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Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on Reduced Versions of the Camellia Block Cipher

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Advances in Information and Computer Security (IWSEC 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7631))

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Abstract

The Camellia block cipher has a 128-bit block length and a user key of 128, 192 or 256 bits long, which employs a total of 18 rounds for a 128-bit key and 24 rounds for a 192 or 256-bit key. It is a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, a European NESSIE selected cipher, and an ISO international standard. In this paper, we describe a few 5 and 6-round properties of Camellia and finally use them to give (higher-order) meet-in-the-middle attacks on 10-round Camellia with the FL/FL− 1 functions under 128 key bits, 11-round Camellia with the FL/FL− 1 and whitening functions under 192 key bits and 12-round Camellia with the FL/FL− 1 and whitening functions under 256 key bits.

The work was supported by the French ANR project SAPHIR II (No. ANR-08-VERS-014), the Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61100185), Guangxi Natural Science Foundation (No. 2011GXNSFB018071), and the Foundation of Guangxi Key Lab of Wireless Wideband Communication and Signal Processing (No. 11101).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Infocomm Research, Agency for Science, Technology and Research, 1 Fusionopolis Way, Singapore, 138632

    Jiqiang Lu

  2. Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin City, Guangxi Province, 541004, China

    Yongzhuang Wei

  3. State Key Lab of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100190, China

    Yongzhuang Wei

  4. University of Primorska FAMNIT, Koper, Slovenia

    Enes Pasalic

  5. Département d’Informatique, École Normale Supérieure, 45 Rue d’Ulm, Paris, 75005, France

    Pierre-Alain Fouque

Authors
  1. Jiqiang Lu
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  2. Yongzhuang Wei
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  3. Enes Pasalic
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  4. Pierre-Alain Fouque
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC), National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), 1-1-1 Umezono, 305-8568, Tsukuba, Japan

    Goichiro Hanaoka

  2. Graduate School of Natural Science and Technology, Okayama University, 3-1-1 Tsushima-naka, 700-8530, Okayama, Japan

    Toshihiro Yamauchi

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Lu, J., Wei, Y., Pasalic, E., Fouque, PA. (2012). Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on Reduced Versions of the Camellia Block Cipher. In: Hanaoka, G., Yamauchi, T. (eds) Advances in Information and Computer Security. IWSEC 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7631. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34117-5_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34117-5_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-34116-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-34117-5

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