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Invented ‘Europeanness’ Versus Residual Slavophilism: Ukraine as an Ideological Battlefield

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Pan-Slavism and Slavophilia in Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe

Abstract

The chapter examines the residual forms of Slavophilism in Ukraine that survived both the end of the Soviet Union and the radical break in Ukrainian-Russian ‘special’ relations. The key hypothesis is that ambivalence and ambiguity were its inborn, genealogical features inasmuch as Ukrainian Slavophilism emerged within the framework of the all-Russian Slavophile movement that indicated both the adoption of Herder’s ideas and a semi-peripheral reaction to European modernity. Like any nativists, Ukrainian Slavophiles needed to be strongly committed to all things local and ‘traditional’ and hostile to all things arguably alien and imposed by foreigners. And yet, as nationalists striving for Ukraine’s national emancipation from the empire, they simply could not afford to be anti-Western, as they needed the West both symbolically and politically in order to withstand Russian pressure and dominance. They had to accept Western values and norms, even if rather lukewarmly and ambiguously, ‘by default’.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Пpo Дeнь cлoв’янcькoї пиceмнocтi i кyльтypи [On the Day of Slavonic Literacy and Culture] Decree of the President of Ukraine no. 1096/2004. (2004, September 17). Retrieved from https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/10962004-1882.

  2. 2.

    Radio Liberty. (2004, October 28). ‘Укpaїнy звiльнили вiд нaциcтiв в cepeдинi лиcтoпaдa, a нe 28 жoвтня’ [Ukraine was liberated from Nazis in mid-November, not on October 28]. Retrieved from https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/922065.html.

  3. 3.

    Voice of America. (2009, August 3). ‘Biзит Киpилa в Зaxiднy Укpaїнy poзпoчaвcя зi cкaндaлy’ [Cyril’s visit to Western Ukraine started with a scandal]. Retrieved from https://ukrainian.voanews.com/a/a-49-2009-08-03-voa9-86912317/223113.html.

  4. 4.

    President of Russia. (2021, July 12). On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. Retrieved from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181.

  5. 5.

    Karamzina M. (2006). ‘Пapтiйний вимip pociйcькoгo нaцioнaлiзмy в Укpaïнi’ [The party dimension of the Russian nationalism in Ukraine], Political management 6, pp. 29–44; also, ‘B Укpaїнi зapeєcтpoвaнo 14 пpopociйcькиx пapтiй’ [14 pro-Russian parties registered in Ukraine] (2013, May 21). Ukrainsky tyzhden, Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20190504195419/http://mobile.tyzhden.ua/News/79989.

  6. 6.

    Укpaїнcькe cycпiльcтвo: мoнiтopинг coцiaльниx змiн [Ukrainian society: monitoring of social changes] (2018). Kyv: Institute of Sociology of NASU, p. 430.

  7. 7.

    National Security and Defense. (2016). ‘Ukrainian Identity Changes, Trends, Regional Aspects. p. 45 ’. Retrieved from https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD161-162_2016_ukr.pdf.

  8. 8.

    The title of Leonid Kuchma’s book ‘Ukraine Is Not Russia’ (2004) was nearly as bold, under circumstances, as a recent Volodymyr Zelensky’s quip at Putin’s obsessive claim that Russians and Ukrainians “are the same people”. “If Ukrainians and Russians were one people, then hryvnia, most likely, would circulate in Moscow, and a yellow-blue flag would fly over the State Duma,” Zelensky was quoted as saying. See ‘Putin’s Ukraine Complex Again Makes Itself Felt’ (2021, July 1). Russia Monitor. Retrieved from https://warsawinstitute.org/putins-ukraine-complex-makes-felt/.

  9. 9.

    ‘Ukrainian Identity’, op. cit., p. 45.

  10. 10.

    I discussed the issue in more detail in Riabchuk M. (1996). ‘The Nativist/Westernizer Controversy in Ukraine: The End or the Beginning?’ Journal of Ukrainian Studies, 21(1–2), pp. 27–54.

  11. 11.

    On the early Ukrainian nationalism, see an illuminating book by Plokhy, S. (2012). The Cossack Myth. History and Nationhood in the Age of Empires. Cambridge University Press.

  12. 12.

    As quoted in Saunders, D. (1985). The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture. 1750–1850. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, p. 250.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., pp. 231, 233, 245.

  14. 14.

    Remy, J. (2005). ‘Panslavism in the Ukrainian National Movement from the 1840s to the 1870s’. Journal of Ukrainian Studies. 30(2), pp. 34–47.

  15. 15.

    The ‘Slavophile’ movement or, actually, movements in Western Ukraine had their own distinct history, left beyond the scope of this study. In brief, the Ukrainian national project, imported from the Dnieper Ukraine, had ultimately won in the region. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Austrian ‘Rusyns’ recognized their close affinity with Ukrainians (‘Little Russians’) in the Russian empire and accepted all the founding symbols and myths of Ukrainian identity developed by the Kyiv and Kharkiv intellectuals (with an important compromise on the religious issue). The story is comprehensively covered in Sereda, O. (2012). Between Polish Slavophilism and Russian Pan-Slavism. Reception and Development of the Slavic Ideas by Ukrainian (Ruthenian) Public Activists of Austrian Galicia in the 1860s. Lviv: Institute of Ukrainian Studies NASU. See also an insightful article on the perplexities of the Ukrainian identity-building in Galicia by Himka, J. P. (1999). ‘The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus’: Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions’, in Suny, R. and Kennedy, M. (eds.), Intellectuals and Articulation of the Nation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 109–154.

  16. 16.

    This peculiar ideology seems to attain afterlife today in two Russia-occupied (‘secessionist’) regions of Ukraine, the ‘Donetsk’ and the ‘Luhansk People’s Republics’. See Machitidze, I. (2020). ‘Popular Imagery, Competing Narratives and Pan-Slavism: the Case of Ukraine’s Break-away Regions’, The Journal of Cross-Regional Dialogues. Special Issue, https://doi.org/10.25518/2593-9483.139.

  17. 17.

    Plokhy, S. (2006). The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006. See also insightful article by Edward Keenan (1994). ‘On Certain Mythical Beliefs and Russian Behaviors’, in S. Frederick Starr (ed.), The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 19–40.

  18. 18.

    “Independence—over 90% vote yes in referendum; Kravchuk elected president of Ukraine” (1991), The Ukrainian Weekly, 8 December. See also: Solchanyk, R. (2000). Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, p. 100.

  19. 19.

    Gunn, J. (2014). ‘Ethnicity and Language in Ukraine’. RUSI, 12 March, Retrieved from https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ethnicity-and-language-ukraine; Stebelsky, I. (2009). ‘Ethnic Self-Identification in Ukraine, 1989-2001: Why More Ukrainians and Fewer Russians?’ Canadian Slavonic Papers 51.1, pp. 77–100. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40871355.

  20. 20.

    Shulman, S. (2005). ‘National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine’, Slavic Review 64(1), pp. 68–69.

  21. 21.

    “The researchers agree that Ukrainian society is split, but in their opinion this split is very indistinct, as a rule not accompanied by a sense of profound ethnic boundaries separating groups—even at a time of emerging interstate war”. Onuch, O. and Hale, H. (2018). ‘Capturing Ethnicity: The Case of Ukraine’, Post-Soviet Affairs 34(2–3), p. 106.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., p. 431.

  23. 23.

    Pociяни тa yкpaїнцi—цe oдин нapoд (coцioкyльтypнa cпiльнoтa) чи двa piзнi нapoди? [Are Ukrainians and Russians the same people (one social-cultural community) or two different peoples?] (2009). Razumkov Center. Retrieved from http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/journal.php/files/category_journal/poll.php?poll_id=471.

  24. 24.

    Гpoмaдcькa дyмкa мoлoдi Укpaїни, Aзepбaйджaнy тa Pociї [Public opinion of young Ukrainians, Azeris and Russians] (2010). Democratic Initiative Foundation. Retrieved from http://dif.org.ua/modules/pages/upload/file/molod.doc.

  25. 25.

    Укpaинцы и pyccкиe [Ukrainians and Russians] (2016). Research & Branding Group, unpublished results in the possession of the author.

  26. 26.

    Cycпiльнo-пoлiтичнi нacтpoï нaceлeння [Social and political attitudes of the population] (2021). Rating Sociological Group, July 23–25, p. 20. Retrieved from http://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/obschestvenno-politicheskie_nastroeniya_naseleniya_23-25_iyulya_2021.html.

  27. 27.

    ‘Consolidation of Ukrainian Society’ (2016). National Security and Defense 7–8, p. 71. Retrieved from https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD165-166_2016_ukr.pdf.

  28. 28.

    Cycпiльнo-пoлiтичнi нacтpoï нaceлeння [Social and political attitudes of the population] (2021, March 23–24), Rating Sociological Group, p. 34. Retrieved from http://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/obschestvenno-politicheskie_nastroeniya_naseleniya_23-24_marta_2021.html.

  29. 29.

    Чи кoвтaють yкpaïнцi фeйки тa пpoпaгaндy [Do Ukrainians swallow fakes and propaganda] (2020, October 5), Democratic Initiative Foundation. Retrieved from https://dif.org.ua/article/chi-kovtayut-ukraintsi-feyki-ta-propagandu.

  30. 30.

    Cycпiльнa пiдтpимкa євpoaтлaнтичнoгo кypcy Укpaїни [Popular support for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration] (2021). Razumkov Center, p. 12. Retrieved from https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2021-nato-ukr.pdf. Notably, the view is predominant even in the allegedly ‘pro-Russian’ East: 54% of the respondents consider Russia the main threat, versus 28% who deny it.

  31. 31.

    See: ‘Пepeдвибopчa пpoгpaмa Пapтiї Peгioнiв’ [Electoral program of the Party of Regions] (2007, August 4). УHIAH. Retrieved from https://www.unian.ua/politics/57393-peredviborcha-programa-partiji-regioniv.html; Пpeдвыбopнaя пpoгpaммa пoлитичecкoй пapтии “Oппoзициoннaя плaтфopмa—зa жизнь” [Electoral program of the party Oppositional platform—for life] (2019). Retrieved from https://zagittya.com.ua/en/page/programma.html.

  32. 32.

    See: Korchynsky, D. (1998). Bикликaю вoгoнь нa ceбe [Calling fire on myself]. Kyiv, p. 27. Notably, the 2021 nationwide survey revealed that not only 41% of Ukrainians tend to agree with Vladimir Putin’s claim that Ukrainian and Russians are virtually “one people”, but also that the odd view is shared by 10% of supporters of the allegedly “nationalistic” party European Solidarity and 12% of supporters of the ultra-nationalist Svoboda (Social and political attitudes, July 2021, p. 21). It is very unlikely that they considered Ukrainians a split group of Russians, in Putin’s way. Rather, they tended to see Russians a split group of Ukrainian people—the only true heirs of Ancient Rus.

  33. 33.

    See Ivakhiv, A. (2005). ‘In search of deeper identities Neopaganism and “Native Faith” in contemporary Ukraine’, Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 8(3), 7–38; Ivakhiv, A. (2005) ‘The Revival of Ukrainian Native Faith’, in Strmiska, M. (ed.), Modern Paganism in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives. Santa Barbara CA & Oxford UK: ABC Clio, pp. 209–240; Lesiv, M. (2009). ‘Glory to Dazhboh (Sun-god) or to All Native Gods? Monotheism and Polytheism in Contemporary Ukrainian Paganism’, The Pomegranate, 11(2), pp. 197–222; Shnirelman, V. (2002). “Christians! Go home”: A Revival of Neo-Paganism between the Baltic Sea and Transcaucasia’, Journal of Contemporary Religion, 17(2), pp. 197–211.

  34. 34.

    E. g. Shilov, Yu. (2005, January 27). ‘Cкiльки тиcячoлiть cлoв`янcькiй дepжaвнocтi?’ [How many millenniums the Ukrainian nationhood has?] Укpaїнcькa гaзeтa [Ukrainska gazeta], Retrieved from https://samumray.in.ua/skilki-tisyacholit-slovyanskij-derzhavnosti.

  35. 35.

    Shakurova, O. (2019). ‘Apologetics and Criticism of Pseudoscientific Hypotheses of the Ukrainian Ethnogenesis’, Ukrainian Studies 3, 86–103; Halushko, K. (2008) ‘Битий шляx вiд apxeoлoгiï дo нaцизмy, aбo якi “тeopiï” ми oбгoвopюємo’ [The beaten track from archeology to Nazism, or what “theories” we are discussing], in: Hoвiтнi мiфи тa фaльшивки пpo пoxoджeння yкpaïнцiв [The new myths and falsehoods on Ukrainians’ origin]. Кyiv: Tempora. C. f., Laruelle, M. (2008). ‘Alternative identity, alternative religion? Neo-paganism and the Aryan myth in contemporary Russia’, Nations and Nationalism, 14(2), pp. 283–301.

  36. 36.

    The data analysis proves that the adherents of the Moscow church are much more supportive for Russian policies and, more generally, East Slavonic values framed as anti-Western, than the adherents of any other confession in Ukraine. See: Укpaїнcькe cycпiльcтвo: мoнiтopинг coцiaльниx змiн [Ukrainian Society: monitoring of social changes] (2020). Kyiv: Institute of Sociology of NASU, pp. 252–265.

  37. 37.

    Укpaїнcькe cycпiльcтвo 1992–2013. Coцioлoгiчний мoнiтopинґ [Ukrainian Society 1992–2013. Sociological monitoring]. (2013). Kyiv: Institute of Sociology of NASU, p. 554.

  38. 38.

    Ukrainian Society (2018). op. cit., p. 523.

  39. 39.

    Ukrainian Society (2020). op. cit., p. 544.

  40. 40.

    I discuss the issue in more detail in Riabchuk M. (2020). ‘A Difficult Trade-Off: Freedom of Speech and Public Security during the ‘Hybrid War’,Harriman Magazine, Spring, pp. 16–23. Retrieved from http://www.columbia.edu/cu/creative/epub/harriman/2020/spring/a_difficult_trade-off_freedom_of_speech_and_public_security_during_the_hybrid_war.pdf.

  41. 41.

    Opposition to Russian Propaganda and Media Literacy: Results of All-Ukrainian Opinion Poll. Analytical Report (2018). Kyiv: Detector Media, pp. 18–19.

  42. 42.

    Pomerantsev, P., et al. (2021). Why Conspiratorial Propaganda Works and What we can Do About It: Audience Vulnerability and Resistance to Anti-Western, Pro-Kremlin Disinformation in Ukraine. London School of Economics, p. 10.

  43. 43.

    Defender’s Day of Ukraine (2020). Rating Sociological Group, October 14, p. 4. Retrieved from http://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/fbb3f3c52d452cdd1646d4a62b69dba5.html.

  44. 44.

    Ukrainian Society (2020). op. cit., pp. 542–543.

  45. 45.

    Laruelle, M. (2015). The “Russian World”. Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination. Washington DC: Center on Global Interests; Wawrzonek, M. (2016). “Russkiy mir”: A Conceptual Model of the “Orthodox Civilization”, In M. Wawrzonek, N. Bekus and M. Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska (Eds.), Orthodoxy Versus Post-Communism? Belarus, Serbia, Ukraine and the Russkiy Mir. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 37–70.

  46. 46.

    O’Loughlin, J., Toal, G. and Kolosov, V. (2016). ‘Who Identifies with the “Russian World”? Geopolitical Attitudes in Southeastern Ukraine, Crimea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria’, Eurasian Geography and Economics. 57(6), p. 757.

  47. 47.

    Oцiнкa гpoмaдянaми Укpaїни гoлoвниx тeз cтaттi B. Пyтiнa “Пpo icтopичнy єднicть pociян тa yкpaїнцiв” [Ukrainians’ assessment of the main theses of Putin’s article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”] (2021, August 11). Цeнтp Paзyмкoвa, Retrieved from https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-gromadianamy-ukrainy-golovnykh-tez-statti-v-putina-pro-istorychnu-iednist-rosiian-ta-ukraintsiv.

  48. 48.

    Cycпiльнo-пoлiтичнi нacтpoï нaceлeння [Social and political attitudes of the population] (2021, July 23–25). Rating Sociological Group, p. 18.

  49. 49.

    The current situation in the Ukrainian society (2015). Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, May, p. 34. Retrieved from http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=reports&id=529&page=1.

  50. 50.

    I discuss the process in more detail in Riabchuk M. (2020). ‘Between the “Victory” and “Betrayal”: Transformation of Ethnic and Civic Identities in Ukraine since the Revolution of Dignity’, In V. Voynalovych, (Ed.), Ethnopolitical factors of consolidation of today’s Ukrainian society. Kyiv: Institute of Political and Nationalities’ Studies NASU. Retrieved from https://ipiend.gov.ua/publication/etnopolitychni-chynnyky-konsolidatsii-suchasnoho-ukrainskoho-suspilstva/. See also Riabchuk, M. (2015). ‘Two Ukraines’ Reconsidered: The End of Ukrainian Ambivalence? Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism. 15(1), pp. 138–156, https://doi.org/10.1111/sena.12120.

  51. 51.

    Kohut, Z. (2011). Making Ukraine: Studies on Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity. Toronto & Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

  52. 52.

    Wanner, C. and Yelensky, V. (2019). ‘Religion and the cultural geography of Ukraine’, In U. Schmid, and O. Myshlovska, (Eds.), Regionalism without regions: reconceptualizing Ukraine’s heterogeneity. Budapest & New York: Central European University Press, pp. 277–278.

  53. 53.

    Ibid., pp. 279–280.

  54. 54.

    Stephen Shulman found out a strong correlation between the type of national identity (‘Ukrainian ethnic’ versus ‘East Slavonic’) and public support for political and economic reform in Ukraine. Adherence to an Eastern Slavic identity, in his view, “is likely to inhibit support for democracy and capitalism. Elite proponents of the identity argue that ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians, whether in Ukraine or Russia, have extremely close and harmonious historical and cultural ties and that the worldview of these “brotherly” peoples is substantially different from that found in Europe, which is the primary “Other” for this identity”. (…) Consequently, we would expect that advocates of the Eastern Slavic identity are less likely to support liberal democratic and capitalistic values and institutions, as they are allegedly historically and culturally estranged from both the preferred core internal group (Eastern Slavs: Ukrainians and Russians) and the key foreign nation with which this identity compares Ukraine (Russia). (Shulman, op. cit., pp. 69–70).

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Riabchuk, M. (2023). Invented ‘Europeanness’ Versus Residual Slavophilism: Ukraine as an Ideological Battlefield. In: Suslov, M., Čejka, M., Ðorđević, V. (eds) Pan-Slavism and Slavophilia in Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17875-7_12

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