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Saussurean Games

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Art and IR Theory

Part of the book series: Mathematics in Mind ((MATHMIN))

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Abstract

Saussure (1916, 98) asserts that a linguistic sign emanates from an association between a concept and an acoustic image, the two elements of a sign:Saussure’s definition of linguistic signs finds a niche in visual terms. Following Saussure, I argue that a visual sign is not a painting but an IR concept the painting represents. The painting helps an IR scholar to form an association between itself and an IR proposition in her mind. Whether the painting is qualified as abstract or not matters as long as the sign depends on human senses of a correspondence in purely abstract terms. The painting becomes a visual signifier provided that it helps the formation of a mental correspondence between itself and propositions by Waltz and Wendt. The propositions find home in the realm of abstract art as a result. Not all paintings are helpful; helpful paintings aid IR scholars to nail down theoretical essentials. Scholars’ task is not an easy one because contours (if they ever exist) of artistic abstract thinking subsume linguistic theoretic abstractions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Rubinstein informs that the third interpretation is due to Aumann: Robert J. Aumann. 1987. “Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality.” Econometrica 55: 1–18.

  2. 2.

    This condition is called Harsanyi Doctrine (Fig. 5.6).

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Güner, S.Ş. (2023). Saussurean Games. In: Art and IR Theory. Mathematics in Mind. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32342-3_5

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