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Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 7))

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Abstract

For all that intentional action is the paradigmatic form of mens rea, knowledge and foresight rival it as crucial elements of responsible agency. To intend one’s conduct or its consequences presupposes knowledge of relevant circumstances and of causal connections. So too, both strong and weak intentionality require foresight of consequences, either as possible or as practically certain. Although to know and foresee is not to intend, to intend is to know and foresee.

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Notes

  1. See: Fletcher (1971), 403-405 and 436–437; dicta by Justice Holmes in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165 (1884).

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  2. Aristotle, Nich. Eth., Bk 3. Hegel(1977), 80.

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  3. Aquinas (1973), 203.

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  4. Hart (1968), Hall (1960), and see Ch. 6, n.1, supra.

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  5. Holmes (1963), 46; cf. his claim that there must be actual knowledge: ibid, 45–47.

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  6. For discussion of connivance, see Edwards (1954), 298ff.

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  7. People v. Howk, 56 Cal. 2d 687 (1961).

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  8. Example from Williams (1961), 59–61.

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  9. Critics include: Hart (1968), Husak (1987), Fletcher (1978), Gross (1979), Baker (1987), Sistare (forthcoming).

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  10. Hall (1963), 634. It is his view that negligence liability attaches to inadvertence rather than to the behavior: ibid, 634; and (1960), 120.

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  11. Salmond (1910), 21–22.

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  12. See Hart (1968), 146.

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  13. See n. 35, supra.

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  14. See Robinson (1977), 124–126. And see the discussion of “the British view” in Ch. 6, supra.

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  15. Hall (1963), 641; also see Hall (1960), 137–139.

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  16. Hall (1960), 114.

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  17. Hart (1968), 134.

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  18. MPC (1955), sec. 2.02, Comments.

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  19. Hart (1968), 149.

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  20. See Lon Fuller (1964), 70ff.

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  21. See O’Hearn (1965), 11:419.

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  22. See Ch. 6, supra: pp. 111 & 113.

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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Sistare, C.T. (1989). Knowledge and Foresight. In: Responsibility and Criminal Liability. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2440-6_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2440-6_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7601-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2440-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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