Abstract
Does European business lobby in international investment policy and notably for the conclusion of international investment agreements? The chapter argues that business is little involved in this policy domain due to limited perceived welfare effects. Theories of public choice and bureaucratic politics may better account for policy outcomes. The chapter verifies these hypotheses in case studies of international investment policy-making in Germany and the European Union. Finally, the chapter raises the question of whether the exceptional, vocal involvement of European business in the debates on investment regulation under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) might be the result of policy-maker influence on the business community. The findings imply that policy-makers may be freer in reforming their approach to international investment policy and international investment agreements than assumed.
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a legal agreement for the promotion of international trade by, e.g., the reduction of tariffs and removal of other trade barriers. The Uruguay Round (1986–1994) was the most ambitious negotiating round with an expansion of competences to areas such as agriculture, services, intellectual property, and capital and with developing countries playing an active role.
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Basedow, R. (2019). Business Lobbying in International Investment Policy-Making in Europe. In: Dialer, D., Richter, M. (eds) Lobbying in the European Union. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98800-9_28
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