Abstract
In a cooperative TU (Transferable Utility) game (N, v) as modelled by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944), N is a finite set of players, and the characteristic function v assigns to each subgroup of players a real number which is to be interpreted as the maximal gains this coalition can secure by cooperating.
This research was sponsored by the Foundation for the Promotion of Research in Economic Sciences, which is part of the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Borm, P., Nouweland, A. van den, and Tijs, S.H. (1991). “Cooperation and communication restrictions: a survey”, in: ‘Economic Behaviour in an Imperfect Environment’, Gilles, R.P. and Ruys, P.H.M. (Eds.), North-Holland, Amsterdam. (To appear) ai]•_Myerson, R.B. (1977). “Graphs and cooperation in games”, Math. Oper. Res. 2, 225–229.
Neumann, J. von and Morgenstern, O. (1944). “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” (3rd edition, 1953), Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Shapley, L.S. (1953). “A value for n-person games”, in: Contributions to the Theory of Games, II (Eds. Tucker, A.W. and Kuhn, H.), Ann. Math. Studies 28, Princeton University Press, 307–317.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1993 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Feltkamp, V., van den Nouweland, A. (1993). Controlled Communication Networks. In: Karmann, A., Mosler, K., Schader, M., Uebe, G. (eds) Operations Research ’92. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-12629-5_114
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-12629-5_114
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0679-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-12629-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive