Abstract
Whenever machine learning is applied to security problems, it is important to measure vulnerabilities to adversaries who poison the training data. We demonstrate the impact of variance injection schemes on PCA-based network-wide volume anomaly detectors, when a single compromised PoP injects chaff into the network. These schemes can increase the chance of evading detection by sixfold, for DoS attacks.
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References
Barreno, M., Nelson, B., Joseph, A.D., Tygar, J.D.: The security of machine learning. Technical Report UCB/EECS-2008-43, UC Berkeley (April 2008)
Lakhina, A., Crovella, M., Diot, C.: Diagnosing network-wide traffic anomalies. In: Proc. SIGCOMM 2004, pp. 219–230 (2004)
Rubinstein, B.I.P., Nelson, B., Huang, L., Joseph, A.D., Lau, S., Taft, N., Tygar, J.D.: Compromising PCA-based anomaly detectors for network-wide traffic. Technical report UCB/EECS-2008-73, UC Berkeley (May 2008)
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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Rubinstein, B.I.P. et al. (2008). Evading Anomaly Detection through Variance Injection Attacks on PCA. In: Lippmann, R., Kirda, E., Trachtenberg, A. (eds) Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection. RAID 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5230. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-87403-4_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-87403-4_23
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-87402-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-87403-4
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