Abstract
Rational secret sharing is a problem at the intersection of cryptography and game theory. In essence, a dealer wishes to engineer a communication game that, when rationally played, guarantees that each of the players learns the dealer’s secret. Yet, all solutions proposed so far did not rely solely on the players’ rationality, but also on their beliefs, and were also quite inefficient.
After providing a more complete definition of the problem, we exhibit a very efficient and purely rational solution to it with a verifiable trusted channel.
The original version of the book was revised: The copyright line was incorrect. The Erratum to the book is available at DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_36
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Micali, S., shelat, a. (2009). Purely Rational Secret Sharing (Extended Abstract). In: Reingold, O. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5444. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_4
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