Scientia in the Renaissance, Concept of

Abstract

“Scientia” is a long-standing heritage of Aristotelian logic and denotes an epistemic ideal pursued through several centuries. According to Aristotle’s (1984) Posterior Analytics, knowledge that conforms to this ideal must consist of propositions that are universally and necessarily true. This necessity can be demonstrated through syllogistic inferences that proceed from premises containing the cause of the conclusion. Accordingly, scientia consisted in a systematic, demonstrative presentation of why things behave the way they do, and not in the discovery of the causes from which demonstrations followed. This ideal started to erode in the Renaissance period. Its various aspects had been challenged and alternative ideals of inquiry had been proposed. As the emphasis shifted from the demonstration of phenomena in accordance with Aristotelian logic and metaphysics to the production of useful knowledge and the standards of intelligibility changed, the idea of scientia would be gradually abandoned. Syllogistic inference had been increasingly criticized as incapable of producing useful knowledge, and explanations that appealed to Aristotelian essences started to be perceived as empty or unintelligible. The increasing commitment to observation and experimental practices and an ensuing “culture of fact” replaced the conviction that in natural philosophy there is room only for universally and necessary true propositions, and the development and usefulness of mathematical practices shed doubt on syllogism as the only way through which demonstrative certainty could be achieved.