Summary
Nowadays mobile and fixed networks are trusted with highly sensitive information, which must be protected by security protocols. However, security protocols are vulnerable to a host of subtle attacks, such as replay, parallel session and type-flaw attacks. Designing protocols to be impervious to these attacks has been proven to be extremely challenging and error prone.
This paper discusses various attacks against security protocols. As an example, the security of the Wide-Mouthed Frog key distribution protocol when subjected to known attacks is discussed. Significantly, a hitherto unknown attack on Lowe’s modified version of the Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol is presented. Finally, a correction for the protocol to prevent this attack is proposed and discussed.
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Dojen, R., Jurcut, A., Coffey, T., Gyorodi, C. (2008). On Establishing and Fixing a Parallel Session Attack in a Security Protocol. In: Badica, C., Mangioni, G., Carchiolo, V., Burdescu, D.D. (eds) Intelligent Distributed Computing, Systems and Applications. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 162. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85257-5_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85257-5_24
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-85256-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-85257-5
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