Abstract
Secure communication is a fundamental cryptographic primitive. Typically, security is achieved by relying on an existing credential infrastructure, such as a PKI or passwords, for identifying the end points to each other. But what can be obtained when no such credential infrastructure is available?
Clearly, when there is no pre-existing credential infrastructure, an adversary can mount successful “man in the middle” (MIM) attacks by modifying the communication between the legitimate endpoints. Still, we show that not all is lost, as long as the adversary’s control over the communication is not complete: We present relatively efficient key exchange and secure session protocols that guarantee that any MIM adversary is immediately detected as soon as he fails to intercept even a single message between the legitimate endpoints.
To obtain this guarantee we strengthen the notion of key exchange to require that the keys exchanged in any two sessions are independent of each other as long as each session has at least one honest endpoint, even if both sessions has an adversarial endpoint. We call this notion credential-free key exchange. We then strengthen the existing notion of secure session protocols to provide the above guarantee given a CFKE (existing definitions and constructions are insufficient for this purpose). We provide two alternative definitions and constructions of CFKE, a game-based one with a (very efficient) construction in the RO model, and a UC one with a construction in the CRS model.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Arkko, J., Lehtovirta, V., Eronen, P.: RFC 5448: Improved extensible authentication protocol method for 3rd generation authentication and key agreement, EAP-AKA’ (May 2009), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5448
Barak, B.: Constant-round coin-tossing with a man in the middle or realizing the shared random string model. In: FOCS, pp. 345–355. IEEE Computer Society (2002)
Barak, B., Canetti, R., Lindell, Y., Pass, R., Rabin, T.: Secure Computation Without Authentication. In: Shoup, V. (ed.) CRYPTO 2005. LNCS, vol. 3621, pp. 361–377. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Bellare, M., Kohno, T., Namprempre, C.: Authenticated encryption in SSH: Provably fixing the SSH binary packet protocol. In: Atluri, V. (ed.) ACM CCS 02: 9th Conference on Computer and Communications Security, November 18–22, pp. 1–11. ACM Press, New York (2002)
Bellovin, S.M., Merritt, M.: Encrypted key exchange: Password-based protocols secureagainst dictionary attacks. In: SP 1992: Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, p. 72. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC (1992)
Canetti, R.: Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2000/067 (2000), http://eprint.iacr.org/
Camenisch, J., Casati, N., Gross, T., Shoup, V.: Credential Authenticated Identification and Key Exchange. In: Rabin, T. (ed.) CRYPTO 2010. LNCS, vol. 6223, pp. 255–276. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Canetti, R., Dachman-Soled, D., Vaikuntanathan, V., Wee, H.: Efficient password authenticated key exchange via oblivious transfer. In: Fischlin, M., Buchmann, J., Manulis, M. (eds.) PKC 2012. LNCS, vol. 7293, pp. 449–466. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
Canetti, R., Fischlin, M.: Universally composable commitments. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 19–40. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Canetti, R., Halevi, S., Katz, J., Lindell, Y., MacKenzie, P.: Universally Composable Password-Based Key Exchange. In: Cramer, R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2005. LNCS, vol. 3494, pp. 404–421. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Analysis of key-exchange protocols and their use for building secure channels. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 453–474. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channels. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 337–351. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Di Crescenzo, G., Katz, J., Ostrovsky, R., Smith, A.: Efficient and non-interactive non-malleable commitment. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, p. 40. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Canetti, R., Kolesnikov, V., Rackoff, C., Vahlis, Y.: Secure key exchange and sessions without credentials. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/693 (2013), http://eprint.iacr.org/
Di Crescenzo, G., Ishai, Y., Ostrovsky, R.: Non-interactive and non-malleable commitment. In: Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 141–150. ACM (1998)
Dolev, D., Dwork, C., Naor, M.: Non-malleable cryptography (extended abstract). In: STOC, pp. 542–552. ACM (1991)
Damgard, I., Groth, J.: Non-interactive and reusable non-malleable commitment schemes. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, p. 437. ACM (2003)
Diffie, W., Hellman, M.E.: New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory IT-22(6), 644–654 (1976)
Fischlin, M., Fischlin, R.: Efficient non-malleable commitment schemes. In: CRYPTO, pp. 413–431 (2000)
Goldreich, O., Lindell, Y.: Session-Key Generation Using Human Passwords Only. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 408–432. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Gennaro, R., Lindel, Y.: A framework for password-based authenticated key exchange. In: Biham, E. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2656, pp. 524–543. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Katz, J., Ostrovsky, R., Yung, M.: Efficient Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Human-Memorable Passwords. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 475–494. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Katz, J., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Round-Optimal Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange. In: Ishai, Y. (ed.) TCC 2011. LNCS, vol. 6597, pp. 293–310. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
Lindell, Y.: Highly-efficient universally-composable commitments based on the DDH assumption. In: Paterson, K.G. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2011. LNCS, vol. 6632, pp. 446–466. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
Neuman, B.C., Ts’o, T.: Kerberos: an authentication service for computer networks. IEEE Communications Magazine 32(9), 33–38 (1994)
Pass, R., Rosen, A.: New and improved constructions of non-malleable cryptographic protocols. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, p. 542. ACM (2005)
Rivest, R.L., Shamir, A.: How to expose an eavesdropper. Commun. ACM 27, 393–394 (1984)
Shoup, V.: On formal models for secure key exchange. Technical Report RZ 3120 (#93166), IBM (1999)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this paper
Cite this paper
Canetti, R., Kolesnikov, V., Rackoff, C., Vahlis, Y. (2014). Secure Key Exchange and Sessions without Credentials. In: Abdalla, M., De Prisco, R. (eds) Security and Cryptography for Networks. SCN 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8642. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-10878-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-10879-7
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)