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An Improved Fault Based Attack of the Advanced Encryption Standard

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5580))

Abstract

In the present paper a new fault based attack has been proposed against AES-Rijndael. The paper shows that inducing a single random byte fault at the input of the eighth round of the AES algorithm the block cipher key can be deduced. Simulations show that when two faulty ciphertext pairs are generated, the key can be exactly deduced without any brute-force search. Further results show that with one single faulty ciphertext pair, the AES key can be ascertained with a brute-force search of 232.

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References

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Mukhopadhyay, D. (2009). An Improved Fault Based Attack of the Advanced Encryption Standard. In: Preneel, B. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2009. AFRICACRYPT 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5580. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02384-2_26

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02384-2_26

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-02383-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-02384-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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