Abstract
One story that is told in textbooks to introduce the Shapley value is as follows. The players of the grand coalition enter one by one. When a player enters he will get his marginal contribution to the coalition that is already present. If each order of entrance has the same probability then the Shapley value is the expected payoff to the players.
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© 1992 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg
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Hamers, H. (1992). The Shapley-Entrance Game. In: Gritzmann, P., Hettich, R., Horst, R., Sachs, E. (eds) Operations Research ’91. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48417-9_108
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48417-9_108
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