), pp. 262–266.

  135. 135.

    To realize these gains, legislation design should also account for the omission bias, which may cause legislatures not to revisit laws even when enacted temporarily.

  136. 136.

    Asch (1951), p. 177.

  137. 137.

    Fein (2012).

  138. 138.

    Haidt (2012).

  139. 139.

    Kunda (1990), p. 488; Westen et al. (2006).

  140. 140.

    Cultural Cognition (2020).

  141. 141.

    Cultural Cognition (2020).

  142. 142.

    Woolley et al. (2010).

  143. 143.

    Woolley et al. (2010).

  144. 144.

    Woolley et al. (2010).

  145. 145.

    Woolley et al. (2010), p. 688.

  146. 146.

    Woolley et al. (2010), pp. 686, 688.

  147. 147.

    Woolley et al. (2010), p. 688.

  148. 148.

    Woolley et al. (2010), pp. 686, 688.

  149. 149.

    Woolley et al. (2010), p. 688.

  150. 150.

    Wood (2017).

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Acknowledgements

I thank William Britton and Alana Harrison for excellent research assistance.

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Correspondence to Shmuel I. Becher .

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Becher, S.I. (2021). Key Lessons for the Design of Consumer Protection Legislation. In: Mathis, K., Tor, A. (eds) Law and Economics of Regulation. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70530-5_5

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