Abstract
This chapter combines historical evidence and social-psychology insights to contend that “coherent” Supreme Courts—those with five or more Justices who agree on crucial issues—are far more likely to overrule precedents, and to aggressively attempt to create broad precedents, than are “incoherent” Courts. The author explains the social-psychology dynamics that contribute to the formation (or absence) of coherent Court majorities. He then surveys three historical periods to illustrate the divergent behavior of coherent versus incoherent Courts: the post-1936 New Deal Court, which was highly coherent on most issues and thus ambitious in both overturning and establishing precedent; the Warren Court, which was incoherent and cautious before 1962 but became coherent and aggressive thereafter; and the Rehnquist Court, which was incoherent on most issues (dominated by two centrist swing Justices) and thus adopted a minimalist approach toward precedent. The author concludes with a preliminary analysis of the Roberts Court, suggesting that it is generally incoherent and therefore reluctant to formally overrule precedent in most areas.
This chapter draws from “Ideological Cohesion and Precedent” (Devins 2008) and “The Supreme Court, Social Psychology, and Group Formation” (Devins and Federspiel 2010). The author thanks C. J. Peters for helping him think through the structure and content of the chapter.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
This broad agreement includes the work of Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth (2002), who argue that Justices vote their policy preferences; of Lee Epstein and Jack Knight (1998), who argue that Justices are policy-seekers who take potential resistance to their decisions into account in order to “move the substantive content of law as close as possible to their preferred policy positions”; and of Howard Gillman (2001), who argues that legal considerations play a significant role alongside policy considerations in Supreme Court decisionmaking.
- 2.
See Lawrence Baum’s Judges and Their Audiences for general background (2006).
- 3.
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Justice Kennedy’s unexpected votes in those cases were discussed in popular media at the time, including Terry Eastland’s (1993, 32) article “The Tempting of Justice Kennedy.”
- 4.
Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491–92 (1938) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
- 5.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
- 6.
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
- 7.
See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
- 8.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See Keith Whittington’s “Congress Before the Lochner Court” (2005, 821–23) for a brief overview of the significance of the Supreme Court during the Lochner era.
- 9.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2000).
- 10.
354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957).
- 11.
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263–64 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 306–07 (1965).
- 12.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
- 13.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). The Court in Dred Scott infamously held that slaves, former slaves, and descendants of slaves could not be citizens and declared that Congress had no power to prohibit slavery in the territories.
- 14.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
- 15.
60 U.S. 393 (1856).
- 16.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
- 17.
521 U.S 702, 720 (1997).
- 18.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
- 19.
478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
- 20.
521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
- 21.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
- 22.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
- 23.
521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
- 24.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
- 25.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
- 26.
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
- 27.
551 U.S. 449 (2007).
- 28.
551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007).
- 29.
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
- 30.
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
- 31.
Id. at 740–48.
- 32.
559 U.S. 50 (2010).
- 33.
130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
- 34.
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
- 35.
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
- 36.
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
References
Ackerman B (1999) Taxation and the Constitution. Columbia Law Rev 99(1):1–58
A regrettable decision (1960) New York Times, March 2
Arrow H, McGrath J, Berdahl J (2000) Small groups as complex systems. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks
Baum L (2006) Judges and their audiences: a perspective on judicial behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Baum L, Devins N (2010) Why the Supreme Court cares about elites, not the American people. Georgetown Law J 98(6):1515–1581
Berger R (1984) The activist legacy of the new deal court. Wash Law Rev 59(4):751–793
Caplan L (2012) “The most conservative Supreme Court”, taking note (blog), New York Times, October 1, http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/the-most-conservative-supreme-court/?ref=affordablecareact
Cushman B (2000) Formalism and realism in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Univ Chicago Law Rev 67(4):1089–1150
Devins N (2008) Ideological cohesion and precedent (or why the court only cares about precedent when most justices agree with each other). N C Law Rev 86(5):1399–1442
Devins N, Federspiel W (2010) The Supreme Court, social psychology, and group formation. In: The psychology of judicial decision making. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 85–102
Eastland T (1993) The tempting of Justice Kennedy. Am Spectator 26(2):32–37
Epstein L, Jacobi T (2008) Super medians. Stanford Law Rev 61(1):37–99
Epstein L, Knight J (1998) The choices justices make. CQ Press, Washington, DC
Forsyth DR (1999) Group dynamics, 3rd edn. Wadsworth Publishing Co., Belmont
Friedman B (2010) The wages of stealth overruling (with particular attention to Miranda v. Arizona). Georgetown Law J 99(1):1–63
Friedman LM (2002) The Rehnquist Court: some more or less historical comments. In: Belsky M (ed) The Rehnquist Court: a retrospective. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 143–158
Funston RY (1977) Constitutional counterrevolution? The Warren Court and the Burger Court: judicial policy making in modern America. Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc., Cambridge, MA
Gillman H (2001) What’s law got to do with it? Judicial behavioralists test the ‘legal model’ of judicial decision making. Law Soc Inq 26(2):465–504
Greenburg JC (2007) Supreme conflict: the inside story of the struggle for control of the United States Supreme Court. Penguin Press, New York
Heck E (1980) Justice Brennan and the heydey of Warren court liberalism. Santa Clara Law Rev 20(3):841–887
Irons PH (1982) The New Deal lawyers. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Kirman I (1995) Standing apart to be a part: the precedential value of Supreme Court concurring opinions. Columbia Law Rev 95(8):2083–2119
Lazarus E (2003) “The pivotal role of justice Anthony Kennedy: why the Supreme Court’s romantic may only become more influential over time”, Findlaw’s Writ, August 3, 2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20030807.html
Leary MR (1996) Self-presentation: impression management and interpersonal behavior. Westview Press, Boulder
Maltzman F, Wahlbeck PJ (1996) Strategic policy considerations and voting fluidity on the Burger Court. Am Pol Sci Rev 90(3):581–592
Murphy WF (1962) Congress and the Court: a case study in the American political process. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Nagel RF (2006) Bowing to precedent. Wkly Stand 11(29):24–28
Palmer B (1999) Issue fluidity and agenda setting on the Warren Court. Pol Res Q 52(1):39–65
Peters CJ (2008) Under-the-table overruling. Wayne Law Rev 54(3):1067–1104
Posner RA (2008) How judges think. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Powe LA Jr (2002) The Warren Court and American politics. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Reagan R (1983) The public papers of the presidents of the United States, book 1. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC
Reagan R (1984) Abortion and the conscience of the nation. Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville
Republican Party Platform of 1984 (1984) Republican National Convention Committee on Resolutions, Congressional Quarterly Almanac 40/55-B (1984)
Roosevelt F (1938) The public papers and addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, volume two, the year of crisis, 1933. Random House, New York
Rosen J (2005) Rehnquist the great? Atl Mon 295(3):79–90
Segal JA, Spaeth HJ (2002) The Supreme Court and the attitudinal model revisited. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Schwartz B (1993) A history of the Supreme Court. Oxford University Press, New York
Sunstein CR (2006) Problems with minimalism. Stanford Law Rev 58(6):1899–1918
Tushnet M (1993) The Warren Court as history: an interpretation. In: Tushnet M (ed) The Warren Court in historical and political perspective. University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, pp 1–35
Tushnet M (2005) A court divided: the Rehnquist Court and the future of constitutional law. W. W. Norton & Co., New York
Urofsky MI (2001) The Warren Court: justices, rulings, and legacy. ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara
Warren E (1977) The memoirs of Earl Warren. Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City
Whittington KE (2005) Congress before the Lochner Court. Boston Univ Law Rev 85(3):821–858
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Devins, N. (2013). Group Formation and Precedent. In: Peters, C. (eds) Precedent in the United States Supreme Court. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7951-8_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7951-8_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-7950-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-7951-8
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawLaw and Criminology (R0)