Abstract
The chapter attempts to explore the fate of law and democracy in the euro crisis from the sociological perspective of systems theory. It consecutively ascertains the performance, the relevance, and the function of the law with regard to the current practice of restructuring sovereign debt in the euro area. While novel forms of regulation such as the European Stability Mechanism attest a remarkable assertiveness of the law, they cannot effectively command economic recovery and must cede to economic imperatives for their part. Under such circumstances, the law can no longer adequately fulfill its function to counterfactually secure normative expectations. Nevertheless, the regulatory experiments in the euro crisis may not be regarded as undemocratic. Rather, the heterarchical processes of mutual observation, recognition, and contestation among the various constituencies involved, including representatives of governments, institutions of the European Union, central banks, national parliaments and peoples via referenda, as well as European and national courts, provide some substitute for the lack of elections and parliamentary decision-making at the European level.
Revised version of the original published article “The Limits of Law (and Democracy) in the Euro Crisis: An Approach from Systems Theory” by Lars Viellechner, German Law Journal 17(5):747–762
Notes
- 1.
For an overview of the legal instruments, see de Gregorio Merino (2012), p. 1613.
- 2.
See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400 (16 June 2015); Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756 (27 Nov. 2012).
- 3.
For the German perspective, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 142 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 123 (21 June 2016); 135 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 317 (18 March 2014); 134 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 366 (14 Jan. 2014); 132 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 195 (12 Sept. 2012); 131 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 152 (19 June 2012); 130 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 318 (28 Feb. 2012); 129 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 124 (7 Sept. 2011).
- 4.
- 5.
See von Bogdandy and Goldmann (2013), p. 39.
- 6.
Goldmann and Steininger, chapter “A Discourse Theoretical Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Towards a Democratic Financial Order”.
- 7.
See generally Luhmann (1995 [1984]).
- 8.
See Luhmann (1971), p. 1; Luhmann (1985 [1972]), pp. 255–264; Luhmann (2004 [1993]), pp. 479–490.
- 9.
See the contributions in Kjaer et al (2011).
- 10.
See Luhmann (1995 [1984]), pp. 12–58.
- 11.
Briggs (1961), p. 221; Luhmann (1990 [1981]).
- 12.
Luhmann (1998), p. 369 (my translation).
- 13.
Luhmann (1992a), p. 1419.
- 14.
See Luhmann (1990), p. 176.
- 15.
Luhmann (1985 [1972]), pp. 259–260.
- 16.
Habermas (1998 [1996]), p. 251.
- 17.
- 18.
Luhmann (1992b), p. 397.
- 19.
- 20.
Teubner (2011), p. 3.
- 21.
- 22.
Luhmann (1966) p. 36.
- 23.
See ESM (2012), art. 13(3).
- 24.
See Eur. Comm’n (2015).
- 25.
- 26.
Henkin (1979), p. 47.
- 27.
See Eur. Comm’n (2018).
- 28.
See Ladeur (2014), pp. 148–151.
- 29.
Luhmann (2004 [1993]), p. 487.
- 30.
Id., p. 481. For an illustration regarding the case of Brazil, see Neves (1992).
- 31.
See Luhmann (2004 [1993]), pp. 142–172.
- 32.
Id., p. 148.
- 33.
See Luhmann (1985 [1972]), pp. 31–40. For an obnoxious example of the distinction between normative and cognitive expectations, see id., p. 33:
Suppose, for example, one is waiting for a new secretary. This situation contains both cognitive and normative components of expectation. To be sure, the fact that she could be young, pretty and blonde may be cognitively expected; but in these respects it is necessary to adapt to disappointments, i. e. not to insist on blonde hair, ask for it to be dyed, etc. However, it is normatively expected that she should achieve something.
- 34.
See Luhmann (1971), pp. 10–17; Luhmann (1985 [1972]), pp. 261–264.
- 35.
Luhmann (1985 [1972]), p. 262.
- 36.
Id., p. 261.
- 37.
Joerges (2014), p. 251.
- 38.
Kleine (2013).
- 39.
- 40.
- 41.
- 42.
- 43.
See ESM (2012).
- 44.
- 45.
See ESM (2012), arts. 13, 37–38.
- 46.
- 47.
See ESM (2012), art. 13(3).
- 48.
- 49.
- 50.
See cases cited supra notes 2–3.
- 51.
See, e.g., Case C-226/13, Fahnenbrock and Others v. Hellenic Republic, ECLI:EU:C:2015:383 (11 June 2015).
- 52.
- 53.
See Beck (1992 [1986]); Ewald (1986).
- 54.
- 55.
See ESM (2012), art. 13(1).
- 56.
Id., art. 13(7).
- 57.
See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1390/12 et al., 135 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 317, 371 (18 March 2014).
- 58.
See Luhmann (1985 [1972]), p. 262.
- 59.
Id.
- 60.
Id., p. 264.
- 61.
See ESM (2015).
- 62.
Luhmann (1985 [1972]), p. 262.
- 63.
Luhmann (2004 [1993]), p. 404.
- 64.
See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 et al., 142 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 123 (21 June 2016).
- 65.
See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 et al., 134 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 366 (14 Jan. 2014).
- 66.
See, e.g., Avgouleas (2012).
- 67.
See, e.g., Moloney (2014).
- 68.
See Pistor (2013), p. 315.
- 69.
- 70.
- 71.
See also Goldmann and Steininger, chapter “A Discourse Theoretical Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Towards a Democratic Financial Order”.
- 72.
In a different context, see Peters (2007), p. 273.
- 73.
For a related concept of democracy within the nation-state, see Rosanvallon (2008 [2006]). For some applications to international law, see Krisch (2010), pp. 264–276; Ley (2015), p. 717.
- 74.
Ladeur (2004), p. 113.
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Viellechner, L. (2018). The Limits of Law (and Democracy) in the Euro Crisis: An Approach from Systems Theory. In: Goldmann, M., Steininger, S. (eds) Democracy and Financial Order: Legal Perspectives. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 273. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55568-2_3
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