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Corruption: An Unsolved Puzzle

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Corruption, Entrepreneurship, and Social Welfare

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Entrepreneurship and Innovation ((BRIEFSENTRE))

Abstract

Corruption is not a new problem. Even though it is considered a social ill and almost universally viewed as a problem, it remains present in many of the developing countries. Although the existence of corruption is common knowledge, people are reluctant to admit that they take and pay bribes, and therefore measuring and assessing corruption can be a challenge. In this chapter, we look at what types of corruption exist, how corruption is measured in different sources, and some of the causes that have been found to contribute to engaging in corruption. We have also examined how corruption is present in different sectors and it affects stakeholders in developing countries. With a growing concern regarding the size of government, we also examine how corruption and the size of government affect the recipients of the services, especially entrepreneurs.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Business and Entrepreneurship, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, Brownsville, TX, USA

    Farzana Chowdhury

  2. School of Public & Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

    Sameeksha Desai & David B. Audretsch

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  1. Farzana Chowdhury
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  2. Sameeksha Desai
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  3. David B. Audretsch
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Chowdhury, F., Desai, S., Audretsch, D.B. (2018). Corruption: An Unsolved Puzzle. In: Corruption, Entrepreneurship, and Social Welfare. SpringerBriefs in Entrepreneurship and Innovation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64916-0_4

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