Abstract
Many of the ills afflicting democratic capitalism have their source in the current legal architecture of money and finance. At the same time the reimagination of institutions of money and finance promise an avenue for reform to democratize the economy and prevent the perpetuation of austerity politics. Such institutional reimagination requires a perspective that recognizes money as an institution linking state and civil society, politics and the economy. Economics in great part eschews such a perspective and perceives of money as a medium of exchange largely independent of government and politics. Legal analysis, by contrast, should be ideally suited for the endeavor to analyse the various ways in which the institutional design of money configures political economy.
To start paving the way for such analysis, I seek to clarify how German public law scholarship has been obstructing a reimagination of monetary design. It has adopted an understanding of money that is informed by economics and on this basis has rationalized the particular legal architecture of money in Germany and in the European Economic and Monetary Union as necessary to protect individual freedom and democratic constitutionalism. Recent practice of the European Central Bank reveals that the strict separation between monetary and economic policy, between money and public finance that characterizes the European Economic and Monetary Union, and its rationalization by legal scholarship and case law cannot be maintained. I argue that a growing body of literature on the political economy of money can inspire a legal analysis that overcomes the current fetishization of the legal architecture of money. This literature provides a starting point for imagining institutions that operationalize monetary sovereignty to serve the public interest and that decrease the hold of private creditors on democratic politics.
Republication with slight revisions of “Public Law’s Rationalization of the Legal Architecture of Money: What Might Legal Analysis of Money Become?” by Isabel Feichtner, German Law Journal 17(5):875–906
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Notes
- 1.
Subtitle and argument of this text are inspired by and build on Unger (1996).
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Bank deposits by most accounts are considered money, as account transfers are today the preferred and widely accepted means of payment.
- 5.
Mayer (2014), p. 36.
- 6.
These indirect means include the setting of interest rates and purchase of sovereign and commercial bonds, see McLeay et al. (2014).
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
Josef Huber, who subsumes his reform proposal under the label “New Currency Theory,” focuses on public revenue generation from seigniorage, such as the income accruing from money creation, and sees herein a distinguishing factor from other reform proposals. See Huber (2014); the proposal for monetary reform in Iceland, which is mainly the work of Josef Huber, attributes the power to decide how much money to create to the central bank and the power to decide how this money is allocated to the political institutions of government, see Sigurjonsson (2015), p. 78.
- 11.
- 12.
Streeck and Mertens (2010).
- 13.
See also Chap. 8.
- 14.
See Interview by Shiv Malik with Mario Draghi on 18 Feb 2016 (published on 11 Mar 2016), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/inter/date/2016/html/sp160311.en.html.
- 15.
See only Piketty (2014).
- 16.
- 17.
Teubner (2011). Teubner refers to Joseph Huber’s and Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof’s proposals to reform monetary institutions supra notes 7 and 9.
- 18.
For legal scholarship that seeks to understand how different monetary designs shape political economy, see Desan (2014); for a brief summary and indication of the promise her research holds for reform oriented legal analysis, see Desan (2015); Streeck (2013), also seeks to clarify the role of money and finance in political economy and to derive from this understanding proposals for monetary reform. Streeck concentrates on the external dimension of money, namely the potential of exchange rate policy to address economic imbalances.
- 19.
- 20.
Unger (1996), p. 34.
- 21.
I concentrate on German legal scholarship and jurisprudence because the separation was already very pronounced in Germany prior to the establishment of European Monetary Union and now is even more pronounced in the European Monetary Union in response to German demands for this particular institutional design.
- 22.
Unger (1996), p. 36.
- 23.
It should be noted that while the treaties postulate that “[t]he Union shall establish an economic and monetary union” (Article 3:4 TEU), it would be more correct to speak just of monetary union as member states have not fully transferred their economic policy powers to the EU.
- 24.
On the objectives of the Bundesbank’s monetary policy before monetary integration, which encompassed not only monetary stability, but arguably also full employment and economic growth, see Roth (2015).
- 25.
Public law scholarship and the Federal Constitutional Court speak of the principle of the tax state (Prinzip des Steuerstaats), Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitution Court], Case No. 2 BvL 9/85 and 3/86, 78 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 249, 266 f.
- 26.
See Article 109:3 Basic Law, §4 Stabilitätsgesetz.
- 27.
Article 282:1 TFEU.
- 28.
Article 127:2 TFEU.
- 29.
Article 127:1 TFEU.
- 30.
According to Article 130 TFEU, neither ECB nor national central banks shall seek or take instructions from EU institutions or member state governments; Article 282:3 obliges the ECB to independently exercise its powers and manage its finances.
- 31.
Article 121:1 TFEU.
- 32.
Article 126 TFEU. The reference values are 3 % of GDP for government budget deficits and 60 % of GDP for government debt.
- 33.
In the course of the eurocrisis, the Stability and Growth Pact was reformed inter alia through the so-called 6-pack legislation.
- 34.
Article 125 TFEU.
- 35.
Article 123:1 TFEU.
- 36.
- 37.
See, e.g., Herrmann (2010), p. 149. It should be noted that the function of money to serve as means of payment frequently appears to be subsumed under the function as medium of exchange. This lack of distinction indicates that money is taken to have an existence as medium of exchange that is independent of the legal order that makes it into a means of payment by declaring it legal tender.
- 38.
Waldhoff (2007), para. 9.
- 39.
Herrmann (2010), p. 145.
- 40.
Dostoyevsky (1862).
- 41.
- 42.
Quoted in Friedman (1962) and from there requoted in numerous legal treatises on money.
- 43.
Waldhoff (2007), para. 1.
- 44.
- 45.
Vogel (2004), para. 19.
- 46.
- 47.
Herrmann (2010), p. 149 (author’s translation); the original reads:
Aus der Sicht des Staates tritt hinzu [zur Funktion des Geldes als Tauschmittel, Maßeinheit und Wertübertragungs- und Wertaufbewahrungsmittel], dass erst die Existenz von Geld ihm die Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter sowie die weitläufigen Möglichkeiten wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Lenkung nach Maßgabe eigener, demokratisch gesetzter Ziel- und Zweckvorstellungen ermöglicht; hängen diese doch davon ab, dass der Staat den von ihm beanspruchten Teil des wirtschaftlichen Erfolgs seiner Bürger nicht in Naturalien sondern als Finanz- und Steuerstaat in Geld abschöpfen und dann für seine Zwecke verwenden kann.
Not only can money be used to discharge governments’ fiscal obligations, the existence of money also makes possible the taxation of income, expenditures, and production of services. See Goodhart (1998), p. 416.
- 48.
- 49.
Cf. also Streeck’s observation of the adherence by recent German social theory to the economic concept of money as a politically neutral medium of exchange: Streeck (2015), pp. 9–10. On the account of the evolution of money in mainstream economics and an alternative, cartalist, account, which stresses the central role of the state, see Goodhart (1998). Regarding the success of economic accounts of money that explain its evolution independent of the state, Goodhart hypothesizes that it “may also reflect economists’ normative preference for systems determined by private sector cost minimization rather than messier political factors.” Goodhart (1998), p. 409.
- 50.
- 51.
Vogel (2004), para. 52.
- 52.
- 53.
Isensee and Kirchhof (eds.) (2007) contains separate chapters written by different authors on the constitution of finance and the constitution of money, including: Waldhoff (2007) and Schmidt (2007); on the constitution of money, see Herrmann (2010); Hahn and Häde (2010); on the constitution of finance, see Kloepfer (2014).
- 54.
See also Goodhart (1998), p. 416 (making a similar point with reference to economics and the lack of analysis of the linkages between money and taxation). The linkages between money and finance are manifold, including, but not limited to, the role of sovereign bonds in the money creation process, the impact of monetary policy on the interest yields of sovereign bonds and money creation by commercial banks. To close the research gap on these linkages collaboration with private lawyers is needed. The work of Christine Desan fills the lacuna as concerns money and finance in early modern England. Desan (2014, 2015); on the links between sovereign bonds and money creation by central banks, see also Ingham (2004), ch. 7.
- 55.
- 56.
Additional support for the state’s responsibility to protect the value of money is derived from the private law principle of nominalism, according to which the value of money depends on its nominal value; put differently nominalism means that the extent of a payment obligation is generally determined nominally and not by the purchasing power of money, Hahn and Häde (2010), pp. 32 f.
- 57.
As was already indicated, the view that money “can do without the state” finds ample support in economics; Friedrich Hayek, for example, advocated a denationalization of money. See Hayek (1977).
- 58.
- 59.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1877/97, 97 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 350 (31 March 1998).
- 60.
Schmidt (2007), para. 23.
- 61.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92, 89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 155, 174 (12 Oct. 1993).
- 62.
- 63.
Ohler (2015), p. 2 (citing Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz).
- 64.
In public choice terms, this situation is referred to as the time inconsistency problem.
- 65.
The link between the value of money and price stability is provided by purchasing power as a generally accepted expression of the value of money. See Ohler (2015), p. 8.
- 66.
See Schmidt (2007), para. 5.
- 67.
See Kämmerer (2013), para. 5.
- 68.
The treaty amendment procedure is laid down in Article 48 TEU.
- 69.
Zioli and Selmayr (2001), pp. 32–35. In preparation of monetary integration, the German constitution was amended and Article 88, clause 2 Basic Law now expressly provides for a European Central Bank “committed to the overriding goal of assuring price stability.”
- 70.
See Mundell (1961).
- 71.
See Eichengreen and Frieden (1993).
- 72.
Goodhart (1998). A further line of critique stresses how central banks and monetary policy play varying roles in different political economies and that a model of central banking that worked well for Germany could have detrimental effects on differing political economies of other EU member states, see Scharpf (2011).
- 73.
Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra note 61; the English translation is available at: http://www.judicialstudies.unr.edu/JS_Summer09/JSP_Week_1/German%20ConstCourt%20Maastricht.pdf (quote at 30).
- 74.
Id. p. 31 (emphasis added). The Court reiterated this finding in its ruling of 14 Jan 2014 on OMT:
Nevetheless, this restriction [of democratic legitimation] is still compatible with democratic principles because it takes the tested and scientifically documented special character of monetary policy into account that an independent central bank is more likely to safeguard monetary stability, and thus the economic basis, for budgetary policies, than state bodies whose actions depend on money supply and value and which need to rely on short-term approval by political forces.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13, 134 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 366 (14 Jan. 2014), para. 59 (note the weakening of “scientifically proven“ into “scientifically documented“).
- 75.
Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra note 61, p. 29.
- 76.
Id. p. 30.
- 77.
Id.
- 78.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 987/10; 2 BvR 1485/10; 2 BvR 1099/10, 129 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 124 (7 Sept. 2011).
- 79.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 2/08; 2 BvE 5/08; 2 BvR 1010/08; 2 BvR 1022/08; 2 BvR 1259/08; 2 BvR 182/09, 123 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 267 (30 June 2009) para. 252.
- 80.
Cf. Herrmann (2012), p. 807.
- 81.
- 82.
See Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra note 74.
- 83.
Cf. Roberto Unger’s critique of rationalizing legal analysis in Unger (1996), p. 8.
- 84.
Eichengreen (2012). Ironically, the current expansive policy of the ECB, the governmental institution furthest removed from the electorate, appears aimed not only at stimulating the economy, but increasingly also at protecting social stability in Europe.
- 85.
Roubini speaks of unconventional unconventional monetary policy. See Roubini (2016). The ECB’s newest addition to its unconventional monetary policy arsenal is the program commenced in June 2016 under which the ECB purchases company bonds: Decision (EU) 2016/948 of the European Central Bank of 1 June 2016 on the implementation of the corporate sector purchase programme (ECB/2016/16), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html.
- 86.
Plickert (2013).
- 87.
Trichet (2010).
- 88.
Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:7 (14 Jan. 2015), para. 110.
- 89.
See, e.g., Draghi (2015a).
- 90.
See Goldmann (2014).
- 91.
Trichet (2010).
- 92.
Id.
- 93.
Mersch (2015).
- 94.
Bank of England (2012), p. 254.
- 95.
Bank of International Settlements (2016), p. 63.
- 96.
Draghi (2015b).
- 97.
Transcript of the Hearing at the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (2015): “You asked also whether this [higher inflation] is the only reason we are actually doing this, and whether price stability is the only reason? Well, the answer is yes; we are bound by the mandate. The mandate speaks only of price stability.” Id. p. 10.
- 98.
Cf. also Christian Joerges’ assessment that in the course of the eurocrisis management an authoritarian executive managerialism has come to replace democratic processes, see Joerges (2014b).
- 99.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13, 134 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 366 (14 Jan 2014).
- 100.
- 101.
This shadow may explain why in Germany high tax income currently does not lead to increased public investments. While expansive monetary policy results in low interest rates on sovereign bonds and thus a good budgetary situation this may change at the hand of the ECB and the budget may again be strained due to increased debt service.
- 102.
- 103.
- 104.
- 105.
Cf. Marx (1867), ch. 1.
- 106.
Graeber (2011), ch. 2.
- 107.
Mitchell-Innes (1913), p. 14.
- 108.
Id. p. 19.
- 109.
Id. p. 15.
- 110.
Id. p. 16.
- 111.
Id. p. 31; with this theory Mitchell-Innes also dispels the standard economic account that credit succeeds the emergence of money, id. p. 27.
- 112.
Id. p. 31.
- 113.
See Goodhart (2015).
- 114.
McLeay et al. (2014), p. 7.
- 115.
Desan (2015), p. 27.
- 116.
Goodhart (2015).
- 117.
See Herrmann (2010).
- 118.
Schmidt (2007), para. 5; Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra note 61, p. 31.
- 119.
See Mitchell-Innes (1913), p. 27.
- 120.
Id. p. 29.
- 121.
Graeber (2011), ch. 2.
- 122.
For examples, see Mitchell-Innes (1913), pp. 19, 26.
- 123.
Knapp (1905).
- 124.
Desan (2015), p. 24.
- 125.
See Vogl (2015).
- 126.
Id. p. 76.
- 127.
Id. p. 80.
- 128.
Id. p. 94.
- 129.
Desan (2014), ch. 8.
- 130.
The Bank of England was created when a group of private investors extended a loan to the government of England to be dispensed in the form of bank notes. These notes became acceptable as means of payment as they could be exchanged for species and could be used to redeem tax obligations to the government.
- 131.
Desan (2015), p. 27.
- 132.
- 133.
- 134.
See Kämmerer (2013), para. 5.
- 135.
See Mosler (2010). To be sure, the legal architecture of money in the European Union currently does not allow an implementation of Lerner’s theory of functional finance. Implementation would require a different institutional design.
- 136.
Knapp (1905).
- 137.
Lerner (1943), p. 39.
- 138.
Spending can be financed either by borrowing or issuing money. According to Lerner, governments should only borrow if they hold it desirable that the public has less money and more government bonds (Lerner’s 2nd law of functional finance). Id. p. 40.
- 139.
Id.
- 140.
Lerner (1947).
- 141.
- 142.
Graeber (2011), p. 384.
- 143.
Cf. Specht (2015).
- 144.
Graeber (2011), p. 25.
- 145.
Goodhart (1998), p. 409.
- 146.
Unger (1996), p. 27.
- 147.
Id.
- 148.
Id. p. 189.
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Feichtner, I. (2018). Public Law’s Rationalization of the Legal Architecture of Money: What Might Legal Analysis of Money Become?. In: Goldmann, M., Steininger, S. (eds) Democracy and Financial Order: Legal Perspectives. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 273. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55568-2_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55568-2_10
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Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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