Abstract
In this chapter we examine strategy-proof mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that endow every agent with the best (called dominant) strategy for each permissible preference profile. Based on the revelation principle, we construct, for every strategy-proof mechanism, an equivalent direct non-manipulable mechanism. The key characteristic of such a mechanism is the agent’s effective region in the set of outcomes. From this point of view, we study the structure of non-manipulable mechanisms in both the universal and the single-peaked environments (Sections 3.1 and 3.2). The convex structure of the outcome set yields an affine environment and allows us to mix strategy-proof mechanisms. In Section 3.3 we conjecture that any non-manipulable mechanism (within an affine environment) is a probability mixture of duplet and unilateral non-manipulable mechanisms. In the following two sections, we study the properties of Groves mechanisms in transferable environments, in particular, the issue of efficiency. We present some efficiency evaluations and efficiency criteria for Groves mechanisms.
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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Danilov, V.I., Sotskov, A.I. (2002). Strategy-proof Mechanisms. In: Social Choice Mechanisms. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24805-7_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24805-7_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07715-9
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