Abstract
Traditionally, the main preoccupations of philosophy of science were the justification or refutation of the conclusions of science; critical study of methodology; the pursuit of truth presupposing the quest for certainty; search for absolutes and universals; discarding the ‘merely’ psychological or merely sociological. Reason in philosophy of science was epistemic reason. History of science, while in an historiographies turmoil for decades, was mainly preoccupied with the history of Western science, and especially (though not exclusively) its successes; it was either a Marxist influenced analysis of ideas following socio-economic needs or a history of disembodied ideas. The latter presupposed that only ideas beget ideas and that an idea, once conceived, can be taken up or dropped, used or abused by an ‘external’ factor like society, with its political ideology and technical needs.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes and References
Nelson Goodman in his ‘Ways of Worldmaking’, The Harvester Press, 1978, p. 1.
J. Bruner and A. Gorton (eds.): Human Growth and Development; M. Cole, J. Gay, J. Glick and D. Sharp: The Cultural Context of Learning and Thinking, Methuen, London; M. Cole and Sylvia Scribner: Culture and Thought, John Wiley;
A. R. Luria: Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations, Harvard Univ. Press, 1976;
L. S. Vygotsky: Mind in Society (ed. by M. Cole et al.), Harvard Univ. Press, 1978.
C. Geertz: ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’, Chapter 1 of The Interpretation of Cultures, Basic Books, 1973, p. 5. The essays referred to by Geertz are: ‘Ideology as a Cultural System’ (1964, here up pp. 193–233) and ‘Religion as a Cultural System’ (pp. 78–125), and the more recent ‘Common Sense as a Cultural System’, Antioch Review, 1972.
R. N. Adams in ‘Reviews of Anthropology’ 1 (1974), p. 283.
For a different view, see David M. Schneider: ‘Notes Toward a Theory of Culture’, in K. H. Besso and H. A. Selby (eds.), Meaning in Anthropology, Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1976, pp. 197–220.
P. Feyerabend, ‘Towards a Realistic Appraisal of Science’, (preprint).
Y. Elkana, op. cit., and ‘The Myth of Simplicity’, paper delivered at the Jerusalem Einstein Centennial Symposium, March 14–23, 1979.
P. Feyerabend: Against Method, New Left Books, 1975;
P. Feyerabend: ‘Problems of Empiricism II’, in R. Colodny (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theory, University of Pittsburgh, 1970, pp. 275–353.
P. K. Machamer: ‘Feyerabend and Galileo: The Interaction of Theories and the Reinterpretation of Experience’, St. Hist. Phil. Sci. 4 (1973), pp. 1–46,
and M. Calvelin: The Natural Philosophy of Galileo: Essays on the Origins and Formation of Classical Mechanics, MIT Press, 1974.
Ibid., p. 32.
C. Geertz, ‘From the Native’s Point of View’, in K. H. Besso and H. A. Selby (eds.), Meaning in Anthropology, Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1976, Lap Besso and Selby (eds.), op. cit., p. 235.
I tried to enlarge upon that in ‘Images of Knowledge, Qualitative Indicators and Science Policy’, Proc. of the First International Conference for the Social Studies of Science, Cornell University, 1976, 1–31.
Bruce S. Eastwood in: ‘Grosseteste’s “Qualitative” Law of Refraction: A Chapter in Non-experimental Science’, J. Hist. Ideas 28 (1967), pp. 403–414 describes the Neoplatonic images of knowledge in R. Grosseteste and shows what was the source of his mistaken finding that “a ray passing from a less dense medium will be bent towards the normal so that its path in the second medium is at an angle equal to half the angle of incidence” (p. 403). This, in spite of the fact that Grosseteste was the first to attempt to determine the angle of refraction. Eastwood draws the conclusion that Crombie was wrong in seeing Grosseteste as a great experimenter. In spite of Crombie’s partial revision of his thesis in the Preface of the 1962 reprint of his: ‘R. Grosseteste and the Origins of the Experimental Science’ (Oxford University Press, 1953), I think Crombie was right in his original claim that Grosseteste was an early and great experimenter. This is fully consistent with the fact that Grosseteste, following the hierarchy of sources of knowledge of his time, allowed himself to be ruled by his primary image of knowledge.
See: D. C. Lindberg and H. Stenech, ‘The Sense of Vision and the Origins of Modern Science’, in A. Debus (ed.), Science, Medicine and Society in the Renaissance, Vol. I, London, 1972, 29–45.
David C. Lindberg: ‘John Pecham and the Science of Optics: Perspectiva Communis’, University of Wisconsin Press, 1970, 131.
Ibid., proposition I. 36 (39), p. 121.
Ibid., proposition I. 74 (71), p. 157.
Ibid., proposition II. 29.
Ibid., proposition I. 62 (66), p. 141.
Ibid., proposition II. 6, p. 161.
Ibid., proposition I. 3 (41) pp. 121–123.
David C. Lindberg: ‘Alhazen’s Theory of Vision and its Reception in the West’, ISIS 58 (1967), p. 323.
That Grosseteste, Bacon, Pecham and Witelo followed Alhazen and no ‘retrogression’ occurred, as Ronchi claims, is convincingly shown by D. C. Lindberg ‘Alhazen’stheory …’, op. cit.
Ibid., proposition I (27), p. 109.
Lindberg, ‘John Pecham’, op. cit., p. 40.
For a succinct statement of this, see Crombie and North on Roger Bacon in D.S.B., I, 377–385.
K. Lorenz: ‘Analogy as a Source of Knowledge’, the Nobel Lecture, Science 185 (1974), pp. 229–234.
Ibid., p. 23.
See Horton, Robin and Finnegan, Ruth (eds.), Modes of Thought (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 11.
On this, see Ibid., p. 27 and my essay on this book: ‘The Distinctiveness and Universality of Science: Reflections on the Work of Professor Robin Horton’, Minerva XV (1977), pp. 155–173. Parts of this section first appeared there.
See especially Horton, Robin, ‘African Traditional Thought and Western Science’, Africa XXXVII (1967), pp. 50–71,
155–185.
Skorupski, John, Symbol and Theory: A Philosophical Study of Theories of Religion in Social Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
See especially Horton, R., op. cit.; and ‘Beings and Elementary Particles: A Reply to Mr. Pratt’, Second Order I (1972), pp. 21–33.
Beattie, John, ‘Understanding Traditional African Religion: A Comment on Horton’, Second Order II (1973), pp. 3–11. Though Beattie says that he does not simply conflate scientific thought with instrumentality, yet he says that scientific procedures “are believed to be effective” and “are regarded instrumentally”.
See also Pratt, V., ‘Science and Traditional African Religion’, Second Order I (1972), p. 7;
Horton, R., ‘Beings and Elementary Particles: A Reply to Mr. Pratt’, ibid., pp. 21–33.
On this, see Horton’s most recent work: ‘Understanding African Traditional Religion: A Reply to Beattie’, Second Order V (1976), pp. 3–29.
Hallpike, C. R., ‘Is There a Primitive Mentality?’, Man, n.s. II, 2 (1976), pp. 253–270.
Havelock, Eric A., Origins of Western Literacy (Toronto: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1976), pp. i-vii,
1–88. This is a brilliant study of the origins of syllabaries and the genuine (i.e. Greek) alphabet, its merits, limitations and role in transmitting and shaping cultures.
See also Finnegan, Ruth, ‘Literacy vs non-Literacy: The Great Divide?’, in Horton, R., and Finnegan, R. (eds.), op. cit., pp. 112–144.
Ibid. See also Finnegan, Ruth, Oral Literature in Africa (Oxford: Claiendon Press, 1970).
Goody, J. R., ‘What’s in a List?’, unpublished manuscript. See also Havelock, Eric A., Prologue to Greek Literacy (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), pp. 331–391.
Ibid., p. 377.
Greenfield, P. M. and Bruner, J. S., ‘Culture and Cognitive Growth’, International Journal of Psychology I (1966), p. 89.
Goody J. and Watt, I., op. cit., p. 29.
Geertz, Clifford, ‘Common Sense as a Cultural System’, op. cit.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Geertz, Clifford, ‘From the Native’s Point of View’, in Basso, K. and Selby, H. (eds.), Meaning in Anthropology (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), pp. 221–237.
See Gellner, Ernest, ‘The Savage and the Modern Mind’, in Horton, R. and Finnenegan, R., op. cit., p. 162.
Thomas, Keith, Religion and the Decline of Magic (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971);
Webster, Charles, The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform 1626–1660 (London: Duckworth, 1975).
Wright, Peter, ‘Astrology and Science in Seventeenth Century England’, Social Studies of Science V (1975), pp. 399–427.
Gellner, E., op. cit., p. 166.
See Lakatos, Imre, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Lakatos, I. and Musgrave A. (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91–195;
and Lakatos, I., ‘History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions’, in Elkana, Yehuda (ed.), The Interaction between Science and Philosophy (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), pp. 194–241.
Gellner, E., op. cit., p. 172;
Lukes, Steven, ‘On the Social Determination of Truth’, in Horton R. and Finnegan R., op. cit., p. 230.
Horton, R. and Finnegan, R., op. cit., p. 55.
They are referring specifically to the work of Colby, B. and Cole, M., ‘Culture, Memory and Narrative’, ibid., pp. 63–91.
Chicago University Press, 1938.
Even as late as 1967 Bar-Hillel finds the main difference between Carnap and Popper in their different emphases: Carnap’s on justification and Popper’s on discovery. In Bar-Hillel’s view, this also explains the repeated misunderstandings between the two. He says: … let me first try to formulate clearly the difference of interest between Popper and Carnap in their treatment of science. In a nutshell, it seems to be this: Popper is primarily interested in the growth of scientific knowledge. Carnap in its rational reconstruction; or, to borrow terms from current methodology of linguistics: Popper’s philosophy of science is diachronically oriented, Carnap’s is synchronic. With still other metaphors, Popper’s conception is dynamic, Carnap’s is static. ‘Popper’s Theory of Corroboration’, in Schlipp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Open Court, 1974, Vol. I, 332–348.
Suppe: ‘The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories’, in F. Suppe (ed.), The Structure of Scientific Theories, University of Illinois, 1974, 126. Suppe’s book, in addition to being a very good summary, is also very interesting in his attempt, typical of his generation, at bridging the gap between the old positivism and the newer approaches, extracting the best from the old.
Suppe: ‘The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories’, in F. Suppe (ed.), The Structure of Scientific Theories, University of Illinois, 1974, Lap Ibid., p. 127. After that follows a thorough analysis of the work of Hanson, Toulmin, Kuhn and others on who developed alternatives to the ‘Received View’.
Mary Douglas, ‘Implicit Meanings’, op. cit.
Emile Meyerson, Identity and Reality, Dover, 1962, especially the chapter on ‘Law and Cause’ and on The Irrational’.
Mary Douglas, op. cit., p. xiv.
Ibid., p. xix.
P. Feyerabend: ‘Against Method’ op. cit., Ch. 14, p. 167. Since I quote Feyerabend often and I take some of his arguments very seriously, I should like to disclaim any affinity either with his methodological anarchism or with the related and, in my view, irresponsible attitude that ‘anything goes’.
E. Gellner: ‘Beyond Truth and Falsehood’, in The British Journal for the Phil, of Sei. 26, No. 4, p. 334.
Ibid.
Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant: Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1978, p. 3.
Quoted by Harold L. Davis in his editorial to the July 1976 issue of Physics Today, from a speech by Senator E. Kennedy.
Harold L. Davis in the January 1976 issue of Physics Today.
G. S. Stent: ‘Prematurity and Uniqueness in Scientific Discovery’, Scientific American, December 1972 and H. V. Wyatt: ‘Knowledge and Prematurity: The Journey from Transformation to DNA’, Perspectives in Biol. & Med. 18 (1975), pp. 149–156.
That is what Franklin Baumer means, although he does not use the term premature; when saying Every age boasts a fair number of intellectual ‘sports’, men who think ahead of their times, but the ideas of perhaps the majority of these advanced thinkers die still-born. Or else, like Catellio’s premature deism, they wait for general acceptance until, as we say, “the times are ripe”. Or else, like the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, they activate intellectual change not by being accepted but by provoking opposition and stimulating furious discussion …. The point is that ideas do not win their way by their own unaided power but only with the help of concomitant historical events, intellectual and otherwise. (Franklin K. Baumer: ‘Intellectual History and Its Problems’, J. Mod. Hist. XXI (1949), p. 193.
C. R. S. Harris: The Heart and the Vascular System in Ancient Greek Medicine, Oxford University Press, 1973.
P. Feyerabend: Against Method, op. cit., and ‘Problems of Empiricism II’, op. cit.
E. Hoppe: Geschichte der Optik, Wiesbaden, 1926. Reprinted 1967, 31–32.
E. Havelock: ‘Prologue to Greek Literacy’, in C. G. Boulter, et al.(eds.), Lectures in Memory of L. T. Semple, University of Cincinnati, Classical Studies II, University of Oklahoma Press, 1973, 331–391.
B. J. Shapiro: ‘Law and Science in 17th Century England’, Stanford Law Rev. 21 (1969), pp. 727–765.
D. C. Lindberg and N. H. Steneck: ‘The Sense of Vision and the Origin of Modern Science’, in A. Debus (ed.), Science, Medicine and Society in the Renaissance, London, 1972, I, 29–45,
p. 19.
V. Ronchi: ‘The General Influence of the Development of Optics in the 17th Century on Science of Technology’, Vistas of Astronomy IX (1968), pp. 123–133.
This in 1267! The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon, ed. by J. H. Bridges, London, 1900, Vol. II, 2–3.
The history of the explanation of the rainbow used to be a favourite with historians of science; Carl B. Boyer dedicated a whole book to it (N. Y. 1953). Crombie, in his Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of the Experimental Science 1100–1700, Oxford University Press, 1953, devoted much attention to it, pp. 248–259. The present argument is taken from David C. Lindberg: ‘Roger Bacon: Theory of the Rainbow: Progress or Regress’, ISIS 57 (1966), 235–248.
Ibid., p. 236.
On Theodoric of Freiberg see: William A., Wallace, O. P., The Scientific Methodology of Theodoric of Freiberg, Freiburg, Switzerland, Univ. Press, 1959, 174–226.
Y. Elkana, ‘The Conservation of Energy: A Case of Simultaneous Discovery?’, Arch. Intern. d'Hist. Sciences 90–91 (1970), pp. 31–60. Reprinted as an appendix to The Discovery of the Conservation of Energy, op. cit.
See also Norris S. Hethrington: ‘The Simultaneous “Discovery” of Internal Motions in Spiral Nebulae’, J. Hist. Astr. 6 (1975), pp. 115–125. Here simultaneous ‘discovery’ of a non-effect (a plain mistake) is reported. From the paper it is clear that the simultaneous discoverers were looking for different things. Had the effect been genuine, would the questions have been conflated by hindsight?
‘Is Physics Human?’, Physics Today, June 1976, p. 24.
I have tried to grapple with this issue several times: ‘Science, Philosophy of Science and Science-Teaching’, Educ. Phil. Theory 2 (1970), pp. 15–35. ‘Further Thoughts on the Relevance of History and Philosophy of Science for Science Teaching’ to appear in: Curriculum Implementation and Its Relationship to Curriculum Development in Science, Pinhas Tamir et al., (eds.), Israel Science Teaching Center, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1979.
Lynn White: ‘Technology Assessment from the Stance of a Medieval Historian’, Amer. Hist. Rev. 79 (1974), p. 13.
Charles Babbage: Reflections on the Decline of Science in England and on Some of its Causes, London, 1830.
Gerard Moll: On the Alleged Decline of Science in England by a Foreigner, London, 1831.
Einstein’s eulogy for Ernst Mach in 1916.
Towards a Metric of Science, Yehuda Elkana, Joshua Lederberg, Robert K. Merton, Arnold Thackray and Harriet Zuckerman (eds.), John Wiley and Sons, 1978.
Epicurus, ‘The Menoecus’ in Epicurus, the Extant Remains, Oxford, 1926, part 134. Quoted and adapted by John Russmore: Science and its Critics, Rutgers University Press, 1978, p. 29.
A. N. Whitehead: Science and the Modern World (Lowell Lectures, 1925), The Free Press, N. Y., 1969, p. 10.
Ibid.
Walter Benjamin: ‘Understanding Brecht’, NLB, 1973, p. 8.
William E. Lecky: History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne (European Sociology Series), Arno Press repr. 1975.
‘Temporis Partus Masculus’, in B. Farrington (ed.), The Philosophy of Francis Bacon, Liverpool University Press, 1970, p. 72.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1981 D. Reidel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Elkana, Y. (1981). A Programmatic Attempt at an Anthropology of Knowledge. In: Mendelsohn, E., Elkana, Y. (eds) Sciences and Cultures. Sociology of the Sciences a Yearbook, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8429-5_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8429-5_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1235-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-8429-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive