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Apportionment Strategies for the European Parliament

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Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After

Abstract

A solution, based on power measures, is proposed to the problem of assigning seats to new countries applying for membership of the European Parliament. This solution, simpler than many others, is obtained by weighting the populations and GDPs of all members. A strategy of optimization for each single country is suggested.

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Acknowledgments

This work is sponsored by MIUR. The authors would like to thank Jesus Mario Bilbao, Annalisa Cristini and Moshé Machover for their useful suggestions and Mara Grosini for help in computations.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Management, Economics and Quantitative Methods, University of Bergamo, via dei Caniani 2, 24127, Bergamo, Italy

    Cesarino Bertini & Gianfranco Gambarelli

  2. Faculty of Management, AGH University of Science and Technology, Krakow, Poland

    Izabella Stach

Authors
  1. Cesarino Bertini
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  2. Gianfranco Gambarelli
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  3. Izabella Stach
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Correspondence to Cesarino Bertini .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of SocioEconomics, Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, Hamburg, 10146, Germany

    Manfred J Holler

  2. Department of Political Science and, Contemporary History, University of Turku, Assistentinkatu 7, Turku, 20014, Finland

    Hannu Nurmi

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Bertini, C., Gambarelli, G., Stach, I. (2013). Apportionment Strategies for the European Parliament. In: Holler, M., Nurmi, H. (eds) Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_28

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_28

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