Abstract
Although Jean-Jacques Rousseau does not use the term “recognition” in the sense that it has been known since Fichte and Hegel, he has had an influence on various theorists of recognition. Undoubtedly, the key reason for this is his insightful writings that deal with various aspects of human sociality. In this essay, I shall reconstruct key elements of Rousseau’s work to highlight how he understands human sociality. The second task of the essay is to highlight the meaning of Rousseau’s insights to contemporary recognition theory. Rousseau is well known for his scepticism of modern social life. This shows especially in his analysis of amour-propre, a self-love that appears as a desire for social recognition and distinction from others. Unlike recognition theorists, Rousseau focuses on the inequalizing force of pride and search for esteem. In other words, Rousseau emphasizes the potential social harms that might rise from various struggles for recognition. In his view, individuals face a challenge to balance amour-propre in a healthy, and not inflamed manner. If the balancing is unsuccessful, the unchecked desire for social value leads into increasing (and institutionalized) inequality. However, Rousseau is also aware of the more positive and constructive elements of human sociality and puts value on the social bonds that are built upon respect and goodwill. Furthermore, although Rousseau is highly sceptical of the possibilities of respect and freedom in modern society, in Emile he outlines how freedom could be achieved through upbringing that invites (or even forces) one to be free—not unlike Fichte’s idea of summoning one to realize one’s own agency. Ultimately, Rousseau presents an ambivalent picture of the nature of social relationships. This is a position that has been developed in detail recognition theories only recently (e.g. Ikäheimo et al., Recognition and Ambivalence, Columbia University Press, New York, 2021). Although Rousseau does not have all the conceptual tools of the recent recognition theories at his disposal, he arguably has a developed picture of the positive and the negative effects that stem from the very same desire for recognition.
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Notes
- 1.
It is unclear how much of a direct influence Rousseau had on the early theorists of recognition. However, he was known to at least to some of them: “We can note that at least Hegel, though not Fichte, was intuitively aware of the origins of his own theory of recognition in the heritage of Rousseau’s thought” (Honneth 2016, p. 201).
- 2.
- 3.
Hereon, I will refer to this as the Discourse for the sake of brevity.
- 4.
Mäki (2020, p. 41) condenses the relationships of Rousseau’s key works in the following fashion: Discourse on Inequality shows how freedom and recognition cannot be reached in the modern world, Social Contract shows how freedom could in principle be realized in a society, and Emile provides an instruction for education to freedom and reciprocity.
- 5.
However, see also Neuhouser (2008, p. 210) for a different reading—defending the non-oppressive nature of Rousseau’s idea.
- 6.
The reciprocity in human relations comes apparent also in the case of pity where one needs to be able to put oneself in the shoes of the sufferer and see the similarity in between one and the other, between human beings (Neuhouser 2008, p. 176).
- 7.
In his earlier work, Honneth does discuss the role of reciprocity in Rousseau. Rousseau’s idea of extension of amour-propre to other humans (besides only oneself) seems to work as a reciprocal solution to the problems caused by amour-propre. Honneth (2016, p. 196) sees this as a reciprocal realization of the dependency of each other’s recognition, which would in turn lessen the competition for social reputation. However, despite the possibility of this realization, the desire for social worth and better status remains—and even democratic societies need to ensure “a sufficient scope for the satisfaction of the individual’s desire for reputation and esteem” (Honneth 2016, p. 198).
- 8.
“According to this view, human beings are able to ‘subject themselves to the yoke of reason’ only because they can be educated to find a kind of honor or esteem in doing so. The honor at issue in rational agency is of the sort one wins in giving expression to a practical identity — as, say, a man of reason, a citizen of Rome, or a sovereign member of the republic — where having such an identity implies a normative commitment, an allegiance to some standard of what is good, or worthy of honor” (Neuhouser 2008, pp. 260–261).
- 9.
Interestingly, this sort of ambition can be found from Honneth’s recognition theory as he can be taken to defend theoretical monism, which is built around the concept of recognition.
- 10.
An exception to this rule is Judith Butler (1999) who has always been conscious of the negative power of recognition.
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Hirvonen, O. (2023). The Ambivalence of Human Sociality: Rousseau and Recognition. In: Harris, N., Bosseau, D., Pintobtang, P., Brown, O. (eds) Rousseau Today. Political Philosophy and Public Purpose. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29243-9_5
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